

WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1984

R9372-1



Refugees face much more than mere economic deprivation. They flee a past of persecution and suffering, and they face a future of homelessness. They are clusters of humanity left to endure the aftermath of terror: lost family members, lost possessions, lost hopes.

If we abandon our responsibility to uphold freedom by providing hope to those who are not free, to those terrorized by political persecution, then we have failed history and failed ourselves.

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES



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USCR was established in 1958 to inform the public about world refugee issues and populations. It set itself the tasks then of consulting regularly with government leaders and United Nations officials; stimulating research on refugee problems; and working closely with American voluntary agencies. Although created at government encouragement, USCR has always been privately supported. For a time in the 1970s it was closely associated with the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation.

On January 1, 1982, USCR and the American Council for Nationalities Service were formally merged under the laws of the state of New York. The continuing nonprofit corporation is ACNS; however, the distinctive USCR name and program of public information and advocacy regarding the world's refugees continue.

The year 1961 saw the first issue of the *World Refugee Survey*, then and annually since then a review of the status and fate of refugees around the world. Newsletters and pamphlets on refugee situations have supplemented this publication, including, in recent years, issue papers on Cambodian and Afghan refugees and pirate attacks on Vietnamese boat people.

Recent site visits to Thailand and Malaysia, Uganda and Rwanda, Pakistan and six countries in Central America have allowed staff to learn first-hand of circumstances of refugees and the agencies dedicated to assisting them. Published reports based on such visits are provided to governments and the public.

USCR corresponds with government officials in the U.S. and abroad, as well as with other refugee-oriented organizations around the world to assure attention to refugee problems, equitable and humane treatment of refugees in asylum countries, and safety of refugees in the ultimate resolution of their situations. Also, USCR cooperates closely with UN programs in the refugee field.

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WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1984

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1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

These two international legal instruments, adopted within the framework of the United Nations, govern refugee status on the universal level. Both provide for cooperation between signatories and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, including the determination of refugee status. The *Convention* was adopted by a conference of plenipotentiaries of the UN in 1951 and entered into force in 1954. It was intended to respond to a felt need, after World War II, to replace previous ad hoc agreements adopted in relation to specific refugee situations with a new international agreement which provided a general definition of who was to be considered a refugee.

That definition terms a refugee a person who,

[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

In addition to the basic definition covering who is, who is not, and who has ceased to be a refugee, the 1951 *Convention* contains provisions defining the legal status of refugees and their rights and duties in their country of refuge. These include rights to personal status; acquisition of property; and access to courts, employment, housing, education, public relief, and social security, largely in accordance with the rights of nationals or aliens generally in the country of refuge.

The 1951 dateline came about at the request of governments, which, at the time the *Convention* was adopted, wished to limit their obligations to refugee situations known to exist then or those which might arise subsequently from events (e.g. World War II) that had already occurred. Further, each contracting state was to declare, at the time it acceded to the *Convention*, any geographic limitations it would apply with regard to its obligations under the *Convention*.

States were also permitted at the time of accession to declare reservations to articles of the *Convention*. No reservations by signatories, however, would be permitted with regard to the general definition or articles pertaining to nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, or country of origin; freedom to practice religion; access to courts of law; protection from expulsion or return; facilitation of assimilation and naturalization; or numerous administrative articles.

Article 33, the prohibition of expulsion or return, often referred to as "nonrefoulement" states:

No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group, or political opinion.

The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

In later years, and with the emergence of new refugee situations, it was felt necessary to make the provisions of the 1951 *Convention* applicable to more recent refugees. As a result, a *Protocol* was prepared; it was opened for accession and entered into force in 1967. The *Protocol* is an independent instrument and states which did not ratify the *Convention* may be signatories to the *Protocol* (as, for example, the U.S.). Nevertheless, the *Protocol* binds signatories to the same substantive obligations as under the *Convention*, but without the 1951 dateline of the earlier instrument. Specifically, the *Protocol* defines a refugee as the *Convention* does with the omission of the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and . . ." and the words ". . . as a result of such events." The *Protocol* continues that its provisions are to be applied by signatories without any geographic limitation, except that limits of obligations declared by *Convention* signatories also apply under the *Protocol*.

The 1951 *Convention* and/or the 1967 *Protocol* have been acceded to by more than 90 states (see box on page 9).

Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation

These yearly reports, prepared by the Bureau for Refugee Programs/Department of State for submission to the U.S. Congress, include data on and analyses of refugee situations in over 90 areas of the world. The reports focus on refugees receiving some kind of international aid and are based on information from foreign governments, U.S. diplomatic missions, and international agencies.

Refugee Act of 1980

This act, also known as Public Law 96-212, is the first comprehensive legislative attempt by the U.S. to set national policy and administrative procedures for assistance, including domestic assistance to refugees. The act's objectives are "to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the U.S. and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted."

The act defines a refugee as

. . . any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; or in such special circumstances as the president after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

The Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, Public Law 97-363, were signed into law in October 1982. They reauthorize funds for the domestic refugee resettlement program under the Refugee Act of 1980. Because this reauthorization was for only one year, subsequent reauthorization of the act was to be required.



The Year in Review

Roger P. Winter



There have been, in the last year, some positive developments in the protection and treatment of refugees worldwide. But the quality of international standards has continued to erode. As the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported in June 1984, there have been "savage acts of piracy, armed attacks on refugee camps, acts of forcible return or rejection at the frontier, unjustifiable detention, and manifestations of xenophobia towards refugees."

There has been, in fact, a contradiction in the behavior of governments to which UNHCR has repeatedly and courageously pointed. On the one hand, more and more nations have formally accepted international refugee law and promulgated implementing national statutes. On the other hand, the practices of some nations, while often in the guise of historic refugee protection principles, have robbed those principles of their spirit and essence. Too often, the most restrictive reading of the law has become the performance standard.

Of the negative events in the last year, the following are representative:

Thailand was accused of several incidents in which authorities pushed off boatloads of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees, resulting in significant loss of life.

Hong Kong continued its policy of harsh treatment of Vietnamese refugees who land after fleeing their homeland by boat.

Zambia, having been involved on multiple occasions in forced repatriation of recognized refugees from Mo-

In the past year, pirate attacks on Vietnamese boat people have continued and become more savage. UNHCR

zambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe, has recently established itself as the worst offender against refugee protection principles on the continent north of South Africa.

Kenya and **Tanzania** involuntarily repatriated each other's dissidents, including a number of recognized refugees. Some of those exchanged have been sentenced to death and others imprisoned.

Sri Lanka has been the scene of ethnic violence which has caused thousands of Tamils to flee to India, western Europe, and elsewhere.

Uganda again precipitated a new displacement of thousands of ethnic Banyarwanda citizens and refugees. Some streamed to existing refugee settlements in Uganda and others crossed into Tanzania. Uganda also continued to be a stumbling block in the attempt to resolve the status of Banyarwanda who were displaced in 1982 and now reside in settlements in both Rwanda and Uganda.

Indonesia continued harsh policies in Irian Jaya resulting in an outflow of 10,000 to Papua New Guinea, which has itself considered the forcible expulsion of those refugees.

Guatemala has again been the base for attacks against refugee camps in Mexico.

Perhaps the most consistently violent experience has been that of Vietnamese boat people in the Gulf of Thailand. Without cease since boat flows began, boat people have been subject to attacks by pirates. They have been murdered, raped, and robbed in staggering num-

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bers and proportions. Despite efforts by some, including helpful initiatives by the U.S., the mayhem on the waters of the Gulf continues. In the last year, almost beyond credibility, the attacks have shown what the High Commissioner has called "a qualitative augmentation in the level of violence."

Developed countries, too, appear consistently in the negative column of the ledger. Europe has shown the uglier side of xenophobia of late and generally adopted precedent-setting restrictions on the granting of asylum. The U.S. has continued policies and practices which demonstrate a disregard for high standards of refugee protection—interdiction of Haitians at sea; involuntary return of Salvadorans to their homeland; unjustifiable, long-term detention of some illegal entrants seeking asylum. Refugee resettlement by the U.S. actually declined by 75 percent between FY 1980 and FY 1983, which ended September 30, 1983. In general, the U.S. has demonstrated a somewhat impaired ability to provide world leadership in this critical area of humanitarian concern.

There have been, of course, some real advances. The international system of burden-sharing continued to address the needs of refugees and their hosts in Pakistan, Sudan, and elsewhere. Many nations offered or continued to offer asylum to refugees in significant numbers. Mozambique joined the signatories of the *UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*. In the case of the U.S., new resettlement processing guidelines were finally issued in August 1983 to ameliorate confusion which surfaced in 1981. In addition, the U.S. took steps to help ensure that Thailand engaged in more effective anti-piracy efforts than those of the past several years and to obtain the release of political prisoners in Vietnam. It also vigorously pressed for improvement in Uganda's human rights practices which have produced hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons.

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Nevertheless, there is a danger of further tragedy for refugees and further eroding of the civilizing principles of behavior. If the international community is not to drift into further debasement of refugee protection and treatment standards, nations must act with greater clarity and

creativity. They must take the long view rather than react in short-sighted expediency. To do this, nations need an agenda they do not obviously have at present. In building that agenda, there are several important principles that must be taken into account.

First, the international community must recognize that the matter of refugees is not primarily one of immigration. The underlying principles concerning refugees are more akin to the field of human rights than that of immigration.

Secondly, it must recognize the fact that a well-articulated system of refugee protection and treatment has developed in the decades between 1950 and the present. By means of this system, governments have established moral standards, in effect, by which the world can judge a government's behavior towards its own citizens and the persecuted citizens of other governments. A system with great practical as well as humanitarian value, it is unusual among international agreements and it is worth preserving.

Third, nations must approach creatively the genuine problems that impinge on refugee protection so that the quality of refugee protection and treatment is not degraded. There are always options to approaching any such problems. Options which set a positive tone regarding worldwide refugee protection must be given more serious consideration and prominence than has been the case in decision-making over the last several years.

USCR recognizes that no government alone, nor even governments in concert, can be expected to move positively on all the important refugee issues that confront the world at any given time. They must, however, select those they can accommodate and then proceed with confidence and vigorous commitment if the international refugee system is to work.

The U.S. government bears a significant responsibility for the tenor of world behavior towards refugees. It was instrumental in building the current international refugee protection structure and it remains a mainstay of that structure. But over the last several years, the U.S. has responded inadequately to the need to buttress the international refugee protection system. Creativity and improved coordination within the U.S. government are necessary to reverse the trend of erosion.

Update

The Emigration and Repatriation of Soviet Jews: Current Trends

Jerry Goodman

Yuri Andropov's brief term in power saw, among other things, the solidification of a shift in policy toward Soviet Jews. The policy involved an effort to end emigration, an intensification of cultural and linguistic assimilation, and the severing of contacts between Soviet Jews and others abroad.

Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union had in-

creased steadily from 1970 to 1979, when 51,320 Jews left the country—most of them bound for Israel. However, restrictions imposed in 1980 and tightened last year sharply limited the number of Jews able to apply for emigration. Where once virtually all Soviet Jews with distant relatives in Israel could apply to emigrate, now only the small minority with parents or children there are eligible to apply.

In addition, new, restrictive laws were introduced, which appeared to be part of a general effort by Soviet leadership to tighten the internal control system, but had a special impact on Jews seeking to leave.

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The radical decline in emigration, begun during Brezhnev's final years, dropped to its lowest point since the late

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sixties. In 1983, 1,314 Jews left the Soviet Union, at a monthly average of about 100 people. In the peak year of 1979, over 4,000 left each month. It was the lowest annual total in 20 years and the fourth consecutive year that the number of Soviet Jews able to petition successfully for the right to leave had dropped sharply. The 1983 figure was only half that of 1982, when 2,688 left the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union contended that the decline reflected the fact that fewer Jews want to leave, but the data indicate that it is a deliberate policy and not the result of a decline in applicants.

According to the Soviet Jewry Research Bureau, the research arm of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, over 300,000 Jews had been sent invitations ("vizovs") needed to apply for emigration before Soviet authorities began blocking such invitations in 1980. An invitation from an Israeli relative is a prerequisite to the procedure of applying for an emigration visa. Many such invitations were intercepted in the mail and confiscated. Furthermore, bureaucratic restrictions on who might submit visa applications excluded tens of thousands from beginning the lengthy process.

The creation of an "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public" suggested that the authorities had decided to revoke the *de facto* claim of Jews to repatriation to Israel. If so, this would leave the narrowly defined concept of family reunification as the primary basis for emigrating. With the new limitations restricted to "first degree" relatives in Israel able to send affidavits to begin the process, the number of Jews eligible to apply was drastically reduced. The committee insisted that no more Jews wished to leave, calling evidence that thousands still sought permission "a juggling of figures by Zionist propaganda." Significantly, the wording used by the committee was that "family reunification essentially [had] been completed."

Composed of "Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality," some of whom have been used in the past as spokesmen for the regime, the Anti-Zionist Committee emphasized the inherently "Soviet" nature of Jews living in the USSR, which may portend a heightened attempt at encouraging assimilation. Due to its distinctly Jewish membership, it was seen as an effort to foster an impression of legitimacy, in response to continued Western criticism of Soviet emigration practices.

Jews were warned against trying to leave and having contacts with people in the West. This policy was implemented in part by the interception of mail, in violation of international law and standards, and by news accounts accusing Western tourists of "Zionist provocations."

Related measures made the process of applying to emigrate increasingly difficult. A decree, first introduced in Moscow, rendered visa applications invalid after six months, a period of time during which Soviet bureaucratic wheels barely begin to turn. As a result, applicants are forced to repeat the lengthy and painful procedure at regular intervals.

Vulnerable to dismissal from their jobs once they have submitted their documents to the visa office, Jews trying to emigrate were further threatened by a "Redundancy Law." Intended to streamline a "top-heavy bureaucracy," it encouraged the firing of individuals in managerial positions. Once fired, a person's chances of impris-

onment increased. A third statute was tightened so that a person out of work for only two months, rather than the previous four, could be tried as a "parasite," a charge leveled in the past against prospective emigrants who had to leave their jobs.

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The new measures had their greatest impact on the capital, where the number of Jews allowed to leave during the year plunged to less than 10 percent of 1982's total. Once the leading city for emigration, Moscow now ranks well behind other major cities and outlying regions. In the last year, fewer than 100 people were processed through its visa office. By contrast, roughly 250 individuals left from the Baltic region and the southern Ukrainian city of Odessa, respectively—representing close to 40 percent of the total emigration for the year. Aside from the latter, which actually registered an increase in emigration, the flow from other major cities (Leningrad, Kiev) and regions (the Baltic and Central Asian republics, Georgia, and Moldavia) was more than cut in half. Two outlying centers with significant Jewish populations, Minsk and the Ukrainian town of Kharkov—site of an unofficial "Jewish University"—were virtually shut down.

At the same time, the *refusenik* community, comprised of Jews whose applications for emigration have been rejected at least twice, had grown to over 10,000. Nearly 50 families have been struggling to leave for over ten years, and more than 130 families have been waiting between five and ten years.

Further pressure was brought to bear when seven men were imprisoned in 1983 for activities connected with their trying to emigrate to Israel or improve Jewish life in the Soviet Union. The possibility of re-sentencing for others still incarcerated increased with a new law against "opposition" to penal authorities. Carrying up to five additional years for "especially dangerous recidivists" or those convicted of a "grave crime," it codified a Stalinist practice that had been applied increasingly to political prisoners in recent years.

Despite these increased pressures to halt the movement of Jews, many people hoped that Konstantin Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, would allow emigration to increase because of his closeness to the late Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, under whose regime more than 260,000 Jews left the USSR.

Pakistan: Country of First Asylum

Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas

Pakistan hosts the world's largest refugee population: the Afghans who have fled the Soviet occupation of their country. Although it is impossible to get an exact count of the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the government there reported registering 2.8 million Afghans as of November 1983. A majority of these refugees reside in some 340 camps located in the border areas of the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces. With roughly 1.5 million Afghans in Iran, one-fifth to one-fourth of Afghanistan's population is now living in exile.

H. Eugene Douglas is U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.



The government of Pakistan continues to welcome Afghan refugees, many of them women and children. This widow and her son live in the North West Frontier Province Camp, de Kacha Garhi. UNHCR.

Despite some optimism following the April 1983 round of indirect negotiations in Geneva among the various concerned countries and Afghan resistance groups, UN-sponsored negotiations have not made any progress because of Moscow's unwillingness to withdraw its approximately 105,000 troops. The Soviet Union appears committed to a strategy of wearing down the resistance militarily and remodeling the Afghan political and social structure in its own image. Thus no hope is in sight for a solution to the fighting or for the voluntary repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees.

The government of Pakistan continues to welcome Afghan refugees and to provide for their needs when possible. In order to ease the burden on Pakistan, the U.S., during fiscal year 1983, contributed over \$72 million to the relief effort. In fact, United States contributions represent some 30 percent of the total UNHCR budget and nearly 50 percent of international food assistance in Pakistan. Since the inception of the international refugee relief effort in 1980, the U.S. has contributed over \$354 million for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

As one can imagine, the refugee situation in Pakistan has strained that country's human, material, and natural resources. Thousands of government workers and transportation vehicles have been diverted to refugee care. Moreover, the border regions have suffered long-lasting environmental damage from the refugees and their animal herds. Land and water scarcities are becoming severe now in some refugee camp areas. In order to relieve population pressures and to provide better living conditions, Pakistani authorities began in 1982 to move refugees into new camps in the Punjab Province. The original plan called for the relocating of 200,000 refugees, but the Pakistanis have encountered difficulties in persuading many Afghans to stay in the new camps, given the adverse

climatic conditions and their desire to remain close to their homeland.

As the Afghan refugees have close tribal and family ties to the Pakistani people living in the border provinces, there have been relatively few incidents of violence between local residents and refugees. However, tensions have been growing over grazing and water rights, and there has been some resentment on the part of poor Pakistanis for the food assistance given only to refugees. Within the Afghan refugee community itself, problems have centered around the distribution of supplies.

As long as international support for the refugees remains at current levels and the economy suffers no significant decline, Pakistan will be able to continue to deal effectively with the Afghan refugee presence. In fact, programs are underway with UNHCR to increase refugee income generation and self-reliance. In conclusion, one can only hope that the refugee issue will not be exploited by outside forces or radical political groups within the country and thereby jeopardize this unusual relationship between the refugees and host government.

Banyarwanda Resolution: Slow Progress

Roger P. Winter

The situation of refugees from and displaced persons in Uganda remains complicated. In mid-1984 there were 800,000 uprooted Ugandans, equivalent to six percent of the total population. Of these, 300,000 were refugees, largely in Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, and Tanzania, while 500,000 were displaced from their homes but still inside Uganda. There are four principal situations contributing to this overall picture.

- Although there have been some voluntary returns, several hundred thousand refugees, primarily from the West Nile region, remain in Sudan and Zaire.
- Over 150,000 displaced persons have fled fighting in the Luwero triangle between insurgents and the army. The civilian displacement has been greatly aggravated by attacks from the poorly disciplined army.
- Some 45,000 displaced persons have fled fighting in the Karamoja region between increasingly well-armed Karamojong cattle raiders and the national army.
- There has been little actual improvement in the situation of the Banyarwanda who were displaced from homes primarily in southwestern Uganda beginning in October 1982. In fact, new displacements of Banyarwandans have occurred recently.

It is the situation of the Banyarwanda that is the focus of the balance this update.

As of mid-1984, there were almost 143,000 Banyarwanda living in UNHCR settlements in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, not including the Banyarwanda uprooted in the Luwero fighting. Of these, 10,000 are in the Kagera Salient of Tanzania, 31,000 are located in Rwanda in camps at Nasho and Kibondo, and almost 102,000 are in various locations in Uganda.

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A major task prerequisite to resolving the situation of those displaced beginning in October 1982 has been to sort out the legal status of each person. Under the March 1983 Kabale Accords, Uganda and Rwanda have agreed to accept their own "nationals" once screening is completed. But progress has been interminably slow.

Some 13,000 of those who fled to Rwanda are no longer in camps. Of the 31,000 who remain in UNHCR settlements in Rwanda, approximately 4,000 claim to be Rwandan nationals; the rest are considered by Rwanda to be Ugandan nationals. Of the 42,000 in UNHCR settlements in Uganda, 30,000 are viewed by the Ugandan government as refugees; the rest claim Ugandan citizenship. Throughout the screening process, Uganda has shown itself to be a reluctant participant. Ugandan officials completed interviewing those in Rwanda and Uganda who claimed Ugandan citizenship in August 1983, but have yet to announce their determinations.

In an effort to relieve overcrowding at the refugee settlements of Oruchinga and Nakivale in Uganda caused by the October 1982 displacement, UNHCR and Ugandan authorities agreed to move some Banyarwanda to a new location, Kyaka II, in the fall of 1983. Despite harassment by the army and poor preparation of the new settlement site, over 17,000 displaced Banyarwanda are now located at Kyaka II.

About the time the move to Kyaka was accomplished, more Banyarwanda were attacked and violently expelled from Rakai district. As in prior displacements, their cattle and other property were stolen. Over 9,000 fled to the UNHCR settlements at Nakivale and Oruchinga, again causing overcrowding at those locations. Another 10,000 were able to cross into Tanzania with some cattle.

Ethnic bias against Banyarwanda runs deep and remains strong in Uganda. The displacement of so many who were self-sufficient has not only damaged the economic viability of southwestern Uganda; it has also made a large new population dependent on internationally financed care for the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding protestations of the Kampala government to the contrary, USCR believes the situation in Uganda is ripe for additional anti-Banyarwanda violence and that meaningful, timely assistance to resolve the situation of those already displaced will not be forthcoming from Uganda without specific, significant international pressure.

Geographic Variations in the Economic Adjustment of Southeast Asian Refugees in the U.S.

Robert L. Bach, Linda W. Gordon, David W. Haines, and David R. Howell

Refugee economic adjustment has been shown to be related strongly to length of time the refugee has been in the U.S. and much more weakly linked to occupational background. Further, household size and composition

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have been shown to be important determinants of cash assistance use.

A 1983 survey by the Office of Refugee Resettlement provides data illustrating variations in the economic adjustment of refugees related to the geographic area in which they live. Selected findings from this survey of 1,239 households are presented in Table 1.

Table 1
Employment* and Use of Assistance by Southeast Asian Refugees by Place of Residence: Fall 1983

	California	Texas	Rest of U.S.
Labor force participation rate	44.4%	71.5%	60.4%
Unemployment rate	28.9%	5.8%	14.9%
Mean weekly wages	\$205.42	\$255.04	\$188.10
Percent of refugees in households receiving public cash assistance	65.3%	8.8%	34.7%
AND			
Percent of recipient households that have at least one employed member	22.2%	**	47.1%
Percent of refugees in households receiving food stamps	63.6%	17.6%	43.5%
AND			
Percent of recipient households that have at least one employed member	24.0%	**	53.8%

* Those considered to be in the labor force include all persons aged 16 and over who are working or who are actively seeking employment. The unemployment rate is the percentage of those in the labor force who are not employed. These definitions are the same as those used by the U.S. Department of Labor.

** Sample size insufficient for further analysis.

The most obvious features are the consistent differences among California, Texas, and the rest of the country. Fewer than half of the refugees aged 16 and over are in the labor force in California, but nearly three-quarters are in Texas, and about three-fifths are in the rest of the country. Refugee unemployment is double in California what it is in the rest of the country, but in Texas it is only a fraction of the general rate. Use of assistance also varies greatly: two-thirds of California refugees are in households receiving assistance, whereas the figure is about one-thirteenth for Texas, and about one-third for the rest of the country. Similar distinctions, though less sharp, hold for the number of those in households receiving food stamps. An explanation for these differences may be found in the level of employment opportunities, the nature of public assistance systems, and unique aspects of the client population (e.g., there are indications that the Texas refugee population is somewhat more established).

Beyond this regional variation, however, the data suggest other intriguing findings. One is the difference between the percentage of refugees in households receiving



cash assistance and the percentage of refugees in households receiving food stamps. While in California the figures are similar (nearly two-thirds receiving each kind of assistance), the percentage of food stamp recipient households is double the figure for cash assistance in Texas, and in the rest of the country ten percentage points higher. This indicates that, except in California, there are a significant number of refugees who receive food stamps but do not receive cash assistance. This phenomenon, of course, is the classic case of the so-called working poor—those who, despite employment, simply do not have resources to meet all their needs. A similar point appears when considering the extent to which persons in households receiving assistance are, in fact, also working. While the California figures do not show this to be prevalent for refugees there (less than one in four assistance-recipient households has an employed member), the data for the rest of the country indicate that close to one in two assistance-recipient households has at least one employed member—the exact figures are 47 percent for households receiving cash assistance and 54 percent for those receiving food stamps.

Two separate lessons can be drawn. The first is that there are distinct variations in refugee economic adjustment to the U.S. depending on the states or regions of the country in which the refugees reside. A look at California suggests a relatively bleak situation, while a look at the rest of the country provides a more optimistic view. The second lesson is that within the general aggregate patterns of refugee economic adjustment are very distinct and variable individual experiences. While a large proportion of refugee households receives food stamps, fewer receive cash assistance; while a substantial proportion receives cash assistance, a significant number of them—about half outside of California—are partial-assistance households that have employed members. These variations in economic status among refugee households demonstrate that the conventional emphasis on welfare “dependency” rates, especially national aggregate fig-

ures, is particularly ill suited to the understanding and characterization of refugee adjustment.

Pirate Attacks Against Vietnamese Boat People Continue

Roger Winter and Joseph Cerquone

The escape to freedom can be deadly for Vietnamese boat people. Over 100 died during a two-month period alone during the spring of 1984, victims of pirate attacks on the Gulf of Thailand. The attacks were among the most savage yet reported. Indications are that some of the victims were children. Some of the victims' hands were tied and they were tossed into the sea to their deaths. In one instance, pirates poured gasoline on their prey, then set them ablaze.

These terrible incidents are but a few in the saga of killings and torture by pirates that began with the first flows of boat people and continues to this day. Since 1975, approximately 600,000 Vietnamese have fled their homeland by sea. Pirates have murdered or kidnapped an unknown number on the open water, the latter never to be heard from again. Today, fewer people attempt to escape Vietnam by boat than in past years, but nearly 2,000 still land each month in asylum countries of Southeast Asia. These people continue to be attacked by pirates with staggering vehemence and frequency.

At times in the past year, half or more of the refugee boats arriving in Thailand had been victimized, and one-third of those landing in Malaysia. Over 1,800 victims reportedly have died. Certainly, there are many more cases that we know nothing about; there are no survivors to bear witness.

Attacks on boat people occurred as early as the first

USCR Director Roger Winter and journalist Joseph Cerquone investigated pirate attacks in the gulf of Thailand in Spring 1983 and have prepared numerous subsequent reports.

The Nansen Medal: Honoring Those Who Serve Refugees

The Nansen Medal for 1983 was awarded to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, president of the Republic of Tanzania. In making the award, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling praised Mr. Nyerere's dedication to the cause of refugees and said that he acted on his view “that whatever the cause of their uprooting, refugees are human beings who should receive the same treatment as any other people.”

The Nansen medal is named after the Norwegian explorer, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who became the first League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Awarded for outstanding services to the cause of refugees, it was instituted by the first UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

The medal is awarded as a rule annually, by a committee comprised of persons nominated by the Norwegian government, the Swiss government, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, the chairman of the Commission on Refugees and Migrations of the International Council

of Voluntary Agencies, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The award is accompanied by a prize of U.S. \$50,000. In 1983, the prize money was donated by the Danish Refugee Council.

The Nansen Medal was first awarded in 1954 to Seretse Khama, the late president of the Republic of Botswana. In 1961, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Fridtjof Nansen's birth, His Majesty King Olav V of Norway received the award “in recognition of his own and his country's commitment to the highest humanitarian ideals.” Recent recipients have been General Paul A. Cullen, founder and president of the Australian voluntary agency, Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE), in 1981, and Her Royal Highness Crown Princess Sonja of Norway in 1982. The award is often offered as a tribute, as well, to the organization or nation the individual recipient represents.



boat escapes in 1975. They became more frequent as the number of boats multiplied and word spread along the southern Thai coast that boat people were coming, often with their remaining resources converted into gold or hard currency. In 1981, 77 percent of the boats which left Vietnam and eventually landed in Thailand were attacked; in 1982, 65 percent; and in 1983, 56 percent. We can find no solace in the small decline in attacks, because any level of such violence is unacceptable and because the viciousness of the attacks has increased.

Since 1980, over 800 have been reported as kidnapped; the majority have never been found. Some of the women have been sold into prostitution by their captors.

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Two formal programs have been undertaken to combat the piracy against boat people. An initial bilateral American/Thai effort, backed by \$2 million in U.S. funds, was in effect from February through September 1981. Later, largely on the grounds that the piracy was occurring on high seas and thus cause for world concern, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees negotiated the start of an anti-piracy program to be funded by 12 nations and administered by the Thai government.

The programs have been fraught with problems. Patrols by the Thai Navy aircraft and surveillance teams on the water could not be conducted at night or in rough weather. If notified of an attack by a spotter plane, a patrol boat might need several hours to reach the site of an attack, enough time for pirates to have their way and escape.

Few arrests have occurred, and the international anti-piracy program was underway nearly two years before the first pirates were caught and convicted. A number of factors hinder anti-piracy efforts. The vast geographical area that must be controlled is one reason for the limited arrests. Thailand lacks a conspiracy law, so pirates must be "caught in the act" if they are to be arrested. Also, boat people are disinclined to press charges or provide crucial identification of suspects for a number of reasons: they distrust Thai authorities or fear reprisal from pirates; they worry that involvement might interfere with their hopes of resettlement; and women victims and their families often want to forget their trauma and fear being stigmatized by court proceedings.

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Nonetheless, the sharpest criticism of the anti-piracy efforts has been directed toward the Thai's administration of the program. A high-level group formed to coordinate the effort—the Royal Thai Government Committee on the Suppression of Piracy—met only once during the first ten months of the international program. Thailand's National Security Council took on the responsibility, but was not forceful in implementing initiatives.

There may be several reasons for the poor administration of anti-piracy activities—among them bureaucratic problems within the Thai government and other pressing concerns like controlling drug smuggling, dealing with military conflict on its eastern border, and fighting bandits and local insurgents in south Thailand. The Thai have said simply that, if efforts are to improve, still more and better materiel would be needed.

One of the grimmest explanations for Thailand's lack of concerted effort may be racial animosity hundreds of years old. Events within the last year strongly suggest this

antagonism and have cast a shadow over the international anti-piracy program. For the first time, elements of the Thai navy and marine police have been publicly implicated in activities leading to the death of boat people.

The Royal Thai government has denied these events occurred, although there is substantial evidence that the reports are true. Stung by international criticism, Thailand has chosen to question the commitment of the international community to helping refugees and to suggest that Thai responsibility is limited.

In view of the lowered admissions levels and apparent decline in receptivity to refugees in traditional resettlement countries—leaving nearly 130,000 in asylum camps in Thailand—Thailand has come to regard Western pressure for improved anti-piracy efforts as hollow. Restrictive resettlement policies, we are told, rob nations of their moral weight.

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National governments and international agencies have taken steps to combat piracy and to draw broader attention to the problem. These efforts—from arranging the logistics of surveillance to urging governments to contribute needed funds and resources—are complex.

Still, just because they are complex does not excuse the limited success anti-piracy efforts have had to date.

As have other organizations and international teams of experts, USCR has investigated pirate attacks first-hand. Our report, *Vietnamese Boat People: Pirates' Vulnerable Prey*, generally concurs with the findings of other organizations. Our conclusions, however, are distinctive in one regard—while resources and technical expertise are important to saving the boat people from horrible fates, the will to take action is crucial and this political will has not been evident.

It is not acceptable in humanitarian or moral terms for our governments and our institutions to ignore this persistent tragedy. For that to occur would be dereliction on the part of us all.

Signatories to the UN Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peoples Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Signatories to the *Convention* Only: Madagascar, Monaco, Mozambique.

Signatories to the *Protocol* Only: Swaziland, United States.



Ethnicity: Powerful Factor in Refugee Flows

Jason W. Clay

Many of today's refugees are casualties of power struggles within newly independent states in the Third World. Their lives and fates are manipulated by a complicated political process in which ethnic affiliations and resource control are key variables. Yet those concerned with assisting refugees have, for the most part, turned a blind eye to the causes of their predicaments. It is essential, as the tides of refugees persist, that the institutions and factors that spawn refugee populations be examined and that appropriate analyses be incorporated in vigorous efforts to prevent potential refugee crises.

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Most countries contain distinct cultural groups. These include tribal societies which, until recently, enjoyed relative political and economic autonomy as well as the freedom to practice their cultural and religious beliefs. Other ethnically distinct groups also have been allowed, for a time at least, to maintain social and cultural institutions essential to their identity.

Just as ethnic diversity is not unusual, conflict among ethnically distinct groups for control of land and other resources has been common throughout the world for centuries. Usually, losers of such conflicts would end up economically and politically dominated, but in many cases in the past at least, they would be able to move to new locations and live in relative isolation.

As power and control become more centralized within modern states, however, the existence of separate or distinct societies is discouraged. Such groups are seen as threats to states, and they are expected, sometimes forced, to exchange their political and economic autonomy for the right to continue to practice their cultural and religious beliefs. As states' power grows or is challenged, the rights of tribal people and ethnic groups are curtailed even further.

Within states, tribal or ethnic groups—often thought of as minorities—have low status even though often they are not collectively, or in some cases even individually, numerically inferior to those who dominate. They may be denied access to political and economic power, educational opportunities, credit, and other resources. They suffer benevolent paternalism, harassment, harsh policies of assimilation, prejudice, and hostility. At times, they are the targets of campaigns directed specifically at their persons or their cultural practices.

During the last two centuries, conflicts between different tribal or ethnic groups have been exacerbated by the delineation of national boundaries and the growth of central state power to administer these arbitrarily created regions. Often, those running these new states control not only the land and resources within the country but also the benefits accrued from recognition by other states—foreign assistance, investment, alliances. Through the control of resources, national budgets, and

foreign assistance, individuals and groups increase their dominance.

During periods of economic growth, these ruling, dominant groups often refuse other populations an equal share in the country's resources. During periods of economic austerity, such discrimination frequently accelerates into persecution, as dominant groups attempt to maintain their own economic, political, or social position. Such persecution forces many people to flee their oppressors. Those who flee across national boundaries are refugees; those who escape to other, more isolated, regions of their countries may suffer without assistance or international recognition of their plight.

Today's massive refugee populations often reflect discrimination and persecution based on age-old antagonisms. Long-term solutions for such refugees, therefore, are difficult to design. Yet an understanding of the ethnic/tribal factors which have led to so many displacements is crucial in devising appropriate assistance programs.

Despite its significance, most donor countries and agencies continue to ignore ethnicity as a factor when analyzing refugee situations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international agency charged with protecting and assisting refugees, does not regularly collect information related to ethnicity and refugee flows, for instance, because it is reluctant to analyze the reasons refugees flee their homes. Root causes are "too political," in fact, a tacit admission of their importance.

Programs of assistance, resettlement, repatriation, and development are thus planned and implemented while information essential to their success is unavailable. Often the very groups involved in persecuting others are representatives of the state and must be consulted concerning the appropriateness of various refugee programs; the refugees themselves are consulted rarely.

Because of fundamental conflicts among many ethnic groups and states, refugee populations may remain in "temporary" countries of asylum for years. We have seen what has happened to three generations of Palestinians. Other exiled groups around the world face similar prospects; they refuse to subject themselves to domination by the groups that have taken their lands even if they might be allowed to return.

Since World War II, struggles for political power between various groups within new states, centralization of power within a state by a dominant group, and persecution or discrimination as a result of competition for limited resources have been at the root of refugee flows.

All of these conditions have been intensified by longstanding ethnic or tribal tensions.

The countries producing the majority of the world's refugees are new; most were created after World War II. Each of these states encompasses numerous ethnic groups, but only rarely do the groups dominating these new states comprise a majority of the population.

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The plight of the Miskito Indians, like this refugee and her child in a camp in Honduras, is an example of ethnicity as a factor in the creation of refugee populations. Christian Ernst

Few of these countries maintain plural political systems. Black African nations, for example, which account for about one-quarter of the world's countries, have been particularly unsuccessful in establishing plural societies. Of the 41 major independent Black African nations, only 7 allow opposition parties; 17 are single-party states and 17 are military dictatorships.

In the process of creating new states, departing colonial powers often exacerbated existing tribal or ethnic tensions by hand-picking a single ethnic group to leave in control. Such groups often ruled with consideration only for their own interests, excluding other groups from power. Yet, all citizens were expected to pay, through taxes and other forms of coercion, for foreign development loans, imported consumer goods that often could be afforded by only the dominant ethnic group, and, ironically, the imported weapons that were needed to maintain the dominant group's authority.

In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, Belgian colonial administrators ruled through the dominant Tutsi group. At the last minute, before granting the colonies independence in 1959, Belgium switched its political backing from the Tutsi to the numerically dominant Hutu. Between 1959 and 1972, as the previously dominated Hutu majority consolidated its power, some 100,000 Tutsi were killed; perhaps three times that many fled as refugees.

In Burundi, the Tutsi minority was able to retain its politically dominant position, albeit through repression, in spite of the lack of support from Belgium. In 1972, Tutsi feared that Hutu were planning a revolt similar to the one that had overthrown Tutsi in Rwanda. Hutu were blamed for an abortive coup attempt, and more than 200,000 were killed. Even more Hutu fled to neighboring countries as refugees.

Zimbabwe represents the most recent case of ethnic power struggles within a new state. Robert Mugabe, a Shona (the nation's largest ethnic group), came to power after he and Joshua Nkomo, a Ndebele, overthrew the White-dominated Rhodesian government. Subsequently some 2,000-4,000 of Nkomo's followers were killed by Mugabe's troops, and Nkomo fled to London. Although

Nkomo has since returned to Zimbabwe, Mugabe is still attempting to rule the country through a Shona-dominated central government and, many Ndebele feel, without adequate representation of the country's other ethnic groups. It remains to be seen whether Mugabe will share power eventually with the other groups in the country or, as leaders in so many other newly independent nations, turn to more repressive measures to exclude them.

Even in African nations thought to be among the most stable on the continent, there are indications of increasing conflicts being fought out along tribal lines. In Guinea, the Susu and Fula recently overthrew the Malinke, destroying a political structure that had endured more than a quarter of a century. In Nigeria, the Yoruba and Ibo do not trust the Fulani who, they feel, manage to dominate government—be it civilian or military. In April 1984, northern Moslem tribesmen attempted to overthrow the Cameroon's Christian president, who is from the south and accused of representing those tribes.

Some ethnic groups have denied the legitimacy of newly created states, choosing to struggle for independence rather than representation in central governments dominated by other ethnic or tribal groups. The Kurds have fought perhaps the longest to unite their homeland, Kurdistan, which was partitioned in Europe as a result of post-World War I treaties. Kurds often moved between Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq in response to the varying degrees of repression in the four countries. These countries have recently begun to coordinate their activities to discourage Kurdish separatists. At Iraq's invitation, the Turkish army invaded northern Iraq in an attempt to destroy Kurdish resistance. Today, many Kurds would settle for autonomy within the various states. However, policies such as those in Turkey which outlaw Kurdish language and dress and those in Iran and Iraq which draft Kurds to fight a war they feel has nothing to do with them, force many to flee their homes. When oil was discovered in Kurdish areas in Iraq, loyal Arabs were moved into the region and Kurds were forcibly relocated from their ancestral lands.

Eritreans have the distinction of fighting the longest war of independence against a Black African government. For more than 20 years, liberation fronts have ruled parts of Eritrea independently from the Ethiopian empire. As a consequence of this prolonged war, tens of thousands of Eritreans have been killed and many more have fled to neighboring countries as refugees.

When the Ibo in southeastern Nigeria seceded to form the independent nation of Biafra, perhaps the most destructive war in post-colonial Africa ensued. As the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba brought Biafra under central government control, more than a million people died—some in fighting, but more from starvation. Others fled to neighboring countries and Europe as refugees.

Resistance groups in the southern Sudan fought for independence from the Moslem-dominated central state for more than a decade before an uneasy truce reached in 1972 allowed southerners regional autonomy and a larger share of the national budget. The southerners, both Christians and animists from a number of tribes, have fought the spread of Islam into their areas for centuries. The recent proclamation of Islamic Law for all Sudanese, including the more than six million southerners, has rekindled the southern secessionist movements

and caused the exodus of as many as 800 people per day to Ethiopia.

Since the 1960s in West Papua, the Free Papua Movement has fought the forced annexation of the area by Indonesia. Although international law guarantees West Papua the right to self-determination, the international community has not come to the area's assistance. Freedom fighters claim the Indonesians are trying to destroy the Melanesian culture of the area's million inhabitants, in part by planning to colonize the area with some 750,000 Javanese. Indonesian officials claim that the area can relieve population pressure in other parts of the country while at the same time providing revenues from the massive mineral and timber resources that are as yet unexploited. In the more than ten years of sporadic fighting, some sources indicate that as many as 100,000 Papuans have been killed, many never aware of the political struggle going on around them. Since early 1984, some 6,000 Papuans have fled to neighboring Papua New Guinea as refugees.

While the political success of liberation movements in Biafra, Katanga, southern Sudan, Eritrea, the Ogaden, Western Sahara, East Timor, West Papua, Kurdistan, and the southern areas of the Philippines have been limited, the struggles have resulted in massive flows of peoples and bitterness that will generate conflict for generations to come. The millions who have been killed in these struggles will long be remembered by the even greater numbers that have become refugees or that have temporarily accepted domination by other groups.

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Tribal and ethnic conflicts in new states are often viewed by outsiders as struggles between political parties. In fact, interethnic struggles are often fought under the guise of political parties. International powers aggravate such conflicts by seeking political alliances. In Angola's recent war for independence, for example, three major ethnic groups in the country formed political movements. Each sought and received assistance from a superpower—the U.S., the USSR, or the People's Republic of China. The two parties excluded from Angola's new government are still attempting to overthrow it. The fighting has forced many people from all three groups to flee Angola as refugees.

In addition to fueling internal conflicts, international powers also take sides in border disputes between countries. For nearly a decade, Somalia and Ethiopia have fought over the Ogaden, a border area between the two countries. The Ogaden is presently part of the Ethiopian empire, but Somalia claims the region because it is inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Prior to 1977, the U.S. backed Ethiopia in the conflict while the USSR supported Somalia. In 1977, however, the two superpowers switched their support. Even after this change in alliances, however, Soviet allies continued to sell arms to Eritrean liberation movements, while the USSR countered by selling more than \$4 billion worth of weapons to the ruling Ethiopian junta.

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Both large and small ethnic groups become caught up in international alliances and political intrigue. In Namibia, for example, the hunting and gathering San Bushmen, who number a few thousand, as well as recently

arrived Bushmen refugees from Angola, have been recruited by the South African army to fight against the guerrilla forces of the Southwest African Peoples Organization (SWAPO). The Bushmen, who have been pushed from their land and exploited as agricultural laborers by Blacks more often than Whites, gladly accept what they consider to be astronomical salaries to settle an old score with traditional enemies. As a result of this hatred and their hunting skills, the Bushmen have the highest kill ratio of any battalion in the South African army. Once independence for Namibia is achieved, however, there will probably be retaliation against all Bushmen regardless of whether they fought for the South Africans or not.

A number of distinct ethnic groups are recruited by governments to carry out military operations designed to embarrass or overthrow existing governments. Miskito Indians from Nicaragua claim that the Sandinistas have denied Atlantic Coast Indians a say in the development of their areas, rights to traditional lands, and a share in the timber and minerals of the region. In addition, the Indian organization MISURASATA has been banned and its leaders persecuted. The government now has set up its own "Indian" organization. As a result of these activities, some 15,000 Indians have fled the country as refugees; more have been forcibly relocated by the Nicaraguan government from areas of national interest.

A number of disgruntled Miskito refugees are active participants in covert operations against Nicaragua. The U.S. support of "contra" activity, however, does not represent an interest of the U.S. in the rights of tribal peoples. The Miskito—like the Hmong, Kurds, and numerous other ethnic groups before them—are simply pawns in an international political struggle. While the stakes in such games are rarely clear, ethnic warriors are forgotten when they have served their purpose. Once a treaty has been signed or a nonaggression pact negotiated, the superpowers often turn a deaf ear to the cries of groups like the Miskito who all too often then face intensified persecution.

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Tribal and ethnic conflict is frequently the justification for the establishment of single-party states or military dictatorships. Tyrannical leaders have ruled in the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, and Kampuchea. In each case, these individuals were able to consolidate their power within their own ethnic group in part by attacking other ethnic or tribal groups. What began as organized attacks of rival ethnic groups, however, usually degenerated into random attacks even on members of one's own group. Hundreds of thousands of people have died under such regimes in the past two decades, and millions have fled their homes as refugees.

The rule of such tyrants as Idi Amin in Uganda and Pol Pot in Kampuchea are well documented. However, when such rulers are deposed, revenge by the persecuted groups often results in bloodbaths and chaos similar to that orchestrated by the original tyrant. In Uganda, residents of the West Nile region of the country, as well as the Banyarwanda, Baganda, Bahima, and most recently the Karamojong, are accused of having supported Idi Amin or at least to have benefited from his rule. As a result, more than 300,000 members of these groups have fled the country as refugees and more than 750,000 have been

displaced from their homes. No one knows how many have died.

In some instances, regimes have not stopped at their own borders in their attempts to persecute refugees belonging to dissident ethnic groups. The military from many countries have attacked refugee camps and killed individuals in Central America, South Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

At the same time, states work hard to establish definite and secure borders with neighboring countries in order to assert national sovereignty. This is particularly true in new countries where arbitrarily drawn international borders divide a single ethnic group between two or more countries. Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, have sealed their border to prevent the Borana (as they are called in Kenya) and the Oromo (in Ethiopia) from maintaining the cultural exchanges and political and social interaction they have enjoyed for centuries.


Kenya has also been accused of mounting a genocidal campaign against the ethnic Somali of northeastern Kenya in what appears to be an attempt to kill them or force them to move to Somalia. Until the political boundary between the two countries represents an ethnic boundary, some Kenyans apparently fear that Somalia will never abandon its claims on the part of Kenya where ethnic Somalis reside.

The Amhara-dominated Ethiopian empire has often used colonization as a means of establishing loyal populations in areas of strategic interest. In 1979, the government forced the Anuak, an agricultural group of about 15,000 who live on both sides of the Ethiopia-Sudan border, to flee to Sudan. Ethiopia's plans to develop this sensitive region through agricultural projects, dams, and fences did not include the Anuak, the area's inhabitants. Instead, loyal Amhara settlers were brought in to settle the fertile lands, and the Anuak, like other groups that have been forced to leave their lands, have moved to the Sudan where many have joined resistance movements. Few Anuak are likely to forget or forgive the Amhara-dominated junta which took their land.

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Once borders are relatively secure and most resistance movements have been destroyed, new states follow the lead of European countries and create "national" cultures designed to promote a unified image and to destroy cultural diversity. Invariably, such cultures are styled on those of the dominant groups. This can mean the official banning of languages—Kurdish in Turkey, for instance—or the establishment of an official language which is native to only a small portion of the population, as with the Amhara who represent 15 percent of Ethiopia's population. In other countries, speakers of some languages have been persecuted or killed so that, today, the languages exist only in private homes, as in the case of Nahuatl-Pipil-speaking Indians of El Salvador.

In Guatemala, troops have been trained to recognize the different weaving patterns of the highland Indian communities in order to arrest those who are traveling outside of their own areas. Even in Mexico, where Mayan Indians have sought refuge, Guatemalan units have crossed the border illegally to kill Indian refugees. Such persecution has led numerous Guatemalan Indians, in



Displaced persons in Zimbabwe represent a recent case of ethnic power struggles within a new state. UNHCR.

Guatemala and Mexico, to abandon their traditional clothing to avoid identification as Indians.

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Population pressure, the current global recession, and rising Third World debt have all contributed to increased competition for scarce resources in many countries where long-standing tribal or ethnic conflicts have already produced massive refugee problems.

In the next 20 years, barring massive epidemics, famines, or wars, the Third World labor force will increase by 600-700 million. In order for these people to be employed, as many jobs would have to be created in developing countries as exist currently in the U.S., Europe, Japan, and the USSR combined. Within this context, then, it is perhaps no accident that Africa, the region with the world's fastest growing population (2.9 percent per annum) has produced roughly half of the world's refugees in the last 20 years.

Population pressure leads to conflicts over land and other resources as dominant groups expand into the traditional areas of less powerful groups. In Kenya, Namibia, Uganda, Ethiopia, India, and Iran, for example, nomadic peoples have been forced to live in villages so that the more fertile lands could be used by politically dominant agricultural groups.

Competition for land also results in state-sponsored colonization programs. Reports from Ethiopia indicate that in the early 1980s, the government cleared more than 20,000 Oromo residents in a single valley from the lands they had occupied for generations. The Amhara-dominated government then applied for and received European Economic Commission funds to colonize the "uninhabited" area. Some 2,000 Oromo were killed in the government attack, and 20,000 fled to Somalia, where they were publicly described as Somali victims of the Ethiopia/Somalia conflict over the Ogaden.

In Bangladesh, population pressure has led the government both to promote actively and unofficially endorse colonization into areas occupied by distinct tribal or religious groups. In the Chittagong Hill areas in the eastern part of the country, a number of tribal groups have been evicted from their lands as a result of government colonization programs. The response of tribal groups has been to use their lands more visibly, thus hastening ecological destruction. They have also formed guerrilla movements to fight for political and economic control over the region. On the western border of the country, Bangladesh has done little to curb the flow of its citizens into India's neighboring state of Assam. In 1983, local residents, rapidly becoming a minority on their own lands, attacked the relative newcomers, killing thousands and forcing tens of thousands into "safe" camps.

Since 1982 in Uganda, the ruling Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) party has forced 100,000 Banyarwanda to abandon their homes and property. Local UPC members, mostly Bairu, have confiscated land, cattle, houses, and movable property from the displaced. UPC officials claimed that the Banyarwanda were refugees from Rwanda and therefore not entitled to use lands that rightfully belong to Ugandan citizens. Two years earlier, the UPC forbade the Banyarwanda to vote in elections. In effect, the UPC has declared Uganda's fifth largest ethnic group stateless, apparently because that group does not support the ruling party.

As the global recession penetrates the Third World countryside and as foreign debts increase, governments will intensify their search for natural resources—minerals, oil, timber—which can be converted easily to cash. Such searches inevitably lead into isolated areas that previously were too remote to be exploited profitably. This economic penetration has meant the curtailment of the relative political autonomy and, more importantly, land rights of the different ethnic groups that live in those remote areas.

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By international definition, people fleeing drought are not political refugees. Drought exacerbates long-standing



ethnic tensions, however, and can accentuate the effects of economic discrimination along tribal or ethnic lines. In Senegal, as nomadic herders are moving into new regions in search of pasture for their starving animals, they encounter resistance from resident groups. If the drought persists, the conflict probably will result in the displacement of additional people.

The case of the Karamojong demonstrates the complex relationship of ecological and social factors in population displacements during droughts. In 1980, the international press reported that some 30,000 Karamojong in Uganda died and others fled their homes during a prolonged drought. The cause of the disaster was somewhat more complicated. After the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979, the interim government moved to disarm all ethnic groups that might be disloyal to the new government. The weapons that were taken from the Karamojong were their only defense against raids by tribes from neighboring countries. Without their weapons, their herds were stolen. Even if there had been no drought, they would have been hard pressed to survive; the drought only accentuated their precarious circumstances.

Famine relief that is distributed unequally becomes a political weapon. Dominant ethnic groups have been known to monopolize the distribution of goods, ensuring that their groups receive assistance first. In Africa, this often means that politically dominant agricultural groups do not allow pastoralists equal access to famine assistance.

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In a number of cases, the policies of national groups to assimilate forcibly diverse ethnic groups have resulted in massive internal displacements as well as refugee populations. All too often these central government operations aggravate, or even create, famine conditions. International food assistance, while absolutely essential from a humanitarian perspective, allows the dominant group to pursue policies of discrimination and persecution as effectively as direct military assistance.

Africa perhaps best illustrates how the economic/ethnic squeeze has resulted in the creation of numerous refugee populations and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future.

The 1960s were optimistic years for most African countries. For the first time, Africans dominated their own bureaucracies and controlled their own budgets. They controlled employment, designed development programs, and negotiated with foreign investors and governments.

By the 1970s, the optimism had begun to fade. Per capita food production and consumption have declined steadily since independence as has the purchasing power of individual incomes. Nearly every African country imports food. Continent-wide, annual food imports have tripled in the last decade.

The development loans that were obtained so easily in the 1960s and 1970s as foreign governments attempted to align politically the newly independent African states are now due. The continent's debts are estimated to exceed \$100 billion annually. Yet, exports have often fallen in volume since the loans were obtained.

The economic base of many African countries is rapidly deteriorating. A recent report indicates that in 1960, before Zaire's independence, the country had some

58,000 miles of good roads. Today, fewer than 6,200 miles of roads are maintained. The arable land of the continent is slowly eroding. Deserts account for 20 percent of the continent's surface, but experts fear that they could make up as much as 45 percent in 50 years if current patterns of land use continue.

As oil and development costs rise, as populations increase and food production declines, dominant ethnic groups in each country may well resort to the use of force to maintain their economic position at the expense of less powerful ethnic groups. Even the weapons used to dominate these groups are paid for through increased repression.

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In countries of asylum, ethnicity is also a complicating factor. In the past, refugees fled across national borders, but often remained within the areas occupied by their kinsmen. While this undoubtedly placed a strain on the receiving groups, it did provide emergency assistance without putting financial strains on already overextended central government budgets. Today the massive size of most refugee flows makes such solutions impossible.

In Pakistan, the huge numbers of Afghan refugees moving into the North West Frontier Province have allowed the central government to gain political control over this fiercely independent region. Assistance to the Pathan refugees has given the central government the excuse it needs to assert a firm grip over its own Pathan population.

Countries of asylum are often willing to accept refugees in order to embarrass neighboring countries or further their own ends. For many years, the Sudan would accept only Eritrean refugees as a way of giving international assistance to the Eritreans. Thus, by the second or third interview with Sudanese officials, most refugees from Ethiopia would realize that it was to their advantage to be "Eritrean."

Somalia has manipulated the ethnicity of refugees seeking asylum as much as any other country. Officially, all refugees from Ethiopia are ethnic Somalis who want to live in a Somali-run state. While most are Somali, a great many are members of other ethnic groups who were being persecuted in Ethiopia, but who have no desire to remain permanently in Somalia. In the absence of any survey of the refugees, the ethnic claims made it easier for Somalia to justify the war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, an area occupied for the most part by ethnic Somalis. The presence of the refugees also allowed the government to focus the attention of Somalians on a common enemy—Ethiopia—rather than on problems within the country.

Somalia's claims about the ethnic affiliation of the refugees set off a chain reaction of policies designed to increase refugee assistance to Somalia by opportunistic government planners. From Somalia's claims that all refugees were ethnic Somalis, it followed that they were all herders. Once it was established that all refugees were herders, it is logical that the government would apply for assistance to train these people in agricultural techniques, even though it appears that a large number of the refugees were already agriculturalists. The portrayal of the refugees as Somalis also allowed the government and assistance organizations to emphasize the "ethnic reunification" factor when seeking funds either from other



governments or the general public. It is easier to raise money for "once-proud herders" now living in confinement than for agriculturalists.

At one point, Somalia claimed as many as 1.5 million ethnic Somali refugees. However, even a quick examination of the last Ethiopian census of the Ogaden indicated that in all fewer than 700,000 people, not even all Somali, lived in the region. Clearly, the numbers of refugees, their ethnic affiliation, or both were being distorted, but no one was attempting to make sense of the contradictory information.

In their first round of attempts to relieve competition for scarce resources, many Third World countries have attacked the most vulnerable groups within their borders. Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Djibouti, and Libya have expelled foreign workers. Uganda and Djibouti have forcibly expelled refugees. Kenya and Tanzania recently traded refugees that each country considered political subversives and wanted returned so that they could no longer lead opposition groups from their exile sanctuaries. Uganda recently attempted, in effect, to declare the fifth largest ethnic group to be noncitizens; later many

were pushed off their land and either out of the country or into refugee camps where they will generate foreign exchange for the country through international assistance programs.

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There are millions of refugees. As economic conditions in the Third World deteriorate, and as countries search for solutions to the problems of dividing scarce resources, the numbers will increase. While the stay of refugee populations in countries of asylum must often, for political reasons, be considered temporary, it can be lengthy. Ethnic conflict in the refugees' countries of origin is the single most important factor contributing to lengthy exiles. Governments and humanitarian organizations must begin to analyze this aspect of the problem and encourage dominant groups to resolve ethnic conflict internally. While the hospitality of the countries of asylum and the generosity of the international donor countries may be waning, the pressures that contribute to the internal conflicts which produce refugees most certainly are mounting. Something must be done to avert a disaster of tremendous proportions.

Refugees and the Genocide Convention

Charles Duryea Smith

Forty years ago, there was no word for the purposeful destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. In 1944, the term "genocide" was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who, with his brother, was the only member of his family to survive Hitler's holocaust. The term's Greek root "genos" and Latin root "gens" mean race or kind, as in "genesis," "progeny," and "geneology." The suffix, "cide," derives from the Latin "caedere," meaning to kill. Genocide, then, is the murder of a people, a homicide directed at the family of man.

On December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly, meeting in Paris, adopted unanimously the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Lemkin, who died in 1959 in New York City, was the determined individual who lobbied and persuaded the UN delegates to define this crime, which since has become part of the corpus of international law.

Ninety-three nations encompassing three-quarters of the world's population have ratified the genocide convention. Among those that have yet to do so are Japan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Portugal, and Thailand. Perhaps most shamefully, as it had a major hand in drafting the treaty and was one of the first countries to sign it, the U.S. also has not yet ratified it.

The convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such." Acts of genocide are described as killing members of a group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members; deliberately inflicting conditions of life on the group calculated to bring about its physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. In addition to direct acts of genocide, the convention also makes punishable conspiracy, incitement, attempts, and complicity to commit genocide.

The convention makes genocide a crime against the law of nations. Its acceptance is so widespread that the Ameri-

can Law Institute's 1982 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. reports that the prohibition against genocide is customary international law by which all states must abide even if they have not ratified the treaty.

In addition to defining the crime, the treaty looks to punish perpetrators. Because there is no international tribunal for the prosecution of persons alleged to have committed genocide like that created after World War II for the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, all nations that ratify the genocide convention pledge to enact the necessary legislation to put in place its provisions, in accordance with their respective constitutions, and in particular to provide effective penalties. Furthermore, they agree that genocide is not a political crime which would exempt its perpetrators from extradition.

Genocide is among the sad catalogue of factors that create refugees. Survivors of genocidal attacks often have fled their country's borders and become refugees. In their countries of haven, they, like other refugees, are protected by the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees from being returned to the persecution they escaped and guaranteed their personal and group dignity. The inclusion of political groups in the refugee convention is the only distinction between its coverage and that of the genocide convention.

Refugees who have escaped genocide are special witnesses to that most horrible of human crimes. Not all surviving victims of genocide are fortunate enough to be refugees; many remain locked inside their countries.

The genocide convention may prove useful in seeking international sanction against the persecutors of those who died, those who have escaped, and those who have remained. By applying the laws of those nations that have joined the treaty, extraordinary criminals like those Raphael Lemkin survived can be brought to justice.

Charles D. Smith is associate editor of the immigration law newsletter *Interpreter Releases*.

Refugee Aid and Development: Genesis and Testing of a Strategy

Poul Hartling

The nature of the refugee crisis has changed drastically since the Second World War. Today we have grown accustomed to flows of hundreds of thousands, even millions of people on the move across international borders. These multitudes arrive in some of the poorest countries of the developing world already struggling with their own severe problems of underdevelopment.

UNHCR has long provided assistance to refugees. But when a huge number of people descend on a poor country with a stricken economy, this is not enough. Of course, in the initial stages of a refugee emergency, immediate relief efforts must be focused directly on the refugees. Otherwise, in many cases, they would not survive to take advantage of any more durable solutions. But it must now be recognized that, in the longer term, the fundamental problem is to provide refugees with the possibility of providing for themselves.

In the vast majority of refugee situations in the developing world, the only alternative to keeping refugees inactive and endlessly dependent on relief is to set up income-generating projects on a large scale. For social, psychological, and political reasons, it is difficult to do this for refugees in isolation from the host community. Projects are needed which create jobs and other productive activities for both refugees and local people, thereby contributing to the overall development of the area.

There is at present no single organization that has the mandate, the expertise, and the funds to design and implement such double-target projects. Setting up a new organization for the purpose is not realistic. The alternatives of either amending the mandate of UNHCR to enable it to acquire development expertise or of issuing new guidelines to an organization specializing in development to carry out refugee-oriented projects are neither practical nor justified. So who could design and finance projects of this type and how should they be implemented?

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The need to find practical responses to these questions was first raised at UNHCR's Executive Committee meeting in 1981. Two years later, in August 1983, I invited 24 experts from both industrialized and developing countries for a three-day meeting at Mont Pelerin in Switzerland. Participants were invited in their personal capacity. Drawn from governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations, as well as the private sector, some had special knowledge and experience of refugee and/or development problems; others were well versed in the practical difficulties involved in designing, financing, and implementing projects to meet these problems.

The experts formulated a number of general principles which they felt should be applied in the event of a large-scale influx of refugees into a low-income area. They argued that in these circumstances, projects designed exclusively or predominantly to benefit refugees were

not in themselves an adequate answer. What was needed, they said, was a mechanism which would bring together refugee and development aid.

In the absence of an organization that single-handedly could do the job, the experts concluded that the most practical answer—or perhaps the least impractical—would be for interested governments and agencies together to formulate, finance, and implement a new approach. As a rule, UNHCR should take the initiative, they said. In consultation with the host government, it should then enlist the services of an agency with development experience. It was stressed that any such arrangement should ensure adequate provision for formulating, appraising, and negotiating the project with the government, as well as supervising its implementation.

The experts also recommended that UNHCR should help secure the necessary finance. Funds should be made available on a grant basis, mainly by interested governments, from either refugee-aid or development-assistance sources, or indeed from both. The various international financial institutions were also called upon to participate. It was stressed that funds should be "additional" to those provided for existing projects and programs; they should not be perceived by host governments as diverting resources from their own development plans.

The experts agreed that every project should meet the needs, objectives, and priorities of not only the refugees and the affected areas but of the international community as a whole. Any project which did not meet the exigencies of all three would not command support; nor would it achieve the twin objectives of enabling the refugees to support themselves and contributing to the area's development.

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The experts also tackled the thorny issue of reversing major refugee flows. In many cases today, there are indications that refugees would seek repatriation if economic conditions in their areas of origin were better. This is particularly true where a large-scale exodus of refugees from a low-income area results not only from persecution or conflict but also from economic deprivation or destruction. The experts proposed that UNHCR take the initiative, in agreement with the country of origin, to encourage governments and concerned organizations to undertake programs which might encourage refugees to go home of their own volition.

It was recognized that to ensure the successful reintegration of returnees, rehabilitation assistance is often required on a long-term basis. Development agencies and interested governments should be ready to take up the baton and step in when UNHCR steps down.

Another theme underlined by the experts was the economic and social cost borne by host countries and the need for donors, both bilateral and multilateral, to re-examine the criteria they use in the allocation of their development funds. The aim should be to remove barriers

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It is hoped that, through education and training projects, refugees and returnees can become self-sufficient and an asset to their host countries. UNHCR.

ers to targeting assistance at refugees in the context of wider development programs.

The passage from refugee relief to development assistance is often complicated by the administrative structures of the bodies providing assistance. Too often, at both the national and international level, there seems to be a lack of effective coordination between bodies charged with providing assistance to refugees and those dealing with development aid.

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The nexus between refugee relief and development was again raised at an informal meeting of the Executive Committee in January 1984. It was agreed that funds provided for refugee-related development projects should be additional to any resources made available to asylum countries for their regular development programs. There was also support for the view that such projects would benefit not merely the refugees, but affected areas as a whole.

The meeting forged complete agreement on several important issues. In particular, a number of general principles were formulated:

- Solutions will be lasting only if they allow the refugees or returnees to support themselves and participate in the social and economic life of the community on an equal footing with the surrounding population: this should be the ultimate aim of assistance to refugees;
- From the outset, the refugees or returnees should be encouraged to provide for themselves, and to participate in local schemes to improve economic and social infrastructure;
- In low-income areas, the needs of the local people should also be taken into account;
- UNHCR, while being the focal point for durable solutions, should not assume the role of a development agency, and where development initiatives are needed, UNHCR's role should be essentially that of a catalyst and coordinator: the Office should initiate suitable

projects, promote their financing and implementation by competent organizations and host governments, and monitor their impact on refugees;

- In the case of large-scale voluntary repatriation to a low-income country, an international commitment to help is required to achieve successful reintegration: this may need to include, beyond UNHCR's programs, development investments for the benefit of the returnees that would also benefit their compatriots;
- In all phases of a refugee crisis, the beneficiaries (refugees and others) should be involved in program planning, management, and implementation.

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UNHCR has already entered discussions with some of the specialized development agencies which might be helpful in formulating and implementing projects helping both refugees and the areas in which they live. So far, we have found a prudent but sympathetic reception and readiness to cooperate. We hope that as the novelty of the concept fades, we will be able to work closely with a growing number of institutions and governments.

In the meantime, while principles and modalities are still taking shape, we have undertaken a novel income-generating project for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This pilot project has been developed jointly by the government of Pakistan, the World Bank, and UNHCR.

A fresh approach to the problem of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was proposed by UNHCR some time ago, and the government of Pakistan has endorsed the idea. UNHCR approached the World Bank—which has vast experience of rural development in low-income countries—to identify a pilot project which, if successful, could become the first building block in a more ambitious program.

The World Bank agreed to provide its services, using its established methods and procedures. UNHCR's role is limited to promoting contributions by interested governments and organizations towards the \$20 million project and monitoring the benefits of the project for the refugees. Because the project is developmental in nature, it falls outside the scope of UNHCR's normal programs and therefore cannot be funded by UNHCR directly; and since the investment is required in the form of a grant, it cannot be financed by the World Bank.



The enormity of the Afghan refugee problem has had a serious impact on the economies of the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, two of the least-favored provinces in the country. In addition to the costs involved in their care and maintenance, the presence of the refugees and their flocks has caused severe damage to the environment and the infrastructure of the two provinces; water resources are tapped at an alarming level, deforestation is taking place at an accelerated pace, and the wear and tear on roads and bridges has been considerable. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of refugees remain idle in their villages, entirely dependent on outside aid because there is no work for them in the area.

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The pilot project attempts to regenerate durable economic assets in the areas most affected by the damage and give the refugees (as well as some needy local people) an opportunity to work and secure an income. The project is to achieve these objectives through forest and watershed management, irrigation rehabilitation and upgrading, flood protection, and road improvement. All schemes selected meet the following criteria:

- They are technically viable and have an economic rate of return above the local opportunity cost of capital;
- They are labor-intensive (62 percent of the total cost of the project is expected to be paid out in daily wages for manual labor);
- They are located in close proximity to existing refugee villages; and

- They are likely to be completed within the three-year project period.

The project proposed by the Pakistan government was subjected to a detailed and comprehensive appraisal by a World Bank team. The result was communicated to all governments which had manifested an interest in the project. Upon acceptance of the report by UNHCR, the Bank negotiated separate agreements with the government of Pakistan and the two provinces. The agreements provide, inter alia, that in each sector of the project more than half of the manpower required will be provided by refugees.

The agreements, signed at the beginning of 1984, became effective in February, by which time firm pledges for the financing of the project received from six governments exceeded 50 percent of the total cost of the project. Implementation had actually started in the second half of 1983, thanks to contributions made very swiftly by three governments for the prefinancing of activities which were vital if the planting season was not to be missed.

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This pilot project is in line with the principles agreed on by the Executive Committee, and it follows a pattern which is considered as fully replicable by the World Bank. A comprehensive review of the project's first year of operation will be undertaken jointly, towards the end of 1984, by the government of Pakistan, the World Bank, and UNHCR. If this review shows that the project is achieving its objectives, we can start thinking of further projects in other parts of the world.

ICARA II: African Nations Seek World Help with Refugee Population

Faced with their own pressing national development needs, economic recession, catastrophic drought, and severe food shortages, many African countries are obliged to support refugee populations at the expense of national progress.

Fourteen African nations asked the world community to help them launch a range of projects designed to lighten heavy social and economic burdens caused by the presence of massive numbers of refugees and returnees. These projects were considered at a second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), held in Geneva, Switzerland July 9-11, 1984.

The Africans submitted a total of 127 projects valued at some \$362 million. The projects were also to benefit local citizens and were fashioned for implementation over a three- to five-year period.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees officials stress that the problem is not only serious but unique, in that African countries, which are very generous towards refugees, are among the least developed countries in the world. They are, therefore, bearing a special burden as the refugees add to their problems at a time when they themselves lack some basic necessities for their own populations.

The 14 countries which responded to the UN Secretary General's invitation to draw up project proposals were Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia.

During the summer and autumn of 1983, a team of

technical experts from the UN system and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) visited each of the 14 countries to review proposals with the governments. The projects retained were refugee- and/or returnee-related, conformed with national development plans and priorities, complemented existing refugee assistance programs, and were considered technically sound and feasible. The projects represented several sectors as follows: roads, ports, bridges, energy, 28 percent; agriculture, reforestation, fisheries, 24 percent; education and training, 20 percent; health, 16 percent; water supply, 10 percent; social development, support systems, 2 percent.

ICARA II also provided the international community with an assessment of the direct assistance needs of African refugees and returnees. UNHCR's projected expenditure for Africa for 1984 is some \$155 million. Additional assistance needs valued at \$10.9 million have also been identified and were presented to the conference. These amounts are in addition to the \$362 million requested for infrastructure development.

At the request of the General Assembly, ICARA II was convened by the Secretary General. The OAU, UNDP and UNHCR were also represented on the conference steering committee.

In introducing the concept of infrastructure development as a means of pursuing lasting solutions for refugees in Africa, ICARA II represented the most global, long-term approach to the continent's refugee problem yet undertaken.



Médecins Sans Frontières: Recognizing Human Rights Through Medical Care

Rony Brauman

Médecins Sans Frontières is active today in most of the refugee camps that exist throughout the world. But this work—providing medical aid to these mass populations of uprooted people—was not the organization's original preoccupation. Further, the techniques it has developed have evolved as MSF's experience with medical crises has grown.

Two groups of physicians formed MSF. The first, working in Biafra under the auspices of the Red Cross, was composed of medical teams who relieved one another for several months in the territory controlled by secessionists shortly before the country's last stronghold fell. They provided surgical assistance to the injured and nutritional aid to the victims of famine created by the Nigerian blockade. A second group, responding to a plea from a medical journal, worked in eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970, helping populations beset by catastrophic flooding. Here, too, teams alternated in providing medical care and public health assistance.

Both groups, though at work in different parts of the world with very different problems, formed a set of conclusions that applied to both situations. These were to become the basis for the work that MSF would do.

First, they realized that in disaster situations physicians must make specific and properly adapted responses. Obviously, a structure was needed which would adapt to these emergencies. They knew it must be quickly operational and adequate to cover a wide range of situations flexibly. Next, they learned that medical interventions in areas of conflict must be apolitical: other than applying the medical humanist ethic, philosophical assumptions should not be made about the situation in which they and their patients found themselves.

Further, they understood the importance of media in focusing attention on these crises, especially those created by disregard for human rights. While carefully maintaining their independence—especially financial independence—the teams were aware that media could help them bring aid and raise the public consciousness about people in need.

With these guiding principles in place, Médecins Sans Frontières was created, and the organization became a reality in 1972. Its early experiences in medical intervention took place in situations of conflict and disaster—the Vietnam War, the famine in the Sahel, the war in Lebanon. But a decisive change in the nature of its work occurred in the second half of the 1970s—a time of critical change also in the international political scene. The withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia and the gaining of independence of the last Portuguese colonies in Africa were both contemporary events marking the renewal of military action in the Third World.

While it is not the role of MSF to assign blame for these

events or to analyze the hopes and disappointments of the second generation after decolonization, we must take note of the dramatic phenomenon we witnessed in the late 1970s in the Third World: the creation of masses of political refugees. Since then, almost wherever MSF has been called upon to bring medical aid to the world's "hot spots," as was the case in 1976, when Indochinese began to pour from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into neighboring Thailand, refugees fleeing war and repression have been a major concern.

Since the late seventies, too, the number of our missions—particularly in Africa—has increased, and little by little we have developed an intervention technique. It involves approaches sufficiently specific that MSF now provides special classes for last-year medical students and paramedics within a university tropical medicine curriculum.

This method of intervention emphasizes the organization of medical work rather than medical problems themselves, for, in reality, pathology in refugee camps is not usually specific to them. (Exceptions do exist, however. There are problems unique to mass concentrations of people—a point to which we will return. Further, occasional situations are created when a population is exposed to a disease that does not exist in its region of origin. For example, as it spread through Thailand, malaria ravaged the Hmong refugee population there. In Laos, Hmong people traditionally had lived at a high altitude, in regions where there is no malaria; consequently, the refugees had no immunity against the malaria parasite.)

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Our intervention technique is based on three closely linked elements which cannot be disassociated: medical treatment, preventive medicine, and training.

Medical treatment involves first organizing a framework for intensive treatment and follow-up. This does not refer to only a place where medications are distributed. Rather, medical treatment here means a coherent system which has several functions. First, it organizes registration and pre-consultation of patients. For each person interviewed, an individual, numbered follow-up card is prepared, on which notes are made giving the reason for consultation, temperature, and height and weight for children. Next, in the consultation stage, diagnosis, prescription for treatment, simple laboratory tests if required, and occasionally "hospitalization" occur. Third, the system provides for the distribution of medications, either immediately or after the laboratory tests. By administering first dosages at the center, physicians can teach patients how and when to make medications properly. In some cases, especially for tuberculosis, medications are taken at the center daily to ensure regular treatment.

Preventive medicine is one of the most important—

Dr. Rony Brauman is director of Médecins Sans Frontières.



Médecins Sans Frontières medical teams, as above in camp Colomoncagua, Honduras, depend upon trained local volunteers to support their work. One physician and two nurses can then handle a case load of 10,000 refugees.
Médecins Sans Frontières

and the most thankless—aspects of our work. Its effects are difficult to measure and are perceived only after long months of work. During that period, because patients frequently do not understand why they are being treated, MSF depends upon the active participation of traditional village and camp leaders to encourage patients to continue.

Once medical teams have determined priorities, vaccination campaigns begin for specific groups, in particular, children under five years of age and pregnant women. These campaigns are often urgently needed if, for example, there is an outbreak of cholera or typhoid, which spreads much more quickly in a closed environment than it does in a "natural" one. The vaccinations are given either when the children or women come in for consultation or during the medical team's systematic camp visits.

Among the most arduous problems MSF faces in refugee camps are sanitation and public health. For although toilet facilities are dug far from water holes and food storage points, it is frequently difficult—especially in Africa—to ensure that people use them. Similarly, rational use of water streams (upstream for food, downstream

for washing) and protecting wells (building curbstones, covering access) present daily problems for the medical teams. And although gathering and burning wastes are not their responsibilities, health workers supervise these tasks closely and occasionally initiate them.

Education is intended primarily for women. They learn nutritional hygiene, emphasizing balanced food intake and water sanitation, and caring for children who have diarrhea or are dehydrated.

This work—clearly vast and varied—obviously surpasses the capacity of a small medical team. MSF understands how important training of local health workers to support the team's efforts can be. As soon as possible, local volunteers who can read and write are recruited and begin training. In exchange for their work, they generally receive a food supplement. Based on individual interests and capabilities, each learns a specific task: some learn distribution of medications or supervision of water resources; others master laboratory techniques, vaccinations, etc. Often, when the burden of work makes it impossible for the medical team to teach local volunteers, a reinforcement team arrives to handle training.

Once the initial phase is completed, we are able to reach a ratio of one team—one physician and two nurses—for 10,000 refugees, on the average, to carry out these vast sectors of activity.

But the first stage of an intervention often looks quite different. There may be a real urgency, in the medical sense of the term. For example, in October 1979, when an influx of Cambodian refugees finally succeeded in enter-



ing Thailand after many months in the forest, MSF sent over 100 doctors and nurses in the space of a few days to treat the great numbers of seriously and gravely ill. In spite of this massive medical presence, all of our work, day and night, was devoted only to treatment. It was not until after the initial period of urgency had passed that we were able to reduce the number of teams and attend to our other functions: prevention and training. MSF health workers must be aware continuously that ultimately these two functions cannot be forgotten in the often overwhelming rush to give treatment.

Beyond their purely technical work, MSF teams are called upon occasionally to play a diplomatic role, particularly in developing a working relationship with local authorities. Refugee camps, almost by definition, are located in unstable areas of conflict, often near sensitive border points. In these regions, the protection of human rights frequently takes second place to governments' concerns for their own safety. Establishing and maintaining good relations, both with the population and with local officials, can help resolve many of the difficult, tension-related problems that often exist.

The presence of physicians is comforting in itself and is a symbol of solidarity for people who feel that the world has abandoned them, who have been tossed back and forth in a political torment which they cannot grasp. But it is also real protection against excesses which may occur. By accepting permanent teams in their country, the governments concerned are very aware of this aspect, and they accept it. This does not mean that there is complete harmony between the central authority and local officials or that the attitudes are the same. But thanks to this understanding, in some of the particularly difficult areas like the border between El Salvador and Honduras, MSF teams, along with UNHCR delegates, take charge of Salvadoran refugees coming into Honduras even before security forces are present.

Finally, there is the question of how a medical mission in a refugee camp comes to an end. Several examples may be given, depending on which aspect of the refugee problem is being considered.

The most frequent case, unfortunately, is that of continued presence, of "palestinization," as it were. (Such situations may be the case in Lebanon, Thailand, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, etc.) In this case, either our presence is maintained, as in Thailand, for example, or we turn over responsibility to a humanitarian organization that is willing to work on a long-term basis. This takes place after a minimum presence in the field of two to three years, the time needed to complete setting up a system of medical care and public health. Whatever the solution, the presence of trained local health workers eases the need for outside teams.

In cases where the host country agrees to settle the refugees, we take part in setting up permanent medical structures. As soon as we are able to do so, we transfer responsibility to an organization that is active in development.

When plans are made to return refugees to the country of origin—of course, provided guarantees are given to the refugees that they will be received—we support the move. For example, in northern Uganda, two teams are

working to ensure that the main health facilities in the province of West Nile are operational again, having been ravaged by a civil war that caused 200,000 persons to flee. Missions in the host countries of Zaire and Sudan were, of course, completed. The return home, implemented through the collaboration of UNHCR and the authorities of the country concerned, is in our opinion particularly important, and we encourage it in every instance possible.

The problems discussed above involve individuals who have fled their country and crossed over a border. The reasons for their flight and their presence on foreign soil ensure them a status which, although often a precarious one, permits them to receive international assistance and protection. Persons moving about within a country, however, have no such status, and, in many instances, their existence is not known at the international level. This was the case in Zimbabwe where the war for independence caused nearly 500,000 persons to be uprooted, and is also the case in Nicaragua, Chad, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. As the United Nations cannot intervene in this type of situation, only governments, who often do not have the means or occasionally the willingness to act, and private organizations, whose resources generally cannot meet the problem, can take the needed action.

In spite of the absence of international awareness of this increasing problem—which, it is hoped, is only temporary—MSF intervention is the same for these populations of "the homeless at home." These missions are carried out officially when possible, as in Nicaragua. But when there is official refusal, and if the situation warrants it, we cross borders without authorization because the right to medical care and the duty imposed by solidarity are more legitimate, in our eyes, than the cynicism and intolerance of certain powers.

This same cynicism and indifference to the plight of populations allow some powers to use refugees as a work force and as leverage for their political ends. Recent history has shown how difficult it is for a regular army to conquer guerrilla resistance. A "rational" solution is called for by strategists: isolate fighters from their base and, by food blockades or terror, cause the civilian population to flee to more remote areas or over the border. In addition to cutting off the opposition, this tactic has the advantage for its promoters of creating an influx of populations in a neighboring country whose position is thus weakened. The trend toward this relatively new type of situation is on the rise and poses new problems for humanitarian organizations. These problems occasionally cannot be resolved, as in Iranian Kurdistan where an entire people agonizes in silence behind a wall of intolerance and fanaticism and where there is no possibility of sending in assistance. Elsewhere, fortunately, medical teams more often succeed in breaking through a blockade, reaching the population and, in a limited number of cases, enforcing real respect of the right to medical care which is scorned every day.

The struggle for recognition of this right is an integral part of the fight for human rights. It is in this spirit that Médecins Sans Frontières, beyond the technical assistance it provides, intends to play its role.

On The Jubilee of The International Rescue Committee

Peter I. Rose

Fifty years ago, as Hitler's minions began targeting Jewish and "prodemocratic" intellectuals for special treatment, Albert Einstein helped to establish the International Relief Association to facilitate their escape and relocation. The organization later merged with the Emergency Rescue Committee to form the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Early advisors included Max Ascoli, Jacques Maritain, Thomas Mann, and Jan Masaryk. Among the many artists and scholars who benefitted from IRC's often clandestine activities were Hannah Arendt, Marc Chagall, Max Ernst, Jacques Lipchitz, Wanda Landowska, Otto Meyerhoof, Giuseppe Modigliani, and Franz Werfel.

From the start, IRC differed from most other agencies involved in refugee assistance. It was a broad-based citizen's committee, independent of government or sectarian affiliation. In a recently published history of IRC, *Escape to Freedom* (Greenwood 1983), Aaron Levenstein points out that its mission "was not only humanitarian in the Judeo-Christian tradition but also political in the broadest democratic sense." Its leaders, supporters, fund raisers and field workers were outspokenly critical of the various "isms" of the period. But they had an underlying ideology of their own. Freedom was (and has remained) the watchword; aid to victims of totalitarian tyranny—whether "Black" or "Red" in the old sense of those terms—the credo.

After the Second World War, IRC continued to provide care and succor to the dispossessed. It is still doing so. IRC's list of "clients" gives testament to Heinrich Boll's comment that ours is "the century of refugees and prisoners." Over the years, the agency has ministered to the displaced persons of Europe, South Asia, and Southern Africa; aided the Chinese, Biafrans, Afghans, and Ethiopians; and helped to resettle hundreds of thousands: Greeks, Hungarians, Czechs, Cubans, Chileans, Iranians, and a significant portion of those who fled Indochina after the fall of Saigon.

Under the long-term chairmanship of economist, advocate, and recent recipient of the Medal of Freedom, Leo Cherne; an active board of prominent donors and doers; dedicated officers such as the current president, John Whitehead; and active vice presidents, Bayard Rustin and Liv Ullmann, the IRC has continued to fill the special niche in the field of international social service it carved out long ago. Executive Director Charles Sternberg is assisted by an able staff of New York-based specialists, regional directors, and field workers—many, like himself, former refugees—who serve as job trainers, doctors and

other health care experts, language teachers and interpreters, and case managers in offices and camps scattered across this country and in many places overseas. IRC's most recent operation is in southern Lebanon; its largest to date has been the Indochina program.

Shortly after the end of the war in Vietnam, the agency (which had already been working on refugee problems within Vietnam) placed 30,000 boat workers in the four U.S. camps set up to relocate those flown here in what came to be known as "the first wave." Working with representatives of other voluntary agencies, IRC helped to move refugees out of the centers and into U.S. communities. By the end of 1975, that job was finished. It proved, however, to be but a prelude to a much larger endeavor. The boat people were still to land on ASEAN shores—and to be resettled in many "third countries." Six hundred and fifty thousand were to come to the U.S. Again, IRC was involved.

Along with many nongovernmental organizations, it provided general relief services, educational programs, and medical care in several of the first asylum countries of Southeast Asia. It also ran a large holding center for refugees in Hong Kong. Its presence was most visible in Thailand where, under contract to the Department of State, IRC organized and directed the prototypic Joint Voluntary Agency, established to process nearly all the potentially resettlable refugees within Thai borders. With twelve well-organized sections, most of them ethnically specific (Vietnamese, lowland Lao, hilltribe, Khmer, etc.) and some of them administrative, IRC's JVA/Bangkok became a model for U.S. programs in all the other countries in the area and, later, for some in parts of Africa.

Like such sister U.S. agencies as the American Council for Nationalities Service, Church World Service, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, and various Catholic refugee organizations, all of which ran JVA operations in Southeast Asia, IRC also was involved deeply in the reception and resettlement of the Indochinese (and those from many other places). It still is.

IRC is not the oldest nor the largest of the refugee agencies—those credits go to HIAS, the 100-year old Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and the U.S. Catholic Conference, respectively; but for half a century, IRC has served the special cause it espouses with dogged determination and compassionate professionalism. Millions of freedom seekers have been its beneficiaries.

It is fitting that the work of the International Rescue Committee be noted on the occasion of its jubilee. It is also important to recognize how much its presence—and that of other refugee agencies—is needed in a world where political persecution and forced migration seem to have become all too permanent facts of modern life.

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Displaced Persons: Humanitarian Challenge in Central America

Frank Sharry

In October and November of 1983, I had the opportunity to visit six Central American countries to observe how the region has responded to the tremendous numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. What emerged from this survey was the inescapable conclusion that Central Americans who have fled their homes, crossed their national boundaries, and been recognized as refugees in neighboring countries are generally far better off than those who have fled home and village, but who remain within their country of origin and are regarded as internally displaced.

This is not to suggest that those who are recognized as refugees are to be envied or that only a few issues remain to be resolved for those outside their homelands. To the contrary, many Central Americans residing in countries of first asylum are in precarious situations. Serious problems in the areas of protection, care and maintenance, and prospects for durable solutions continue to plague refugees, those who assist them, and the host countries; these issues require attention and action. Nevertheless, the international system of protection and care is working in Central America. The most pressing priority for those concerned with the plight of uprooted Central Americans, therefore, is to formulate an effective response to the tragedy of the internally displaced.

Building on an established tradition of offering asylum to relatively small numbers of political exiles from neighboring countries, Mexico, Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama have opened their doors to influxes of significant proportions. They have provided safe haven, food, shelter, medical attention, and more in some instances. Mexico harbors over 40,000 registered Guatemalan refugees and large numbers of unregistered Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Belize has let in an estimated 7,000 Salvadorans (approximately 5 percent of its total population). Honduras provides asylum to 18,000 Salvadorans, 19,000 Nicaraguans (14,000 of whom are Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indians from the Atlantic Coast Region), and 500 Guatemalans. Nicaragua has absorbed 17,500 Salvadorans and 500 Guatemalans, while Costa Rica has provided haven for 10,000 Salvadorans, 3,900 Nicaraguans, and 300 Guatemalans. Even Panama has allowed approximately 1,200 Salvadorans to resettle there. All of these are under the care and/or protection of UNHCR. The notable exception is Guatemala, which reports the presence of large numbers of Salvadorans for whom there is at present no UNHCR assistance or protection provided. It is assumed that these are largely people in sympathy with the position of the Guatemalan government or migrant farm workers who have chosen to remain in Guatemala.

In general, UNHCR has done a thorough job of sensitizing the region's governments to international codes of

conduct with regard to refugees. Consequently, as a rule borders stay open, adequate protection is provided, and sufficient levels of relief assistance are distributed. Beyond these accomplishments, UNHCR has seen to it that many refugees benefit from decent opportunities to support themselves. In Belize, the "Valley of Peace" project has given Salvadorans the chance to clear land and produce enough food to feed themselves. The most successful self-sufficiency projects can be found in Nicaragua. Salvadoran refugees are integrated with Nicaraguans into agricultural cooperatives created on land provided by the Nicaraguan government; UNHCR supported the refugees during the start-up phase. The Miskito Indians from Nicaragua have been welcomed by the Honduran government and settled in the eastern region with extensive support from UNHCR.

Particularly when compared to the harsh reactions of refugee-receiving countries in some other parts of the world, the response of Central American countries of first asylum to increased flows of refugees generally must be judged as generous and humane. Unlike those Southeast Asian countries, for example, which only offer temporary asylum on the condition that Western nations resettle those that arrive and where one sees "humane deterrence" policies that are anything but, the Central American governments provide asylum without such conditions. Despite serious political problems, they retain their relative openness to asylum-seekers, though their absorption capacity is certainly not unlimited and large increases in and of themselves could be destabilizing.

It might even be suggested that the U.S. has something to learn from these Central American countries if it hopes to regain its moral leadership in the arena of refugee treatment and assistance. Rather than conferring refugee status or even safe haven to Central Americans on a group basis, the U.S. continues to make case-by-case asylum determinations while stressing stricter border enforcement, incarceration, and deportation. UNHCR has raised the possibility that U.S. policy regarding Salvadorans who reach the U.S. may be in violation of U.S. obligations under the international *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*. Meanwhile, the Honduran government, which is not a signatory to the *Protocol*, permits UNHCR to decide who among the asylum seekers arriving in Honduras should receive refugee status.

There are still serious issues regarding the treatment of refugees throughout the region that need to be resolved. A number of reports have emanated from Mexico that some Guatemalans have been repatriated involuntarily and others harassed by local enforcement officials. The Guatemalan Army and paramilitary units have been known to cross into Mexico and raid refugee camps close to the border. Belizean authorities, fearful of upsetting the 58 percent Black majority by admitting too many Hispanics, have begun to take restrictive actions.

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In Honduras, some Guatemalan refugees have been arrested and branded a security threat by the Honduran armed forces. Salvadorans have been subject to military harassment in the past and are regarded as subversives and troublemakers by both Honduran authorities and many Honduran citizens. There is also a great deal of controversy regarding a proposed move of Salvadorans from camps near the Salvadoran border to the Honduran interior. The refugees and many of the voluntary agency workers who assist them are prepared to resist the move, claiming among other things that the relocation would weaken protection. Meanwhile, UNHCR supports the move, believing that refugees will gain freedom of movement, access to markets, and the chance to produce adequate food for themselves. In eastern Honduras, the Miskito Indians have been dominated by the anti-Sandinista counter-revolutionary group, the Misura, and some young Miskitos have been forcibly recruited into military action.

In Costa Rica, Salvadorans spread throughout the San Jose area feel compelled to work illegally as the welfare stipend they receive—equal to the benefit given to indigent Costa Ricans—is hardly sufficient. Meanwhile, UNHCR efforts to encourage the Costa Rican government to provide land for self-sufficiency projects have been met with bureaucratic inaction. The government fears a backlash by landless Costa Ricans and their supporters if unpopular refugees are seen as receiving preferential treatment. Similarly, Nicaraguan refugees often spend over a year in transit centers designed for 15-day stop-overs because few self-sufficiency projects are open for them to move into.

A key regional issue is whether future refugees will even be offered the same benefits that current refugees have received or if the countries will claim they are "saturated" and become increasingly restrictive.

These national and regional issues require interna-

Despite the hardships these Salvadoran refugees in Honduras must endure, they are better off than those 4-700,000 internally displaced in El Salvador who have little access to international protection. UNHCR

tional vigilance and intelligent negotiation. Fortunately, the fundamental openness of the refugee-receiving countries, the extensive presence of UNHCR, and the activities and advocacy efforts of the local and international PVOs all enhance prospects for their satisfactory resolution.

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Compared to the vast majority of those who have made it across their country's border and have gained recognition as refugees, the internally displaced of El Salvador, Guatemala, and to a lesser extent, Nicaragua, are in danger. For many of them, it is a challenge merely to stay alive, to eat, to stay clothed and sheltered, to receive medical assistance, and to recover some semblance of a normal life. The overall situation cries out for an effective response. There is much talk of what could be done, but until now, little has happened that would reduce the suffering of so many. Although certain features are common to all three countries, this discussion will focus on El Salvador as a dramatic example.

During the last four years, El Salvador has been the scene of continuing political violence and war-related suffering. The statistic which reveals the country's level of political violence most graphically is perhaps that provided by *Tutela Legal* (Office of Legal Protection), the reputable human rights monitoring office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador. It has documented 38,000 civilian deaths—proportionately equivalent to 1.8 million American civilians—at the hands of members of the uniformed and nonuniformed security forces, operating either with official sanction or as renegades. There are also instances of guerrilla-inspired persecution and violence in the



Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)-controlled zones. For example, *Tutela Legal* documented 67 civilian murders committed by guerrillas in 1983. The U.S. government also makes the claim that guerrillas use civilians as a shield against government forces in combat situations and are, therefore, responsible for the deaths of many noncombatants.

More widely reported from those close to the situation is that civilians caught in "conflicted areas" (contested areas in El Salvador where neither the guerrillas nor the government forces are in control) sometimes find themselves in "no-win" positions. If they assist the government forces, they may face retribution from the guerrillas. If they do not help the government forces or are identified as having assisted the guerrillas, they may be singled out for punishment by the government forces or death squads. Given the level of violence and the pervasive fear that hangs over El Salvador, it is probably not surprising that roughly 25 percent of the population has fled homes and villages in search of refuge inside or outside the country.

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It is estimated by the U.S. State Department that there are 400,000 internally displaced Salvadorans. Other estimates run as high as 700,000. It is extremely difficult to get an accurate count due to the constant changes in actual numbers and the interest many sources have in manipulating the count for political purposes. According to a recent report, 468,000 displaced people are receiving some sort of assistance (meaning meager food supplements and occasional medical attention). Knowledgeable sources indicate that at least 60-80,000 displaced persons, particularly in the conflicted areas, are beyond the reach of such assistance; some suggest that many more fall into this category.

It is believed that less than 25 percent of the displaced reside in camp situations. Many displaced people, wanting to stay close to their home village if possible, carve out an existence in or near their provincial capitals. Many others migrate into the San Salvador area. Constructing shanty towns or moving in with friends and relatives, many of the displaced are too proud or too scared to submit to a camp situation. Those who do must choose between government-controlled camps, where it is questionable whether they will be adequately protected, and church-run refuges, where the threat of government harassment is ever-present. The conditions the displaced live in throughout the country, while perhaps expected in the midst of a civil war, are deplorable. Displaced Salvadorans would find much better conditions in virtually any refugee camp or settlement in a nearby country of asylum.

The range of agencies or individuals to whom the displaced turn for help reflects the sharp divisions and deep distrust that hamper provision of adequate protection and equitable distribution of relief assistance. Of the 468,000 displaced persons known to be receiving assistance, the majority live in areas controlled by the government. Of these, 264,000 are officially registered as displaced persons with the government, while an additional 124,000 receive assistance from over 20 religious and nonsectarian voluntary organizations. Many of the displaced who look to church and private agency sources for food and medical assistance refuse to register with the

government because they are afraid to have their names on any list that might come into the hands of the death squads.

An additional 80,000 displaced people are given emergency relief assistance by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the only organization authorized by both the government and the FMLN to distribute food and deliver medical services to noncombatants in the conflicted areas as well as in guerrilla-controlled zones. The displaced that live in the roughly one-third of the country dominated by the FMLN may soon receive more than the food and medical assistance delivered by the ICRC. An agency called *Dad Paz* (Give Peace) was formed recently in Mexico City by the FMLN to coordinate additional international assistance targeted for the displaced persons in guerrilla-controlled zones.

Who is charged with the responsibility of protecting the displaced from persecution and violence? Unlike the Salvadoran refugee camps located just across the border in Honduras, there are no UNHCR protection officers monitoring the displaced camps and settlements of El Salvador. The UNHCR mandate is limited to providing protection and seeking permanent solutions for persons defined as refugees. Ironically, the primary source of protection for the internally displaced is the same Salvadoran government that is accused by many sources of perpetrating much of the violence and persecution in the first place. Another source of protection for some is the guerrillas who have also contributed to the escalating cycle of violence and retribution.

Displaced persons and those who work on their behalf often are viewed with great suspicion by the government. The Army claims that the camps and settlements established for the displaced who refuse to register with the government are used by guerrillas and their relatives to rest and resupply. There have been a number of instances in which armed forces and paramilitary groups are alleged to have attacked camps for the nonregistered, abducting, torturing, and in some cases, killing residents. Displaced persons caught outside their church-run refuges have been detained, tortured, and executed. There are also thoroughly documented instances of relief workers and medical personnel for displaced persons having been harassed, arrested, tortured, and in some instances, murdered. For example, the four American churchwomen who were abducted, sexually assaulted, and killed by government security forces on December 3, 1980, were working with displaced persons prior to their deaths.

There are also numerous reports of displaced people in conflicted or FMLN-controlled areas coming under attack by the Salvadoran Air Force. Beginning in September 1983, the Air Force is reported to have bombed sites in conflicted and guerrilla-controlled zones where displaced people assembled to receive ICRC food and medical assistance. Due to these bombings and other obstacles created by the Salvadoran government, ICRC was forced to reduce the number of displaced persons it assisted in troubled areas by approximately 30,000. Some Salvadoran officials and even U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering have maintained that civilians who remain in conflicted or FMLN-controlled areas are either guerrillas or civilian support personnel who live and travel with the armed guerrillas. The implication that it may be justifi-



able to attack civilian noncombatants in conflicted zones does not bode well for the displaced persons caught there.

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As suggested earlier, the distribution of food and the provision of medical assistance to displaced persons is highly politicized and fraught with shortcomings. Perhaps the best example of this is the role the U.S. government plays in the effort to get humanitarian assistance to the displaced. The U.S. completely funds the Salvadoran government agency which is responsible for the care and maintenance of the displaced persons registered with the government. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) directs displaced persons projects that include emergency health services, vaccinations for mothers and children, and Food for Work programs that give temporary, subsidized employment to some of the almost entirely unemployed displaced population.

What stands out as most significant is that U.S. government assistance is provided only to those who are registered with the Salvadoran government. This represents roughly one-half of the estimated displaced person population in El Salvador. Furthermore, AID funds a resettlement program for the displaced which is similar in strategy to the military's civilian pacification program used in Vietnam. The idea is to regain military control over a disputed area, relocate displaced persons to the area with a full complement of relief and development assistance, and ultimately strengthen political control over the area. Most displaced have been reluctant to be resettled under this effort, fearing these reclaimed areas are unsafe. Some reports indicate that the Salvadoran government's implementing agency has attempted to coerce the displaced to move into such areas by withholding food assistance until they relocate.

The point is that even with the significant U.S. government commitment to helping the displaced, the highly politicized nature of the relief delivery system severely limits the effectiveness of the overall effort. In order to expand its impact on the problem, the U.S. has offered funds to the religious and nonsectarian agencies serving the nonregistered. The offer has been turned down by those organizations, whose officials claim it would jeopardize their neutrality in the civil war and their credibility with the people they serve. Some U.S. officials suggest that the private organizations are ideologically biased in favor of the Salvadoran Left and use the tragedy of the displaced as evidence for their political perspective. Whatever the case, the result is that humanitarian assistance available for the displaced is not reaching thousands of people in desperate need.

As this stark reality became clearer to the various governmental and private agencies working with the displaced, calls for greater coordination and accountability were heard. This led to discussions about devising a more depoliticized, equitable system of distributing humanitarian assistance. To its credit (and to the detriment of the proposal), the U.S. government has encouraged the notion of a lead coordinating agency, such as ICRC, to achieve more effective distribution. ICRC, however, has been reluctant to assume such a politically dangerous role at the possible expense of its top priority—to aid victims in the conflicted areas. In any event, the initiative has not been successful.

A central unresolved issue, then, is how to channel the millions of dollars of relief more effectively so that it reaches those in need who now receive little or nothing. Assuming ICRC remains reluctant to assume a leadership role, many have recommended that UNHCR (or another agency such as UNICEF) be invited to strengthen the provision of protection and relief to the internally displaced of El Salvador. With its mandate to assist persons defined as refugees, UNHCR normally does not extend its helping hand to internally displaced persons. Nevertheless, there have been a number of situations, usually within the context of a voluntary repatriation program for returning refugees, where the agency has provided assistance to displaced persons, for example, in the Sudan, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, and Indochina. Another possibility might be the creation of a special United Nations agency for the specific purpose of assisting the displaced. There is also a precedent for this approach: in response to the crisis situation on the Thai-Kampuchean border in 1979, the UN set up the United Nations Border Relief Operations (UNBRO), which continues to provide emergency relief to the Khmer living along the 500-mile border.

Whatever the mechanism, it seems obvious that action must be taken if improved protection and sufficient relief are to be provided to the displaced persons of El Salvador. So far, little progress has been made. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of desperate Salvadorans are in need.

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In the welter of discussion and rhetoric about political violence, human rights, and the fight against communism in Central America, little attention has been focused directly on the 10 percent of the region's population that has been uprooted. These unplanned migrations have required tremendous efforts by the governments of the region and the international community. The situation still cries out for effective action. In particular, the tragedy of the displaced demands immediate action.

Most of the people engaged in service to the region's displaced are trying very hard to make a real, measurable impact. What seems to be needed now is a new level of courage and commitment; a determination that transcends the opinion-swapping and righteous indignation that undermines so much of the work done currently; a willingness to be politically aware without being overly politicized; an ability to be sensitive to national sovereignty without compromising the essential goals of adequate protection and equitable distribution of assistance; a capacity for compassion devoid of naiveté. The key question is who will accept the challenge, provide the leadership, and follow it through to its satisfactory resolution? The UN? ICRC? The United States government? The Salvadoran government of Jose Napoleon Duarte? The Contadora nations? Some combination of these?

Compared to what it will take for peace and prosperity to prevail in Central America, we have a chance to realize the goals of protecting lives, constructing shelters, distributing food equitably, providing sufficient medical assistance, and giving many more uprooted people a chance to become productive and self-sufficient again. We cannot let this opportunity to alleviate dramatically the suffering of so many pass by.

U.S. Refugee Policy and Southeast Asia: Time For A Renewed Commitment

Senator Mark O. Hatfield

When the Refugee Act of 1980 was before Congress four years ago, it was met with a chorus of boisterous praise. The act was touted as a bold, humanitarian initiative, a monument to this country's capacity for compassion and welcome to the oppressed and persecuted. The picture of Vietnamese boat people perishing at sea and Cambodian foot people escaping Pol Pot's slaughterhouse was too much for the American public to bear. The extension of a caring American hand to those tortured souls in flight became a political mandate.

That mandate translated into the 1980 legislation. The Refugee Act provided clear statutory language which in 1981 granted permanent asylum to more than 200,000 persons fleeing persecution in their homeland and involved the expenditure of over \$1.5 billion.

But in just four short years, the same public which embraced the refugee with open arms is perceived to have become fatigued, discouraged, burnt-out. There are many reasons to assume this tired condition exists. Despite our heroic involvement in refugee protection and resettlement during this decade, the worldwide refugee problem has worsened. There are at least nine million refugees in the world today, and the geopolitical climate offers little hope that the numbers will remain constant, much less abate.

The refugee problem in 1984 is such that people of good conscience sometimes despair in their efforts to assist. Those who argue that "because we cannot save everyone, we should not bother saving anyone" have broader audiences these days. Still others maintain that, having resettled almost 550,000 Southeast Asians since 1980, we have helped enough and should slam shut the door to the U.S. and concentrate on domestic problems.

These arguments have an appealing ring, particularly in light of depressed economic conditions facing parts of the U.S. and the troubling uncertainties of the foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, these arguments fail to account for the many compelling reasons that underlie our country's refugee policy, a policy focused largely at present on refugee migrations in Southeast Asia. An examination of these reasons reveals with unmistakable clarity that the justification for a generous refugee resettlement policy is as forceful today as ever.

First and foremost, the U.S. accepts refugees for humanitarian reasons. This country voluntarily presents itself to the international community as a beacon to the oppressed and to those thirsting for freedom.

Indeed, the fabric of our society today is woven of immigrants and refugees from all over the world who came to America for that precious freedom. For over 200 years, this country has been a place of refuge for some and a light of hope for all. Our rich heritage lies in the

tireless efforts made by our forefathers in defiance of tyranny and persecution. American refugee policy arose as a humanitarian response to international crises, to senseless bloodletting.

How can we possibly avert our eyes from the plight of the modern-day refugee? The U.S. must not see refugee problems merely as a component of the global poverty issue. Threadbare provisions and sub-human living conditions are endemic to countries suffocated by poverty, and refugee camps appear to many to be indistinguishable from most Third World villages. But refugees face much more than mere economic deprivation. They flee a past of persecution and suffering, and they face a future of homelessness. They are clusters of humanity left to endure the aftermath of terror: lost family members, lost possessions, lost hopes.

There is no way to quantify humanitarianism, but one measure of our generosity is the level of admissions to this country of refugees for permanent resettlement. In a process of consultations between the State Department, the Department of Justice, Congress, and other public and private officials, an annual ceiling of legal admissions is set. In 1982, that ceiling was set at 140,000; in 1983 at 90,000. In 1984, the number was set at 72,000, with 70 percent of allowable admissions earmarked for refugees from Southeast Asia. Many contend that this number is too high, or, alternatively, that it is too small and will have only a trifling effect on refugee camp populations.

Indeed, the U.S. cannot admit everyone fleeing war or the threat of war. But our role in providing hope for those escaping tyranny, in providing assistance to the countries of first asylum who bear the immediate brunt of refugee migration, and in providing shelter for our appropriate share of the refugee population, cannot decline. If we abandon our responsibility to uphold freedom by providing hope to those who are not free, to those terrorized by political persecution, then we have failed history and failed ourselves. This penetrating truth presents a moral imperative for this country to sustain its refugee policy regardless of the discouraging prognostications and the immensity of the worldwide refugee problem.

Beyond humanitarian reasons, there are many other persuasive arguments in support of a strong American refugee policy. These can be grouped together as "foreign policy" considerations. It is helpful to examine our refugee policy as it relates to Thailand because we have resettled more refugees out of that country over the past two years than from any other first asylum country.

For almost ten years, the kingdom of Thailand has carried the burden of Indochinese refugee migrations, and the U.S. has made repeated representations that it would continue to resettle refugees from the UNHCR camps, including those along the Cambodian border. America's willingness to assist in dealing with the Viet-

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namese, Lao, and Cambodian refugees stems in part from its role in exacerbating the problems in that region years ago.

However, Thailand's importance to our foreign policy interests plays a much greater role in the shaping of U.S. refugee policy. No one can doubt the value which refugee resettlement carries as a tool of diplomacy. The U.S. government sees Thailand as a critical ally in a traumatized region. Because Vietnam has spread its empire across Cambodia and Laos and up to the very borders of Thailand, the fall of Thailand would imperil U.S. security interests. While no one expects Vietnam to attack Thailand in the near future, border skirmishes between the two countries have occurred over the last two years. With the Philippines and Indonesia mired in domestic turmoil, Thailand, the only country in the region never to be colonized, emerges as a land vital to our interests. Good diplomatic relations are paramount and, with respect to Thailand, that means a dependable U.S. refugee admissions policy.

Refugee resettlement is the *quid pro quo* for matters unrelated to geopolitics as well. The U.S. conducts the majority of its investigative work involving American soldiers "missing in action" out of Thailand. Refugee camps prominently display signs instructing refugees who have sighted Americans in their homelands to step forward with such information.

U.S. drug enforcement agents point to their work in the "Golden Triangle" as instrumental in their efforts to obstruct opium and heroin shipments from Burma and Laos to America. Thailand serves as the key operations

Thailand's willingness to continue in its role as a first asylum nation may hinge on U.S. resettlement plans. UNHCR

base for these agents and provides assistance to Drug Enforcement Agency activities. The U.S. also exports over 150,000 metric tons of goods to Thailand each year, with total trade between the two nations already over \$2 billion dollars annually.

Because refugee migration imposes a serious burden on Thailand, the Thai government sees the U.S. role in resettling refugees as crucial. Should the U.S. decrease its efforts, thereby breaching promises made to Thai authorities that we would process all refugees in the camps, the Thai government would be hard pressed to deal with the refugees. Thailand, as well as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines, has so far withstood inconsistencies in U.S. processing of refugees, which have resulted in uneven rates of approval and uncertainties about our commitment to relieving asylum countries through resettlement off-take. New processing guidelines issued in August 1983 have given these governments hope that America's efforts in this multinational partnership will improve. If America were to abandon its resettlement effort, then we could expect the condemnation of Thailand and the inevitable consequences of strained relations with that sovereign land. Put simply, a solid U.S. refugee policy is good for this country and good for Thailand.

Many critics of U.S. refugee policy fail to consider foreign policy and national security interests when they



This Lao refugee and his family were transferred from one camp to another as part of Thailand's consolidation policy.
UNHCR

assail America's willingness to resettle refugees. But this analysis of our policy as it affects Thailand could be adapted to many other regions from which we currently accept refugees.

Although Southeast Asian asylum countries are affected most pointedly by the reduction in the U.S. admissions ceiling—this year a full 20 percent below the level of the previous year—other nations, too, need to be assured of our intention to preserve a viable, credible refugee resettlement program. A more generous ceiling would be evidence of this intention. Our interests in and relations with other asylum countries in all areas of the world can only be enhanced by such a policy.

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While U.S. refugee resettlement efforts are endangered, refugee assistance efforts do not appear to be in jeopardy. The U.S. has been the world's most generous donor of money to feed and house refugees. American funds to the United Nations Border Relief Operations, United Nations Relief and Works Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, and other international outreach projects have saved millions of lives.

But in addition to funds, international attention and pressure must be brought to bear to assure the protection of vulnerable refugees at Thailand's border.

I visited the Thai-Cambodia border in January 1984 and am well aware of living conditions of refugees at

Nong Samet and at other non-UNHCR camps along the border. One would be strained to identify in the history of mankind a people whose past was more horrifying and whose future more surely was doomed. These refugees survived the genocidal efforts of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge cadre. These refugees survived the subsequent bloody invasion and takeover of Cambodia by the hated Vietnamese. And to date, these refugees have survived the annual artillery and ground fire assault that since 1979 has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of their countrymen.

So the refugees are condemned to exist in a "no-man's land" and left to pray for an early rainy season. They are penned in by land mines and by anti-tank ditches in Cambodia and Thailand, and were it not for the food and water contributed primarily by the U.S., they would starve to death. For them it is an unbroken ritual of dodging bullets and bombs in the dry season and of retreating to their miserable camps in the rainy season.

The desperate cries emanating from the thatched houses along the Thai-Cambodian border do not seem to have found a sympathetic audience among the members of the international community. It is incumbent upon all governments of good conscience to spotlight the Vietnamese attacks in the hope that international public opinion (particularly European) will serve to mitigate Vietnamese aggression. Perhaps border camps with the greatest civilian population could be declared "safe-haven zones" under the surveillance of the United Nations. The fact that the UN already has a presence along the border makes this course of action worth serious consideration.

Congress, through restrictive language in last year's



appropriations bill, has forbidden the expenditure of any funds that would assist the Khmer Rouge. China should follow suit. Despite the intolerable nature of the Vietnamese occupation, the arming of Khmer Rouge soldiers is not a moral or acceptable counter-measure. The civilians along the border have suffered enough.

The international community did not learn of the incredible carnage of the Pol Pot era until it was over. In the case of the current massacre of Cambodians along the Thai border, there is no such element of secrecy. Should we stand idle in the face of this documented persecution, we shall not have the excuse that we did not know as a defense to the condemnations of history.

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U.S. refugee policy is in a period of transition. The decisions made today will dictate the direction of American refugee resettlement and protection efforts for the remainder of this decade.

The U.S. government has embarked upon a major increase in the rate of refugee processing through a program of legal emigration from Vietnam—the Orderly Departure Program (ODP). Because the annual admissions ceiling includes the number of refugees who enter under ODP, each such entry decreases the openings available for refugees to be resettled from first asylum countries such as Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Unless the ODP numbers are considered separate from the ceiling computations, the U.S. will find itself in the peculiar position of turning its back on its allies in favor of relations with Vietnam. Because ODP is not available to many of interest to the U.S., because exit often relates to ability to pay, and because the waiting list for the program is 500,000 and growing, a U.S. position which centralizes our admissions in ODP, while de-emphasizing resettlement of those in first asylum countries, would be indefensible. Once the residual population in Southeast Asian refugee camps is dealt with by the international community, the U.S. can then treat ODP as the cornerstone of our refugee processing efforts in the region responsibly. But for now primary emphasis should be on resettlement opportunities for those in the region's first asylum camps.

In a much broader perspective, the number of refugee admissions from Southeast Asia could face drastic reductions. As stated at the outset, Southeast Asia historically has received the large majority of refugee numbers from the worldwide ceiling. However, the more time that is placed between U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia and the present, the more likely it is that refugees from Southeast Asia will be given less emphasis in refugee number allocations. Further, as soon as the nexus between the U.S. presence in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and the ongoing political problems in the region is strained sufficiently, one can expect a move in Congress to steer away from refugee admissions entirely.

U.S. refugee admissions policy is a three-legged stool. It involves a primary effort to support first asylum countries until voluntary repatriation is feasible; it involves a secondary effort to relocate refugees permanently within the region; and finally, it involves a fallback position of resettlement as a "safety net" of support for the first two efforts. While a comprehensive approach to refugee assistance and protection in the embattled regions of the

world is laudible, the resettlement leg of U.S. refugee admissions policy is absolutely vital. If removed or weakened, the refugee policy of the U.S. will collapse. That sobering fact must mobilize supporters of a solid American refugee policy to act as capable stewards in the critical years ahead.

NEWS

FROM
THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES



Poll Reveals Significant Public Support for Refugee and Immigrant Admissions

Washington, D.C., June 8—*The widely held belief that Americans are solidly opposed to admitting refugees and immigrants to the U.S. is a superficial conclusion and, in fact, wrong on many counts, according to a poll released today by the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY), ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, who participated in the release, indicated, "This survey confirms that the openness and generosity of the American people remain strong." Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, added, "The survey shows the public strongly supports admitting individuals seeking to reunify families or in need of protection from persecution."*

When asked in the abstract if the number of foreigners coming into the U.S. should be reduced, much of the public responds in the affirmative. But when asked specifically about admitting ten different persons with a mixture of characteristics and motivations as refugees or immigrants, in every case the majority of those surveyed chose to admit the individual. For example, 79 percent of the national sample polled would admit "a Jew from the Soviet Union facing persecution because he is Jewish." Another person was described as follows: "A man from El Salvador comes from a town in which many people were killed by fighters from both sides of that country's civil war. He fears that if he is forced to return to El Salvador he will be in great danger." Sixty-six percent of the respondents said they would admit him to the U.S.

Other major poll findings were:

(1) *The more accurate knowledge a person has regarding refugee/immigrant issues, the more willing the person is to support a generous refugee/immigrant admissions policy.*

(2) *Most members of the public do not know the difference between refugees and other immigrants, the relative numbers in the various categories of people who come from elsewhere to live in the U.S., or where they are coming from.*

(3) *Regardless of a person's personal attitudes concerning a generous or restrictive admissions policy, the overwhelming majority of those interviewed considered the issue as one of moderate to low importance compared with other major national policy issues.*

Much of the characterization of U.S. public opinion on refugees and immigrants has been derived from the inclusion of a few questions in broader surveys. In its survey, USCR undertook to examine comprehensively and specifically public attitudes on refugees and immigrants. The research was carried out under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

"The real conclusion to be drawn from the survey is that there is more positive sentiment on the part of the American public on this issue than is usually acknowledged in Washington," according to Roger P. Winter, director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), which sponsored the survey. "The public is confused about the national policy debate in this area, but there is a clear relationship between increased knowledge about refugees and increased support for admissions. The lack of positive leadership on this issue at the national level has created the distinct possibility that, by superficially misreading the attitudes of the American public, our political leaders are in danger of adopting short-sighted, negative refugee and immigration policy."

USCR is a public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Established in 1966, it encourages the American public to participate actively in efforts to assist the world's refugees.

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U.S. Refugee Resettlement: A Program at the Crossroads

Susan S. Forbes

The U.S. refugee resettlement program is at a crossroads. In recent years, numerous initiatives were launched in an atmosphere of crisis, with refugee admissions numbering 14,000 per month and with the experiences of one major refugee group—Southeast Asians—in mind. Looking ahead, however, one can anticipate decreases in admissions levels (though the prospect of a new, large-scale emergency is always present); more ethnic diversity among resettled refugees; and new political and social contexts affecting implementation of refugee policy.

How the refugee program adapts to changing circumstances is an issue of concern to policy makers and program coordinators alike. Effective decision-making requires that past experiences be considered while realistic appraisals of the future are made.

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Although the U.S. has been a place of refuge throughout its history, until recently, most refugees entered under ad hoc legislative and administrative measures. Concerns about the inadequacy of U.S. refugee policy led to calls for legislative action, culminating in 1980 with the passage of the Refugee Act. According to the report of the House Judiciary Committee, the purpose of the bill is "to establish a coherent and comprehensive U.S. refugee policy. This objective is accomplished by creating a systematic and flexible procedure for the admission and resettlement of refugees."

Since passage of the act, considerable attention has been given to developing various policies and mechanisms needed to make the domestic assistance program more efficient and effective. These have included efforts to

- improve the preparation given overseas of U.S.-bound refugees;
- develop and refine programs stimulating early self-sufficiency;
- develop policies and programs to regulate the movement of refugees and minimize perceived negative impact of resettlement; and
- understand better the experiences of refugees and the effectiveness of programs.

In addition, procedural aspects of resettlement have evolved, becoming more formal, particularly with the institutionalization of certain programs and offices, the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement, state coordinators' offices, social service programs, targeted assistance programs, overseas language training and cultural orientation programs, etc.

With institutionalization has come a demand for greater accountability, clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities, and more standardization within resettlement programs. For example, recent amendments to the Refugee Act call for more monitoring of voluntary

agency operations and reporting requirements for agencies that receive federal funds; consultations have been held among federal officials, state and local government administrators, voluntary agencies, service providers, and refugee organizations to discuss, among other issues, each sector's roles and responsibilities; ORR has formed groups to establish standards for employment and other services; and considerable attention has been given to program and case management.

While few would argue that the resettlement program could not benefit from better management, institutionalization is a two-edged sword which can as easily lead to bureaucratic rigidity as to improved management. Balancing the need for structure with the need for flexibility is an issue which all of the agencies involved in resettlement must address.

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In 1980, Refugee Processing Centers (RPCs) were established in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to relieve pressures in first-asylum camps and provide adequate living conditions for Southeast Asian refugees awaiting resettlement. During the past few years, however, the centers have assumed significance as sites for pre-resettlement training. Under current arrangements, U.S.-bound refugees remain in the RPCs for up to six months while they receive intensive English language training and cultural orientation. In addition, those with certain medical conditions, such as active tuberculosis, undergo treatment at the camps, where they stay until cured. (Previously, refugees with active but non-communicable tuberculosis were permitted to travel to the U.S. and received treatment here.)

Initial assessments are positive regarding the contribution these centers make towards assisting refugees to resettle effectively in U.S. communities. The more successful these programs are, however, the more some argue for keeping refugees in the centers for longer periods to increase their readiness to live in the U.S. For example, a recent report from a California legislative delegation—noting that the ability to communicate in English facilitates self-sufficiency, reduces community tensions, and "reduces significantly dependence on welfare, thus further decreasing the cost of income maintenance to federal, state, and county governments"—recommended that priority for coming to this country be accorded to those who can demonstrate fluency in English and that refugees who cannot satisfy this requirement remain in the RPCs for additional training.

This proposal raises logistical problems with potentially serious ramifications. The RPCs have limited capacity and it takes time to increase their size. If training periods are lengthened, they could become a bottleneck, slowing admissions and alarming the countries of first asylum, whose receptivity to refugees is directly tied to the commitment of resettlement nations to admit the Southeast Asian refugees.

Susan Forbes is a senior associate of the Refugee Policy Group.



An explicit aim of the U.S. domestic assistance program is to promote early economic self-sufficiency among refugees. Throughout the Refugee Act of 1980, this goal is expressed. For example:

In providing assistance . . . the Director [of ORR] shall . . . make available sufficient resources for employment training and placement in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as quickly as possible, . . . provide refugees with the opportunity to acquire sufficient English language training to enable them to become effectively resettled as quickly as possible.

In 1982, several amendments were added to the legislation to encourage early self-sufficiency:

- employable refugees are required to register for employment immediately, rather than receiving a 60-day waiver, as the original legislation permitted;
- employable refugees who are receiving cash assistance are required to participate in an appropriate employment or language training program;
- assistance is to be terminated immediately if a refugee refuses to participate in appropriate training or to accept an appropriate job offer;
- states are required to notify voluntary agencies whenever a refugee applies for public assistance, and voluntary agencies must notify welfare officials whenever they are aware that a job has been offered to refugees they sponsored; and
- refugee assistance to full-time college students is prohibited unless the college training is part of an employability plan developed for the refugee.

Several administrative actions were also taken to facilitate refugees' economic independence. ORR identified employment and English language training as priority services. In addition, the agency launched a program of support for projects which, in ORR's words, "enhance refugee employment potential and increase the ability of refugees to find and retain jobs." The "targeted assistance" grants were earmarked for counties which needed supplements to existing social service programs,

At the Galang Processing Center in Indonesia, refugees like these young Cambodians work at a variety of trades while attending language and vocational classes. Refugees spend an average of six months at the camp before resettlement. UNHCR

because they served large numbers of dependent refugees.

While most of these administrative efforts have been directed towards service provision, less has been accomplished with regard to the delivery of interim cash and medical assistance, with one exception—the encouragement of case management systems. Several states have developed these systems, which assign refugees to case managers who refer them for public assistance and social services and monitor their progress toward self-sufficiency. Yet, although widespread interest has been expressed, progress has been slow in implementing case management programs, at least in part because funding and administrative issues have not been resolved at the federal level.

Also under discussion during the past few years, but not yet resolved, are issues pertaining to cash and medical assistance programs. Questions have been raised repeatedly about refugee assistance programs modeled after Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid, since neither of these programs was designed to meet the special needs of refugees for interim assistance. Although several alternative models have been proposed—including privately administered programs—to date few have been tried.

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In recent years, various programs have sought to influence the residency patterns of refugees. The U.S. has always attempted to disperse refugees throughout the nation, but since passage of the Refugee Act, that practice has been codified. In the Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, Congress mandated development of a formal placement policy to balance refugees' desire for family reunification with the concerns of receiving communities about the negative impact they fear would



accompany large refugee concentrations. In addition, ORR has sponsored several demonstration projects, including the Favorable Alternative Sites Program, the Khmer Guided Placement Project, and a program for the Planned Secondary Migration of refugees—all encouraging the placement and/or movement of refugees into areas with smaller numbers of refugees and favorable resettlement prospects.

These initiatives, combined with the fact that voluntary agencies place refugees with affiliates scattered around the nation, have led to substantial dispersal of Southeast Asian refugees. In fact, the question has been raised whether dispersal aids or impedes economic self-sufficiency. The relationship between the two phenomena is an elusive factor in resettlement. Whether adjustment is attained more rapidly within or outside of the ethnic community is debatable. It remains, however, that many immigrant groups have been highly concentrated in a few locations while rapidly attaining economic success.

Among the first waves of Southeast Asian refugees, many were well-educated professionals who had worked with Americans in their own countries. These refugees have entered the mainstream of American life with remarkable speed and vigor. Perhaps the most telling measure of their success is the fact that they have achieved, in less than a decade, a rate of employment equal to that of the rest of the U.S. population.

In comparison, the more recent refugee arrivals have less education, speak less English, and are less familiar with Western culture. Not surprisingly, they have had more problems. Simple chores—shopping, using public transportation, managing a home—become complicated tasks. Without English and a basic education, it is difficult for them to find and keep jobs or to enter vocational training programs.

For these refugees, life is not just difficult—it can be dangerous. A few years ago, for example, four Cambodian children drowned in a Florida river because neither they nor their parents could read a sign that said: "No Swimming."

To better prepare refugees for life in the U.S., the Intensive English as a Second Language, Cultural Orientation, and Pre-Employment Training Program provides instruction to Southeast Asian refugees age 16 to 55. Funded by the Bureau for Refugee Programs of the U.S. Department of State, the goal of the program is to prepare refugees for successful resettlement and self-sufficiency in their new communities. About 112,000 refugees have completed the program since it began in November 1980.

At present, there are three sites for the overseas training program. In the Philippines, training is provided at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center, located on a ridge overlooking the South China Sea, about four hours driving time from Manila. Over 17,000 refugees are housed at the center at any given time, living in ten neighborhoods that

Research is needed to determine if a cause-and-effect relationship is at work.

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U.S. refugee policy evolved with relatively little information about the needs of special refugee groups; the effectiveness of specific programs; the experiences of specific programs; the experiences of refugees in becoming self-sufficient; or the impact of refugee resettlement upon receiving communities.

To obtain better information regarding refugee resettlement, the federal government embarked on a major research and data collection program. Over the past three years, it has funded more than \$3.5 million in research and evaluation studies and has supported the development of a large data base, housed in ORR, which contains information on all entering refugees. These efforts were designed to yield information for improved decision-making on a number of key policy issues: the economic self-sufficiency of refugees; the role of the

Educational Programs In Refugee Camps—

stretch along the four-kilometer ridge. The program implementor in the Philippines is the International Catholic Migration Commission.

In Indonesia, the program operates on Galang, a small island about four hours by boat southeast of Singapore. The Galang Refugee Processing Center is the most isolated of the training sites. Refugees are housed in long, wooden barracks and attend classes in cement-block school buildings. A consortium of Save the Children Federation and the Experiment in International Living acts as program implementor.

In Thailand, training takes place at the Phanat Nikhom Refugee Center, approximately 120 kilometers southeast of Bangkok. The camp is located on a highway outside of the town of Phanat Nikhom, a small Thai farming community. Refugee housing and classrooms are constructed of bamboo or asbestos-board with tin roofs. The program implementor is a consortium of Save the Children Federation, the Experiment in International Living, and World Education.

Although the training sites are located in different countries and are operated by different agencies, program goals are shared.

English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction aims to develop students' ability to use English in work and social settings they will encounter in the U.S. The focus is on the practical: listening and speaking skills are emphasized and the curriculum is organized around topics such as housing, clothing, food, health, transportation, employment, and banking. Under the topic "Health," for example, students are taught how to ask for medical assistance, explain health problems, and follow instructions about treatment.

The Cultural Orientation (C.O.) curriculum is designed to provide refugees with information about the U.S. and help them develop problem-solving and decision-making skills for coping with life in a new culture. C.O. instruction is provided in the refugees' native languages through the use of refugee teaching assistants.

This article was prepared by staff members of the Refugee Service Center of the Center for Applied Linguistics

refugee community in resettlement; the impact of refugees on receiving communities; the health care needs and impact of refugees; the effectiveness of English-language training programs; the resettlement experiences of Hmong, etc.

Most of these research projects will have been completed by the end of 1984. To begin determining policy implications, results of the research were discussed at a conference in early 1984, attended by representatives of most sectors of the refugee program. Follow-up work is planned to ensure that the information is incorporated into the policy-making process.

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Almost all of the undertakings described here have a dual purpose: to assist refugees who are in need of resettlement and to protect U.S. communities from adverse effects of refugee resettlement. The major challenge ahead is in resolving how best to accomplish these goals. To a large degree, our ability to do so will be

determined by our success in dealing with three issues:

- the need for flexibility in responding to the episodic nature of refugee resettlement programs;
- the need to balance our international/humanitarian commitments and our domestic concerns; and
- the requirements of a program that deals with all phases of resettlement, from movement of people out of first asylum camps to their ultimate integration into U.S. society.

Although the flow of refugees into the U.S. has been almost continuous during the past century, it has not been a steady stream, emanating from one source. Instead, each separate movement of people has had its own causes, and each course of events has appeared to be independent of any other. As a result, resettlement has been influenced by fluctuations in both the numbers of refugees who come to the U.S. and their demographic and other characteristics.

This episodic quality makes planning difficult and

Providing a Headstart on New Lives

C.O. topic areas include time management, consumerism and finance, health and sanitation, and social roles. Resettlement and sponsorship are also covered. Each topic consists of specific educational objectives. For example, the "Time Management" section aims to help students understand the importance of punctuality, use a calendar, and make, keep, and break appointments.

While the employment topics in the ESL and C.O. curricula focus on aspects of getting a job, the Pre-Employment curriculum emphasizes the skills and behavior needed to keep a job. For example, students are taught how to follow directions, to ask for clarification, and to speak up if they do not understand something. They learn it is important to tell employers, in advance, if they are going to be absent. Basic skills such as understanding letter and number codes and basic measurements are also taught. The goals of this most recent addition to the training program are to enable refugees to communicate and function more effectively on the job, to understand the expectations of employers and co-workers, and to be able to learn from on-the-job training. Rather than provide training in a specific job, this part of the program aims to enhance refugees' employability and trainability in whatever entry-level position they obtain.

Teachers in the camp training programs are host country nationals—Thai, Indonesian, and Filipino. Most are trained language teachers with a high level of English ability. New teachers take part in several weeks of pre-service orientation, training, and practice teaching before they receive their class assignments. For the duration of their assignments, teachers are required to take part in weekly in-service training that includes workshops on teaching techniques, curriculum and materials development, and information sessions on life in the U.S.

Teachers are encouraged to simulate common settings such as the supermarket, doctor's office, and workplace. In the Pre-Employment program, for example, they are trained to establish an employer-employee relationship with their students and simulate an on-the-job training

environment in their classes, complete with time clocks, sign-in sheets, assembly-line tasks, and breaks.

Teacher training is provided by experienced American and host-country national supervisors. In addition to giving workshops, supervisors work closely with teachers, providing support with planning lessons, monitoring classes, offering feedback, and evaluating teacher performance.

A link between the overseas training sites and resettlement programs in the U.S. is provided by the Refugee Service Center in Manila and a liaison office in Washington, D.C. Both are operated by the Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL). The Service Center provides the three program sites with technical assistance, including help in testing and placing students, and material support. The liaison office manages a two-way flow of information and resource-sharing. Two newsletters are published: one provides information about U.S. resettlement and education trends for overseas staff; the other provides information about the camp programs for educators and resettlement professionals in the U.S. Resource manuals about the overseas curricula and lesson plans are distributed to key resettlement institutions throughout the country. CAL also arranges frequent visits of U.S. professionals to the camps, so that they can provide training support and current information on developments in the U.S., as well as presentations about the training program for educators and resettlement professionals in this country. In addition, a 35-minute videotape documentary about the camp programs was produced recently and is available for purchase or loan.

While refugees will continue to require educational and support services upon arrival in the U.S., the Intensive English as a Second Language, Cultural Orientation, and Pre-Employment Program aims to offer these newcomers a headstart toward adaptation to a new language and culture, attainment of self-sufficiency, and rebuilding of their lives in their new country.



presents challenges. When the number of refugees being resettled is decreasing, as is the case today, attention focuses on the phase-down of resettlement activities. In fact, in the short term, one of the major issues facing the U.S. resettlement program is handling the staff and program reductions necessitated by declining numbers of new arrivals. These short-term issues must be addressed, though, in the context of what we know is the potential for rapid change. Even greater problems will emerge if we are not mindful that new crises are likely to occur and that, when they do, the U.S. may be handling large influxes once more.

Moreover, it must be remembered that new flows may bring different groups of refugees. Certainly, the characteristics and needs of Southeast Asians differed greatly from those of the Eastern European and Cuban refugees who preceded them. Whether the next major flow of refugees will resemble any of these groups is unknown. In the meantime, we do know that refugees currently are entering from over 20 nations, and their diverse needs must be addressed.

Given the ebb and flow of refugee resettlement requirements, flexibility is needed to ensure that this country can respond appropriately. What works best for small numbers or a homogeneous population will not necessarily be best for a large or heterogeneous group. The circumstances under which refugees arrive in this country will also affect the appropriateness of specific policies and programs. Some groups have entered in a crisis atmosphere, following rapid evacuation from their homelands, whereas others come after spending long periods in first asylum camps, and still others have sought first asylum in this country.

As noted above, recent measures have focused on institutionalization and standardization of the refugee program. A challenge ahead is ensuring that these efforts improve program performance without impeding flexibility to respond to new situations.

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The Refugee Act of 1980 recognizes that international, humanitarian, and domestic concerns should be taken into account when refugee admissions numbers are set. In many instances, there is no conflict among these objectives, but there can be, particularly if there is dissonance between what is needed for the expeditious movement of refugees and what is needed for smooth resettlement. The issues discussed above regarding the overseas training program are a good example.

In stark terms, we must ask to what extent refugee resettlement numbers and allocations should be determined by any of the following factors: the number of refugees who realistically must be resettled to maintain first asylum; the number that the U.S. believes it can absorb with minimal negative results; or some other criteria (e.g., international burden-sharing). Certainly, in 1979, at the height of the Indochinese crisis, the determination was made on the basis of the first factor. There are indications that the pendulum is swinging towards the second, with perceived domestic impact playing an expanding role in setting admission numbers. For example, in recent hearings on the Refugee Act and consultations on refugee admissions, discussion has focused on resettlement program costs as a factor to consider in determining admission levels.

Another challenge ahead, then, is to maintain a balance between these factors which enables us to continue as a nation of refuge while still addressing domestic concerns.

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The third challenge facing this country is directly related to the one just described: how to balance aspects of the program related to the relocation of refugees with those related to their longer-term adaptation and integration. The resettlement program provides humanitarian relief to refugees by moving them from unstable situations into the U.S. and helps them become self-sufficient members of our society.

In the years ahead, several basic questions about the resettlement process must be answered. First, more information is needed to define the phases of this process. For this, the research discussed above should help. Second, policy decisions must determine which agencies will be responsible for each aspect of the resettlement process. Also needed are better ideas about how transition is made from one phase to another, to avoid unnecessary duplication or gaps in assistance. Finally, the issue of when an individual ceases to be a refugee—at least for the purposes of receiving special assistance—needs to be addressed.

At present, there are no easy answers to these questions. For example, we cannot say definitively that it takes so many years for a refugee to become economically self-supporting, so many years to adapt to his or her new society, and so many years to become fully integrated. Even if we knew the answers for one group, there are no assurances that the information would be true for others.

For the purposes of policy formulation, however, this question must be dealt with, particularly since our willingness to admit refugees is so often linked to our perceived ability to resettle them effectively and rapidly. First steps were taken in the Refugee Act and subsequent regulations to establish time limits for cash assistance eligibility and federal reimbursements to states for cash assistance costs. These efforts marked a departure from the Cuban resettlement program of the 1960s and 1970s, in which no time limits were imposed on federal reimbursement.

Still of concern are several other issues related to the phasing of the resettlement process, including time limits on eligibility for social services; the extent of federal responsibility for providing impact aid to jurisdictions with large numbers of refugees no longer eligible for assistance but still in need; the emotional and mental health needs of refugees, which often surface several years after resettlement; and the type and duration of support provided by federal and state refugee offices for ethnic associations playing long-term roles in assisting their members.

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The refugee resettlement program has come a good distance from its recent history. Responses to circumstances and situations are less ad hoc, more part of a practiced, structured effort. Given continued, careful attention to fundamental questions, drawing on research and experience and with an eye to a balance among a multiplicity of factors, policy makers and program coordinators can move forward from this turning point to the challenges of the future.



Published documents and other sources often vary in the numbers of refugees reported in a given area or in particular situations. Such variation can be disconcerting and may bring into question the sources' credibility. One obvious reason for discrepancies is the unpredictability and fluidity of so many refugee situations—a country quiet in February may be overwhelmed by June, and equally correct reports might be available for both periods. Counts obtained in relatively stable or contained situations may be more reliable than those from larger or rapidly changing ones; statistics about populations in camps from which refugees are processed for resettlement, as in Southeast Asia, for example, appear regularly and can be deemed quite reliable. But even here, updated or revised censuses or estimates can lead to some discrepancies.

Media reports—although perhaps uniquely providing prompt, continuing information on changing situations—may be inconsistent about whom they term a refugee or may not attribute an official source.

More subtle differences in refugee counts arise because those collecting and reporting data—while most often drawing on figures provided by the governments of the affected countries—present the data for review by their own professionals. Judgments are made, fitting data to definitions, criteria, and purposes which may differ significantly. A clear example is that of numbers provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which include all refugees reported by asylum-country governments (of whom UNHCR assists some) and reports such as that of the U.S. State Department, which classifies refugees as "requiring protection and assistance" or "resettled, not requiring international assistance."

Politics and nations' administrative procedures enter into counts of refugees. Some sources, for example, report certain aliens in a country as meriting international recognition as refugees, while others term them illegal or overstayed migrant workers seeking economic opportunity. It may be in the political interest of a government to understate its refugee population or, in other instances, to report large numbers. Because countries may admit individuals under classifications other than refugee, some who might fit this description by virtue of their circumstances may not be counted as such; among these in countries of resettlement might be family reunification cases and special humanitarian admissions. Asylum seekers whose applications have been denied but who nevertheless are permitted to stay in a country may also not be reflected in refugee counts.

Some clarity in reporting is feasible: for example, agencies can report with confidence the numbers for whom aid is provided or planned. Ideally, assistance and protection would be provided to all those who require it, and thus counts of actual recipients of aid or "registered" refugees would represent all who are in need. In reality, of course, this is not always the case. Further, international assistance is sometimes provided to individuals who do not meet the international definition of a refugee

per se, but who are deemed to be "in refugee-like situations"; these may appear in refugee counts. In Africa, for example, UNHCR operates in accordance with the mandate of the Organization of African Unity, whose refugee definition is broader than that of the UN's own *Convention and Protocol*, and its count of refugees of concern there is of broader scope than its count for Central America.

In some instances, accuracy may be detrimental, even dangerous. Figures reported following rigid definitions may jeopardize agencies' ability to provide adequate services to those quite obviously in need. Also, individuals may rightfully fear to draw attention to themselves, even in countries of asylum, for fear of retribution by home country officials or sympathizers.

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
Suggestions for numerous refinements in the types of statistics available have been made to USCR, often in the form of recurrent inquiries. Prominent among them is more demographic detail—how many refugees are women and children, how many are aged, how many have some level of education so that their employment needs and prospects could be better assessed. Reports of refugees requiring assistance might usefully reflect the different intensities of need—how many require immediate "emergency" assistance, how many need to be maintained and cared for beyond initial assistance, and how many might profit from longer-term development aid allowing prospects for durable solutions. Such detail is not generally retrievable from existing reports, but the means for gathering some of this information may be available to agencies in the field for incorporation in future reports.

In view of the many deficiencies in the available data, questions may arise about the usefulness of collecting and reporting refugee statistics at all.

When used carefully and with a good understanding of their flaws, statistics provide one means to grasp the magnitude of "the refugee problem." Credible, clear, comparable data disallow flagrant exaggeration as well as understatement, either of which might distort the gravity of a particular refugee situation or the worldwide picture. For assistance to be provided and programs to be planned, reasonably reliable numbers are vital; data also allow one measure of success of efforts on behalf of refugees. Numbers are useful, too, to alert the international community that the burden of caring for refugees is shared, and, more importantly, that nowadays it is often the least well-off nations which support significant refugee populations.

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In collecting data for the *Survey*, we rely largely on other sources which we judge, in turn, to be responsible. The sources used are listed below; an annotated list attributing each count to its source will be available from USCR. Instances where key sources differ significantly (for reasons we could identify as other than time period of reports) are indicated in the statistical tables with an asterisk (*).



* These counts may significantly understate the number of refugees from a given country, as reports used as sources often did not specify the origin of some refugees in countries of asylum.

* Indicates significant variance among sources in number reported.

Given the reporting mechanisms of several of USCR's sources, data were provided representing a span of about nine months in collection times. This year, we have chosen to use the most current figures available from the selected sources.

Because USCR's primary concern is for the protection and assistance of refugees, the statistical tables and the reports that follow are organized according to countries of asylum or resettlement, although in some cases the reports also treat a country as a source of refugee flows. (The map above presents the major sources of refugees).

As in last year's *Survey*, we have attempted to separate specifically refugees who require international protection and aid (see Table 1) and those reported as entries resettled since 1975 (see Table 2). It is for the former—largely in Africa, East and South Asia, and Central America—that food, housing, medical care, and perhaps most critically international protection under international legal covenants is needed. The population may be new—as the 44,000 Mozambicans in Zimbabwe—or it may have been in a country pending a resolution for several years, as the more than 2 million Afghans in Pakistan.

The primary source for numbers of refugees resettled was the U.S. State Department, which in turn received reports directly from the governments concerned. Countries which have traditionally offered resettlement and thus have established programs—such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.S., and some Western European countries—provide particularly reliable data. The figures are consistently lower than those in last year's *Survey*, due largely to the more limited time period covered.

All numbers have been rounded, and we stress that none should be interpreted absolutely. Further, the sheer number should not be considered the only indication of the gravity of a given situation—Tables 3 and 4, which present refugee populations in relation to size of receiving

countries' native populations and gross national products, introduce some of the other factors which should be taken into account. Again, because the resettlement figures are cumulative from 1975 only, Table 4 differs from the comparable table in last year's *Survey*.

Voluntary repatriation numbers reflect those people who participated in formal programs administered by UNHCR (see Table 5). There are instances of informal (privately undertaken) voluntary returns to homelands, but data on such generally cannot be deemed reliable.

Internally displaced populations represent people within their homeland displaced as a result of civil strife or persecution and sometimes also by drought or other natural disaster. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross an international border, they are generally not eligible for international assistance as refugees (though often distribution of aid to the displaced uses the same or similar mechanisms). No agency currently has the capacity or responsibility for keeping track of all the displaced people; therefore, available figures are offered in Table 6 as general estimates or ranges, acknowledging that many large groups in different parts of the world are uncounted and unreported. Because the figures are not comprehensive, no total of internally displaced people is provided.

We again report the amounts of financial assistance provided to international agencies by countries (see Graph 1). However, individual countries' contributions to the European Economic Community could not be specifically credited. Bilateral aid, some forms of aid which are not exclusively or even primarily designated for refugees, and aid through such agencies as the World Bank which may benefit refugees are not reflected in these tables. This year, we are able to include as a source of funds the amount of assistance the World Food Program allocated for refugees in 1983. This additional



source makes the total contributions for 1983 appear much higher than in previous years. Once again, relative import of contributions should be considered not only in terms of absolute size but also size in relation to each nation's per capita income and gross national product (see Table 7).

The country reports which follow the statistical tables provide still other information to allow more informed interpretation of the numbers. Omitted from this year's reports (though they may be included in statistical tables) are countries whose situations are little changed from previous years.

Editor

Asylum Country
Source Country/Area

AFRICA			Zambia			LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN		
Algeria		167,000*	Angola	86,000	104,000	Argentina		12,000*
W. Sahara	135,000*		Zaire	9,000		Europe	5,000	
Other	2,000		Namibia	5,000		Latin America	5,000	
Angola		96,000	S. Africa	3,000		Southeast Asia	2,000	
Namibia	70,000		Other	1,000		Belize		7,000
Zaire	20,000		Zimbabwe		44,000	El Salvador		
S. Africa	6,000		Mozambique			Brazil		5,000*
Botswana		5,000	TOTAL AFRICA		2,633,000	Europe		
Zimbabwe	4,000					Other		
Other	1,000					Chile		3,000
Burundi		57,000*	EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC			Europe		
Zaire	2,000		Burma		1,000	Costa Rica		17,000
Rwanda	55,000*		China			El Salvador	10,000	
Cameroon		4,000	Malaysia			Nicaragua	4,000	
Chad			Other			Other L. America	3,000	
Central African Republic		7,000	China		17,000*	Cuba		2,000
Chad			Vietnam			L. America		
Djibouti		23,000*	Hong Kong		13,000	Dominican Republic		5,000
Ethiopia			Vietnam			Haiti		
Egypt		5,000	Indonesia		10,000	Guatemala		70,000*
Ethiopia			(First Asylum)			El Salvador		
Afghanistan			Vietnam	6,000		Nicaragua	19,000	
Other			(Refugee Processing Center)			El Salvador	18,000	
Ethiopia		40,000	Vietnam	3,000		Other L. America	1,000	
Sudan	39,000		Cambodia	1,000		Honduras		58,000
Other	1,000		Japan		2,000	Nicaragua		
Kenya		8,000	Vietnam			El Salvador	120,000*	
Uganda	4,000		Malaysia		101,000*	Guatemala	40,000	
Ethiopia	2,000		Philippines	90,000*		Other L. America	10,000*	
Rwanda	2,000		Vietnam	11,000		Nicaragua		19,000
Lesotho		1,000*	Papua New Guinea		9,000	El Salvador	18,000	
S. Africa			Indonesia			Other L. America	1,000	
Nigeria		5,000	Philippines		18,000	Panama		2,000
Chad	4,000		(First Asylum)			El Salvador	1,000	
Other	1,000		Vietnam	2,000		Other L. America	1,000	
Rwanda		49,000*	(Refugee Processing Center)			Venezuela		1,000
Burundi	18,000*		Laos	2,000		Mainly L. America		
Uganda	31,000*		Cambodia	6,000		Other		2,000
Senegal		5,000	Vietnam	8,000		TOTAL LATIN AMERICA/		CARIBBEAN
Guinea Bissau			Thailand		126,000			353,000
Somalia		700,000*	(does not include persons along			MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA		
Ethiopia			the Thai-Cambodia border)			India		8,000
Sudan		690,000*	Laos	72,000		Afghanistan	6,000	
Ethiopia	484,000*		Cambodia	47,000		Iran	2,000	
Uganda	200,000		Vietnam	7,000		Iran		810,000*
Chad	1,000		Vietnam		21,000	Afghanistan	750,000*	
Zaire	5,000		Cambodia			Iraq	60,000	
Swaziland		7,000	TOTAL EAST ASIA/		318,000	Jordan		775,000
S. Africa			PACIFIC			Palestinians		
Tanzania		180,000	EUROPE			Lebanon		258,000
Burundi	148,000		Austria		10,000	Palestinians		
Zaire	15,000		Eastern Europe			Pakistan		2,925,000*
Uganda	10,000		Greece		4,000	Afghanistan	2,900,000	
S. Africa	6,000		Near East			Iran	25,000*	
Other	1,000		Italy		10,000	Syria		232,000
Uganda		132,000*	nearby countries			Palestinians		
Rwanda	80,000*		Turkey		1,000	West Bank		350,000
Zaire	31,000*		nearby countries			Palestinians		
undetermined			Yugoslavia		2,000	Gaza Strip		402,000
status	21,000*		Eastern Europe			Palestinians		
Zaire		304,000	TOTAL EUROPE		27,000	TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/		SOUTH ASIA
Angola	215,000							5,760,000
Burundi	10,000					GRAND TOTAL		9,091,000
Rwanda	12,000							
Uganda	65,000							
Zambia and other	2,000							

*Indicates significant variance among sources in number reported.



Resettlement Country Source Country/Area

AFRICA		Japan	3,000	Netherlands	9,000	Honduras	22,000
Algeria	1,000	Indochina		Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe,		El Salvador, Nicaragua,	
Ethiopia	6,000	Korea (South)	1,000	L. America, Middle East		Other	
Sudan		N. Korea, Vietnam		Norway	6,000!	Nicaragua	26,000
Kenya	16,000	Malaysia	13,000	Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe,		El Salvador, Guatemala	
Afghanistan, Ethiopia,		Cambodia, Philippines		L. America, Middle East,		TOTAL L. AMERICA/	
S. Africa, Other		New Zealand	6,000	Other		CARIBBEAN	53,000
Mozambique	1,000	E. Europe, Southeast Asia		Portugal	3,000!	MIDDLE EAST AND	
Zimbabwe		Papua New Guinea	3,000	Angola, Other African		SOUTH ASIA	
Rwanda	1,000	Indonesia		countries, Other		Egypt	2,000
Uganda		Philippines	2,000	Spain	26,000	Ethiopia, Iran, Poland,	
Somalia	61,000	Vietnam		Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe,		Romania, S. Africa, Other	
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,		Taiwan	13,000	L. America, Middle East,		TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/	
Tanzania, Uganda		Southeast Asia		Other		S. ASIA	2,000
Swaziland	6,000	TOTAL E. ASIA/		Sweden	23,000	NORTH AMERICA	
Lesotho, Mozambique,		PACIFIC	425,000	Chile, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq,		Canada	142,000
S. Africa, Other		EUROPE		Poland, Vietnam, Other		Africa, Asia, E. Europe,	
Zambia	9,000	Austria	13,000	Switzerland	17,000	L. America, Middle East,	
Angola, Zaire		E. Europe, Vietnam		Poland, Southeast Asia,		Other	
TOTAL AFRICA	101,000	Belgium	2,000!	Other		United States	895,000
		Various		Turkey	4,000	Africa, E. Europe,	
EAST ASIA AND		Denmark	4,000	Afghanistan		L. America, Middle East,	
THE PACIFIC		E. Europe, L. America,		United Kingdom	6,000!	Southeast Asia, Other	
Australia	103,000	Vietnam, Other		Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe,		TOTAL N.	
Africa, E. Europe,		France	119,000	L. America, Middle East		AMERICA	1,037,000
L. America, Middle East,		Africa, E. Europe,		TOTAL EUROPE	281,000	GRAND TOTAL	1,898,000
Southeast Asia, Other		L. America, Middle East,		LATIN AMERICA AND			
China	276,000	Southeast Asia		THE CARIBBEAN			
Cambodia, Laos,		Germany (FRG)	45,000	Argentina	2,000		
Mongolia, Vietnam		E. Europe, Southeast,		Southeast Asia			
Hong Kong	5,000	Asia, Other		Costa Rica	4,000		
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam		Italy	4,000	Cuba, El Salvador,			
		E. Europe		Guatemala, Nicaragua			

(!) Statistics for 1975-1981 were unavailable; total provided reflects 1982 and 1983 entries.

Top 20 Countries

Asylum Country	Ratio	Population (in millions)	Number of Refugees in Need	GNP Per Capita
Jordan	1/5	3.6	775,000	\$1,623
Somalia	1/8	5.3	700,000*	282
Lebanon	1/10	2.6	258,000	N/A
Djibouti	1/13	.3	23,000*	476
Belize	1/29	.2	7,000	1,110
Sudan	1/30	20.6	690,000*	380
Pakistan	1/33	95.7	2,925,000*	349
Syria	1/42	9.7	232,000	1,569
Iran	1/52	42.5	810,000*	N/A
Zambia	1/60	6.2	104,000	586
Angola	1/79	7.6	96,000	790
Burundi	1/79	4.5	57,000*	235
Swaziland	1/86	.6	7,000	844
Zaire	1/103	31.3	304,000	225
Uganda	1/104	13.8	133,000*	356
Honduras	1/108	4.1	38,000	591
Guatemala	1/113	7.9	70,000*	1,159
Rwanda	1/114	5.6	49,000*	250
Tanzania	1/114	20.5	180,000	299
Algeria	1/124	20.7	167,000*	2,129
Gaza	1/1.2	.5	402,000	N/A
W. Bank	1/2.3	.8	350,000	N/A

* Indicates significant variance among sources in number reported.

Top 15 Countries

Resettlement Country	Ratio	Population (in millions)	Number of Resettled Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Somalia	1/87	5.3	61,000	\$ 282
Swaziland	1/100	.6	6,000	844
Nicaragua	1/108	2.8	26,000	874
Australia	1/149	15.3	103,000	11,190
Canada	1/175	24.9	142,000	11,230
Honduras	1/186	4.1	22,000	591
United States	1/261	234.2	895,000	12,530
Sweden	1/361	8.3	23,000	14,500
Switzerland	1/382	6.5	17,000	17,150
France	1/459	54.6	119,000	12,130
New Zealand	1/533	3.2	6,000	7,580
Austria	1/585	7.6	13,000	10,250
Costa Rica	1/600	2.4	4,000	1,476
Norway	1/683!	4.1	6,000!	13,800
Zambia	1/689	6.2	9,000	586

(!) Reflects 1982 and 1983 entries only



Relocated to the Thai-Cambodia border from Thailand . . . 10,000
 To Argentina from other Latin American and
 European countries . . . several hundred
 To Bolivia from other Latin American countries
 and Europe . . . 3,000
 To Chad from neighboring countries . . . 113,600
 To Chile from other Latin American and
 European countries . . . 3,966
 To Eastern European countries from Austria . . . 400

To El Salvador from Honduras and Nicaragua . . . 3,050
 To Ethiopia from Djibouti and neighboring
 countries . . . 31,000
 To Guatemala from Mexico . . . 500
 To Cambodia from Laos . . . 2,200
 To Laos from Thailand . . . 1,664
 To Nicaragua from Honduras . . . 100
 To Uganda from Zaire . . . 17,000
 To Zaire from Burundi . . . 4,000

AFRICA

Angola . . . 150,000-600,000
 Chad . . . 50,000
 Ethiopia . . . 300,000-3,000,000
 Mozambique . . . 400,000
 Uganda . . . 355,000-1,000,000

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Cambodia . . . 230,000

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

El Salvador . . . 400,000-700,000
 Guatemala . . . 35,000-500,000
 Nicaragua . . . 100,000


MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Lebanon . . . 600,000

Top 20 Countries Ranked by Contribution Per Capita

Country	Contribution Per Capita	Population (in millions)	Contribution (in millions of \$)	GNP Per Capita
Norway	\$5.73	4.1	\$ 23.5	\$13,800
Sweden	2.95	8.3	24.5	14,500
Denmark	2.63	5.1	13.4	12,790
Switzerland	1.71	6.5	11.1	17,150
Canada	1.16	24.9	29.6	11,230
United States	1.15	234.2	269.8	12,530
Netherlands	1.04	14.4	15.0	11,140
Australia	.88	15.3	13.5	11,190
Kuwait	.72	1.6	1.2	25,850
Saudi Arabia	.64	10.4	6.7	12,720
Germany	.52	61.5	31.7	13,520
Belgium	.50	9.9	4.9	11,980
United Kingdom	.48	56.0	26.9	8,950
Finland	.47	4.8	2.3	10,380
Qatar	.45	.3	0.13	27,790
Libya	.43	3.3	1.4	8,560
Japan	.41	119.2	48.8	10,330
Jordan	.23	3.6	0.83	1,623
Austria	.22	7.6	1.6	10,250
Gaza	.20	.5	0.1	N/A
Iceland	.20	.2	0.04	12,550

*Contributions by countries for European Economic Community programs are not reflected in this table. Included are contributions made to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the World Food Program. Donations to the four international agencies totaled \$662 million in 1983.





AFRICA

Angola

While 146,000 refugees have returned to Angola, where they are receiving UNHCR assistance toward reintegration, heavy fighting in December 1983 pushed approximately 3,000 Angolans into Zambia. At least 1,500 of them reportedly returned the following month, with government assistance and assurances of protection. However, there also have been numerous reports of forced repatriation from Zambia.

Estimates of the number of Angolans displaced within the country range from 150,000 to 600,000.

During 1983, UNHCR assistance to 20,000 Zairian refugees was being phased out as they attained self-sufficiency. Assistance to 6,000 South African refugees is aimed at developing agricultural production on land provided by the Angolan government. The number of Namibians in Angola remained 70,000, most of them women, children, and elderly. UNHCR assistance to Namibian refugees in 1983 was shifting toward educational and development projects encouraging self-reliance.

Intense fighting and the wide dispersal of groups of refugees and displaced persons throughout Angola has made the delivery of relief, services, and development projects difficult. The effects on refugees of a military disengagement agreement with South Africa in January 1984 are not yet clear.

Botswana

Botswana has continued its policy of granting temporary asylum to refugees in spite of increasing pressures from South Africa and, more recently, Zimbabwe to return them. Zimbabwe's campaign against dissidents in Matabeleland forced some 4,000 Zimbabweans into Botswana in the first half of 1983. By the first quarter of 1984, the influx was reported to be 50 each week.

Botswana did allow representatives of South Africa and Zimbabwe to meet with refugees to encourage them to return. Botswana officials have deported Zimbabwean dissi-

dents who are carrying arms, but affirmed that Botswana would grant asylum to all who were genuinely seeking it and who registered with authorities. Refugees are generally placed in Dukwe settlement where more than 4,000 refugees receive UNHCR assistance, especially through income-generating projects that are less dependent on the scarce water supply in the drought-stricken area.

Burundi

The Burundi government reports it provided refuge to 236,000 people, most of them Tutsis from Hutu-dominated Rwanda; other sources report about 57,000 are actually in need. The Burundi government, despite the country's extreme poverty, has been cooperative with UNHCR. The majority of the refugees have been settled in rural areas, although they are not usually granted citizenship.

Burundi Hutus who fled to Tanzania and Rwanda after the 1972 massacres have been returning to Burundi in increasing numbers and reintegrating into society with full rights.

Djibouti

Djibouti continues to provide temporary refuge to some 23,000 Ethiopians. This number, though reduced by resettlement to third countries and a program of repatriation since 1982, represents one refugee for every 13 Djiboutians. New arrivals offset much of the outflow. Most of the refugees in Djibouti are children under the age of 15 and women.

It is illegal for refugees to work in Djibouti, and UNHCR training programs designed to lead to eventual local integration of refugees have been resisted by Djibouti officials. The health, food, and education programs provided to refugees but not available to Djiboutians have produced resentment among citizens. The few urban refugees are seen as a drain on city services and are blamed for a rise in crime. The limited possibility of achieving self-sufficiency in Djibouti and the declining opportunities for resettlement offered by third countries have made voluntary repatriation a high priority.

In 1983, after threats by Djibouti to forcibly repatriate large numbers of the refugees, an agreement was reached among UNHCR, Djibouti, and Ethiopia for a program of assistance for repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of Ethiopian refugees. Repatriation began in August 1983. Fearing they would be forced to return, some 750 refugees fled to Somalia. Djibouti pledged that any refugees who did not want to return to Ethiopia would be allowed to stay in Djibouti until other solutions were found. By March 1984, 12,400 Ethiopian refugees had returned, half with assistance by UNHCR and the rest on their own. Few, if any, of the political exiles in Djibouti—urban salaried employees, workers, and students—are expected to return. Reports that refugees were being forced to return, then kept in camps in Ethiopia under terrible conditions, and that some had already returned to Djibouti have been denied by officials of both countries and UNHCR.

Ethiopia

Thousands of Ethiopians continue to flee their homeland each year. UNHCR provides assistance to 1.2 million Ethiopians in the Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. There are 484,000 in the Sudan, most of them Eritreans and Tigreans fleeing areas of prolonged fighting between government forces and ethnic liberation movements. This flight has been exacerbated by the reluctance of Ethiopian authorities to facilitate the distribution of relief supplies in Tigre and Eritrea. Severe drought and the fighting between government and ethnic resistance movement forces have increased the number who have been driven into Somalia to 700,000, most of them Oromos and ethnic Somali. Some 23,000 Ethiopian refugees remain in Djibouti.

Military conscription for men and women between the ages of 16 and 30 and the unavailability of exit permits for Ethiopians in this age group since May 1983 have added to the number of young Ethiopians fleeing the country. Of the recent Ethiopian refugees entering the Sudan, 40 percent are single, draft-age males.

Despite the government's stated policy of welcoming returning refugees and a continuing proclamation



of mass amnesty for Ethiopians abroad, relatively few have returned. Current conditions, including reported reprisals against returnees and insurgents' efforts to discourage repatriation, make substantial increases in repatriation unlikely. The government and some relief agencies have reported that 200,000 Ethiopians have returned from Somalia, most in the second half of 1983, and were continuing to return at a rate of 1,000 a day in early 1984. While Somali officials denied this, many Ethiopians have returned from Somalia and the Sudan, prompting a \$20 million UNHCR program, begun in 1982, to assist 110,000 to 126,000 returnees and as many as 3 million internally displaced Ethiopians. Another \$8.2 million was committed by UNHCR for a program of voluntary repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of Ethiopian refugees from Djibouti. By March 1984, 12,400 had returned. UNHCR, Djibouti, and Ethiopian officials have denied charges that refugees in Djibouti were being forcibly repatriated, and observers reported that returnees had begun building their own homes and were living in good conditions, considering the desolation of the area.

About half of the 11,000 refugees, mostly rural Sudanese Ansar tribesmen, who have been in Ethiopia for 10 to 12 years, are self-supporting, with the rest in UNHCR-assisted camps. As a result of a large influx of Sudanese refugees in late 1983, which brought their total in Ethiopia to an estimated 39,000, Ethiopian authorities requested UNHCR assistance. UNHCR released \$392,000 in emergency funds, later increased to \$1 million, to meet the needs of the Sudanese refugees, whose health and sanitary conditions were very poor.

Kenya

In addition to some 8,000 documented refugees, most of them Ugandans, Rwandans, and Ethiopians, there are from 2,000 to 10,000 people who have found refuge in Kenya but have not been granted refugee status. In late 1983, 200-300 Ugandans were reported arriving in Kenya each week.

Asylum is granted sparingly, but those denied refugee status are usually granted alien status and allowed

to remain indefinitely. Although the government generally cooperates with UNHCR, questions about protection of refugees in Kenya have been raised in the last year. Charges of unfair treatment made by Ugandan refugees in the Thika transit center were contradicted by UNHCR.

As part of an agreement with Tanzania and Uganda, Kenya returned several Tanzanian political exiles who had been accused of planning an aborted coup in Tanzania. Some of them had been accorded formal refugee status by UNHCR. The exchange in October 1983 aroused international protest as well as wide-

Many South African refugees, fearing further attacks, left Lesotho for other African countries in late 1983. Reports that landlords had become reluctant to continue renting to South African refugees for fear of attacks prompted a project of UNHCR and the Lesotho government to build low-cost housing for refugees. Due to concerns about refugee protection, refugees are dispersed among the local population; no refugee camps are maintained.

The government estimates 11,500 refugees in Lesotho, but other sources report 1,000 actually in need. The refugees have the same



These Angolan refugees in Zambia lost most of their crops this year during a severe drought. Officials say that those who continue to flee fighting arrive in Zambia in "catastrophic condition." UNHCR

spread fears among the much larger Ugandan refugee population in Nairobi that they might be sent home. There have been no reports so far of Ugandans being forcibly returned. USCR has protested the exchange to the governments involved.

rights to acquire property and obtain services and the same protection under the law as Lesotho citizens. Their political activity is restricted, and Lesotho insists that there are no ANC military bases within the country.

Lesotho

Lesotho repeatedly has affirmed its duty to provide asylum to South African victims of racial and political persecution. The South African government's insistence that Lesotho harbors ANC members who plan and carry out guerrilla actions against South Africa led to an attack by South African Defense Forces on Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, in December 1982, killing 42 people, including 12 Lesotho citizens and 23 refugees.

Rwanda

Some 18,000 Hutus from Burundi have been largely integrated into the society of Hutu-controlled Rwanda. Widespread attacks and harassment of ethnic Rwandans living in Uganda in October 1982 drove an estimated 44,000 people into Rwanda, some of them Ugandan citizens; an agreement between Uganda and Rwanda to assess the number and nationality of these refugees and to allow them to settle in the appropriate country has been carried out by Rwanda.



Some 6,000 Rwandan citizens were identified and are being integrated into society. Uganda has not completed its part of the screening, and Rwandan officials fear that Uganda does not intend to do so.

The recent arrivals in Rwanda included some 30,000 people of agricultural background, whose move

from a makeshift, overcrowded site to a planned camp was completed by February 1983. Another 13,000 were herders who brought 30-40,000 cattle with them. Fearing the loss of their herd, this group and their cattle were moved from an area with inadequate grazing potential to an underutilized cattle ranch. The move was

completed by March 1983, but more than 10,000 head of cattle died from disease, starvation, and slaughtering.

While sanitation, health care, and nutrition programs have prevented major outbreaks of disease, conditions remain overcrowded and difficult. Boredom and unemployment dominate the camps as the Rwandan

Repatriating Refugees to Ethiopia: A Model Calling for Assessment

Roberta Aitchison

Early in 1983, an unprecedented \$8 million program was begun in Northeast Africa to repatriate refugees from the Republic of Djibouti back to neighboring Ethiopia. Initiated by the two governments, with official sanction and financing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the program was launched amidst considerable discussion and controversy about its procedures, the nature of the sponsoring parties (known as the Tripartite Commission), and the conditions refugees face upon their return.

Inaugurated in September 1983 as the cornerstone of UNHCR's efforts to finance and encourage lasting solutions to refugee problems, the actual impact of the program has yet to be realized and assessed.

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Since Djibouti became independent from France in 1978, it is estimated that 35-40,000 people entered the hot, torrid land to seek asylum from neighboring Ethiopia. This influx meant for Djibouti—a country with chronic 60 percent unemployment and a fragile economy based on port trade and pastoralism—that one person in ten was a refugee.

Unable to provide for them, Djibouti nevertheless openly accepted refugees from Ethiopia in the initial years. Despite squalid living conditions, refugees managed to eke out an existence, settled into hastily constructed camps along the border or integrated into the capital, Djibouti City. Roughly 9,000 were granted UN refugee status, and about one-third of those—mostly young, single men—were settled to other countries, predominantly the U.S.

Harboring a neighbor's exiles typically produces tensions between nations. As the political and economic fallout of hosting Ethiopia's exiles started to take its toll, Djibouti's open arms policy began to falter. In a February 1982 sweep of the capital's streets, Amnesty International reported, at least 87 recognized refugees were packed into railway boxcars and deported, or refouled, to Ethiopia. Similar refoulements reportedly have occurred since that time.

Some observers viewed this as a policy move to help rid Ethiopia of an international embarrassment—having had two million people flee the country to seek asylum in the past few years.

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UNHCR, charged to protect refugees and facilitate resolution to their plight, cited international pressure to move beyond short-term approaches to refugee problems toward "durable solutions" as the impetus to adopting the repatriation scheme.

Although UNHCR has aided voluntary repatriation elsewhere, for example to Zimbabwe and Chad, several factors make the Djibouti program distinct. First, no change in government rule has taken place in Ethiopia as in previous repatriation cases. Second, refugees did not spontaneously begin to return on their own, nor did they request assistance to do so. Rather, the initiative for the program came from the governments involved. Finally, no assessment has been made of the causes of refugee flight or whether they have been eradicated. Refugees have claimed that mass resistance to the current colonial government drew wholesale retaliation in rural areas and resulted in massive refugee flight—and that those conditions have not improved.

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The program, as announced in June 1983, calls for refugees to register through UNHCR offices in Djibouti's Dikhil or Ali Sabeh camps, to be sent to "focal locations" in Wollo or Hararghe regions of Ethiopia, where they would be given immediate food aid and domestic supplies for the first four months. The World Food Program agreed to supply \$2 million in food aid to supplement the packages, and relief supplies would be transferred from storage in Djibouti and used in Ethiopia.

The program would then supply "self-sufficiency packages" for the repatriates' reintegration: seed and tools to farmers, a few grazing animals to pastoralists, and tools and raw materials for tradesmen to start urban cottage industries in the cities of Harar, Kallu, and Dire Dawa. Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission planned for returning refugees to develop irrigated agricultural projects along arid railway sites at Shenille and Harawa. Many nomad repatriates were expected to "prefer to adopt a mixed pastoral and agricultural lifestyle," according to UNHCR and were slotted to work on the irrigated sites.

One-third of the program's \$8 million budget was allocated to construct supportive infrastructure in Ethiopia—transportation, communication, buildings, storage, irrigation, etc.

The Tripartite Commission delegated overall responsibility for the program to UNHCR, whose field staff in



government is reluctant to permit any economic activity substantial enough to give the camps an appearance of permanence as long as there is some possibility that Uganda will allow some of the refugees to return. Environmental damage caused by the cattle, the strain on the country's delicate ethnic balance caused by the

refugees, and the pressure on the tenuous infrastructure exacerbate Rwanda's limited ability to maintain the refugees.

Somalia

In 1983, the emphasis of UNHCR assistance in Somalia shifted from

emergency relief to programs aimed at self-reliance for the refugee population, mostly ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden region and Oromos from the area west of the Ogaden in Ethiopia. There was no UNHCR allocation for local integration in Somalia in 1982 or 1983; the proposed allocation for 1984 is \$15 million. Accord-

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa oversees the repatriation. UNHCR subcontracted with Lutheran World Federation as "major implementing partner" in Ethiopia, and other private agencies assist with portions of the program.

Between September 1983 and May 1984, UNHCR reports 5,900 persons registered and repatriated through the program to Ethiopia. A further 6,000 persons appeared on the sites in Ethiopia and received program benefits. Called "spontaneous repatriates," they are assumed to have come from Djibouti because a similar number are thought to have vacated Djibouti's refugee camps.

A Church World Service delegation that visited Djibouti in November 1983 was surprised to learn that many who had been living in the camps were nomads who normally traverse the desert between Ethiopia and Djibouti to trade goods. They found that those repatriating were predominantly nomadic Somali elders and children, and that Ali Sabeh camp had been virtually emptied. One group of refugees who repatriated to Ethiopia on their own accord were thrown in prison and smuggled out a letter describing their fate, according to New African in July 1983.

The international community has proposed no solutions for the thousands who remain in Djibouti, largely Oromo, Eritrean, and Tigray refugees whose national struggles against Ethiopian rule persist.

While refugees were registered in the camps and repatriated to Ethiopia in late 1983, refugees in the capital alleged that the program acted as a cover to regular seizure and deportation of political refugees from Djibouti City to Ethiopia. Little hard evidence existed to prove such charges, except for the notable case of Ahmed Muene, an Oromo refugee with UN refugee status who died in November 1983 as he jumped from a truck loaded with "illegal aliens" en route to Ethiopia.

As refugee groups in Djibouti appealed their concerns about the repatriation effort, so did political opponents in Ethiopia. In January 1984, local insurgents bombed the train tracks at Gota and Aisha repatriate sites in Oromo and Somali areas of Ethiopia. In addition to causing deaths, the blasts disrupted rail service and resulted in a hiatus of repatriation movement back to Ethiopia between January and March, according to a UNHCR official.

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In light of concerns that refugees would face retaliation upon their return, the Tripartite Commission made assurances early on that repatriate movements and activities would be carefully monitored. Primary responsibility for monitoring was delegated to the UNHCR field staff. Private agencies involved with the repatriation were also invited by the commission to monitor, though some observers were barred from investigating conditions surrounding the program in September 1983.

Although Lutheran World Federation, the major implementing agency, offers brief descriptions of this project in their published literature, no information is available to the public about who has repatriated, where they have gone, where they are from, or what they are doing.

UNHCR, on the other hand, issued one progress report in July 1984. The report lists the number of families settled in several areas that have received "reintegration packages." Some program activities and administrative concerns are described. However much is left unexplained, such as why less than half of the eligible agri-pastoralists reportedly received tools and grazing animals donated for their use. And though refugee protection is UNHCR's primary mandate, it fails to report the whereabouts, activities or treatment of those officially repatriated from Djibouti, or indeed whether they kept track.

The report concludes that "there has so far been quantifiable evidence that the assistance activities for the relief and rehabilitation of returnees have created conditions in Ethiopia conducive to a further voluntary repatriation of Ethiopians," though no further explanation of this ensues. Ironically, the Ethiopian government seeks substantial international assistance for repatriates among "drought victims."

To assess this program as a solution to refugee problems, more must be known about its impact. Private agencies and UNHCR should make methods and findings of monitoring activities available to the interested public. In its role as monitor, UNHCR needs to create a clear channel for agencies, refugees, or nationals to report any violations of refugee conventions, such as refoulement or retaliation against repatriates, that can then be investigated independently. (At present the burden of proof rests on the complainants, often refugees, in virtually undocumented situations.) The impact of the repatriation program in several contexts needs to be analyzed: the movement and fate of repatriating refugees; the welfare of other local residents and economies; conditions leading to refugee flight; infrastructural development in Ethiopia; Ethiopia's internal security and military situation; nationally based resistance movements; and agricultural output and foreign exchange.

Through timely and substantive reporting and careful evaluation of this unprecedented step in the international community's handling of refugee affairs, the real effects can be understood and applied to future efforts. The agencies involved have a critical responsibility to inform the public of developments in this otherwise protected and obscured region of the world, lest they be seen as participating in a conspiracy of silence in the ongoing controversy about of this effort to repatriate refugees from whence they came.



ing to UNHCR planning figures for 1983, there are 700,000 refugees in Somalia.

In March 1983, the Somali government announced a program of local rural settlement for refugees whose chances of attaining self-sufficiency under the prevailing camp conditions were poor. Government policy has been against settlement of ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden because that might undermine Somalia's claims for that territory. Somalia's commitment to the local resettlement program is contingent on continued international assistance until significant progress toward self-reliance has been achieved.

Observers say prospects of success for the program are slight. Somalia has very little arable land and almost all of it is being used by Somalis. Due to erosion already caused by overgrazing, pastureland is inadequate to meet the refugees' needs through raising stock. The country's infrastructure, especially transportation, has been severely strained by the demands of the refugee relief program.

The presence of refugees has had a major social, political, and economic impact on Somalia. Scarce resources have been diverted from needed development projects. Somalis are disturbed by the large number of idle refugees—one of every eight persons in Somalia is a refugee—receiving substantial international assistance. Allegations have been made that Somalia has forcibly recruited some young male refugees into its military and that the armed forces periodically prevent groups of refugees from leaving Somalia.

Sudan

During 1983, the remaining Chadians in the Sudan were repatriated and some 2,000 other refugees were settled abroad, mostly in the U.S. This slight reduction in the Sudan's refugee population was overwhelmed by the influx of another 1,000 Chadians and large numbers of Ugandans and Ethiopians. The number of Ugandan refugees nearly doubled since 1982, reaching some 200,000, and an average of 300 were still arriving each month in early 1984. Most of the recent arrivals are women and children, many of them malnourished, sick, and in need of



Over 690,000 refugees currently live in Sudan, one of the world's least-developed countries. These Ethiopian women fetch water in Umm Seqata settlement. UNHCR

immediate emergency care. The number of refugees from Ethiopia is estimated at 484,000. Drought and continued fighting in Ethiopia drove 20,000 people into the Sudan between October 1983 and March 1984. Almost half of the 690,000 refugees in the Sudan are spontaneously settled outside the 70 established camps and transit centers, receiving almost no international assistance.

The Sudan, though one of the least developed countries in the world, has maintained a generous policy of granting refuge and has cooperated with international organizations to provide assistance to refugees. Its Regulation of Asylum Act of 1974 is

viewed as a model of African refugee law. The Sudan does not grant citizenship to refugees, believing that eventually all must return voluntarily to their home countries. Whenever possible, refugees are moved to rural settlements to reduce pressure on severely strained urban services. Self-sufficiency, where it exists in these settlements, is extremely fragile due to shortages of water and arable land. Over one-third of UNHCR's proposed 1984 budget of \$34.5 million is designed to consolidate the refugee settlements in anticipation of their hand-over to the government, expected to begin in 1984.



The large refugee population creates great problems for the Sudan, including strain on health services and exacerbation of water shortages, erosion, and deforestation. Thirty infrastructure projects which would require \$96.2 million were submitted for consideration by ICARA II. Because urban resources are especially scarce, refugees in cities have caused resentment. The presence of insurgents among the refugees endangers the Sudan's delicate detente with Ethiopia.

U.S. and Sudanese officials have expressed concerns that resettlement in the U.S. was drawing refugees to the Sudan and draining leadership from local refugee programs. Subsequently, resettlement processing was closed at Gedaref and Port Sudan, though the center at Khartoum remained open. Voluntary agency officials believed concerns about regional instability also played a part in the closings.

Increased fighting between government forces and several dissident groups, apprehension, especially in non-Muslim southern Sudan, about the consequences of President Nimeiri's Islamization of Sudanese law and other institutions, and the state of emergency proclaimed by Nimeiri in April 1984, suspending much of the constitution, have driven several thousand Sudanese into Ethiopia. Ethiopian authorities reported 39,000 arrivals from the Sudan by late December 1983.

Tanzania

Controversy clouded Tanzania's excellent record of receiving refugees when several Kenyan political exiles were returned to Kenya in exchange for Tanzanian political exiles. Because the returnees included some persons recognized as refugees, their return generated criticism of Tanzania for violating agreements and refugee rights. In addition, Tanzania and Uganda reached agreement in February 1984 to return to Uganda over 10,000 ethnic Rwandans displaced from Uganda in December 1983. This agreement, which did not renounce the possible use of force in the expulsion, was expected to be implemented in late August.

Refugees in Tanzania—estimated at 180,000, of which some 143,000

are from Burundi—have, in the past, been granted the same rights as Tanzanians, including access to land and services. The policy of integrating refugees into local society has contributed to a high degree of refugee self-sufficiency. The Mishamo settlement area, containing 16 villages with 32,000 Hutu refugees from Burundi, is viewed as a successful experiment in achieving self-sufficiency through local settlement.

Nevertheless, given Tanzania's economic crisis, refugees have been a burden, and benefits provided to refugees by the international community are a cause of envy among local Tanzanians. As a result, Tanzania has encouraged international assistance which would integrate refugee assistance with development assistance.

A reassessment of the number of refugees from Burundi resulted in a reduction in Tanzania's refugee population since 1982, but this was more than offset by natural growth and the more recent influx of ethnic Rwandans.

Uganda

The chaos of ethnic and political violence in Uganda makes accurate estimates of the number of people dislocated difficult. In 1983, government actions against guerrilla forces and other actions of the undisciplined army, including the razing of entire villages and the killing of civilians, forced up to one million peasants to seek refuge in camps or go into hiding in the bush. Deaths from starvation and disease due to unhygienic camp conditions were reported. Relief workers were harassed and food stolen by soldiers who assert that "enemy" civilians are better treated than they. The Ugandan government was slow to act on the crisis of displaced persons, but President Obote appealed for aid for 150,000 people in September 1983.

While 130,000 of the approximately 200,000 who had fled to Zaire returned spontaneously to the West Nile area of Uganda in 1982 and 1983, some 68,000 more Ugandans fled into the Sudan during 1982. Most are members of groups which supported the previous government and are not expected to return to Uganda. President Obote has ap-

pealed to all exiles to return as part of a broader Uganda reconciliation policy, but the response has been slow and there have been complaints about the treatment of returnees.

The refugee population in southwest Uganda was thrown into turmoil by attacks on ethnic Rwandans, some of whom were Ugandan citizens, in October 1982. While 44,000 fled into Rwanda, up to 35,000 were forced into overcrowded settlements where they live in fear of renewed attacks. Ugandan authorities have denied reports of government complicity in the violence against Rwandans, attributing it to spontaneous action by Ugandan people. USCR has issued a report challenging this assertion.

In October 1983, there were reports that Ugandan officials were forcibly moving widows and children from the overcrowded southern camps to a new camp, further north, where there are limited provisions for them. As harassment of Rwandans by Ugandan soldiers continued, Tanzania reported that over 10,000 Rwandans arrived from the Rakai district of Uganda in December 1983. An agreement for the return of 10,000 Rwandans and their 30,000 head of cattle to Uganda from Tanzania was signed by the two countries in February 1984. In late July, the two governments agreed on a plan of repatriation, not specifically renouncing the use of force, scheduled to be implemented in late August.

Zaire

Despite substantial voluntary repatriations of Ugandans since 1982, the number of refugees in Zaire has increased to an estimated 304,000, including 215,000 Angolans and 65,000 Ugandans. The Zairian government places the total at 550,000. Zaire accepts refugees freely, allowing them to settle until they decide to return to their countries, granting equal access to services and equal rights under the law, providing them with land, and allowing them to seek employment or settle on farms. The level of self-sufficiency among refugees in Zaire is considered high. Some harassment of refugees by undisciplined armed forces and prolonged detention of some, mostly Angolans, suspected of subversion, have been reported.



An estimated 82,000 Zairians remain in exile. A series of amnesties has led to the return of 190,000 since 1978, and the May 1983 amnesty brought several thousand more back without incident.

Zambia

Zambia's previous policy of providing refuge has been seriously threatened by a weakening economy and by political factors. Urban refugees in Zambia are seen as competing for scarce jobs despite government restrictions on their working, and Zambians envy the international assistance urban refugees and refugees in organized camps receive. While refugees spontaneously settled among Zambians of similar ethnic background have good relations with local people, they are in disfavor with the government. It sees them as a source of political pressure, including incursions by South African defense forces, from neighboring countries who charge that refugees are harboring dissidents.

These difficulties have led to periodic arrests and deportations of "illegal aliens," which have often included refugees. Several instances of forced repatriations in 1983 included a roundup, late in the year, of 2,000 refugees and illegal aliens, including some prominent Malawian political exiles. Harassment and expulsion have focused on Jehovah's Witnesses. These events have reportedly caused fear and hopelessness in the small Malawian refugee community. There have been similar forced expulsions of Angolan and Zimbabwean refugees.

In late 1983, the Zambian government initiated a program, with UNHCR assistance, to register all refugees in the country, now estimated at 104,000. Identification cards issued to refugees will entitle them to remain in Zambia and receive the same treatment as Zambians.

Drought and famine in Western Zambia have necessitated emergency relief efforts for 65,000 spontaneously settled and widely scattered Angolan refugees, many suffering from malnutrition and endemic diseases. Relief efforts have been hampered by the extreme heat, the barrenness of the area, and the total lack of infrastructure, including roads.

There was almost no 1983 harvest in the area and prospects are for more famine. The Angolans who continue to flee fighting in their country arrive in "catastrophic" condition, according to authorities in Zambia.

Zimbabwe

A relatively stable refugee population of some 200 South Africans assisted by UNHCR, dramatically increased in 1983 with the arrival of thousands of Mozambicans escaping drought and the cut-off of food supplies by Mozambican insurgents. Official sources report 44,000 Mozambicans in Zimbabwe, but news sources estimate there were 100,000 by the end of the year, with 1,000 entering each week. A camp established after a cholera outbreak in the area was filled to its capacity of 24,000 within a few days.

Many of the Mozambicans suffer from severe malnutrition and related diseases. They are living with little or no shelter; poor sanitary conditions have produced health hazards. Some refugees have continued into the interior of Zimbabwe to the large commercial farms around Harare where they are said to be taking scarce jobs from local workers. Those who remain in the border area are the youngest and the oldest, and many deaths from malnutrition and disease have been reported.

The government has established no clear policy on returning the Mozambicans, alternately threatening expulsion—thus sending many of the refugees into hiding among the ethnically related local population—and promising not to forcibly return refugees. The government rounded up 2,000 Mozambicans and illegal aliens in March 1984 for screening prior to repatriation.

Zimbabwe enacted a law on refugees which went into force in October 1983. It establishes a Commissioner for Refugees, allows exceptions to the normal procedure of case-by-case consideration of asylum requests, giving the appropriate minister power to grant whole groups refugee status, and affirms the principle of nonrefoulement.

In 1983, several thousand Zimbabweans fled to Botswana from fighting between government forces and dissidents in Matabeleland.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia

Australia continues to be a major resettlement country on a per capita basis, as well as a leading contributor to international refugee relief. In 1982-83, 73 percent of the refugees entering Australia were Asian; 12,000 were Southeast Asians. These numbers reflect a major change in the history of Australian immigration policy, which, until the 1960s, was heavily restricted to European resettlement. The change, which has brought international acclaim to the country for its successful integration of 88,000 Southeast Asians since 1975, also has brought controversy. Many Australians, affected by high unemployment and a poor economy, see the numbers of Southeast Asians clustered in major cities as contributing to their problems.

Cambodia

In March 1984, 230,000 displaced Cambodians were living at the Thai/Cambodian border in the aftermath of fighting between Khmer resistance forces and the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin government.

While voluntary repatriation is the solution UNHCR has sought for the Cambodian refugees created by the political upheavals and violence of the past decade, the proposed program has broken down. To encourage Phnom Penh repatriation efforts, Thai authorities have limited resettlement opportunities for the 47,000 now in holding camps, and forcible repatriation remains a possibility.

Though Thailand closed its border, exceptions have been made. In spring 1983, when Vietnamese destroyed a refugee camp near Nong Chan housing more than 40,000, many Cambodians were moved by Thai troops to a camp further inside the Thai border.

China

Since 1978, China has resettled over 270,000 refugees—primarily



ethnic Chinese fleeing overland from Vietnam. As numbers seeking asylum decline and local integration proceeds, phase-down of a program which has cost the country over \$500 million continues. The first half of 1983 saw only 9,500 arrivals in China: 1,500 from Vietnam and 8,000 ethnic Chinese expelled from Mongolia in May.

Most ethnic Chinese have been resettled on more than 200 state farms. UNHCR continues its work where integration has not been smooth. The World Food Program is in the second of a three-year program to encourage the agricultural self-sufficiency of the farms.

An estimated 2,000 refugee families have applied to join relatives in third countries, but in mid-1983, fewer than 1,000 had been able to leave. Many are former urban workers for whom life on communal farms is especially difficult.

In 1982, China (after Yugoslavia) became the second Communist country to accede to the UN *Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*.

Hong Kong

Densely populated Hong Kong, which has offered first asylum to over 113,000 Vietnamese boat refugees since 1976, continues its 1982 policy of harsh treatment to discourage asylum seekers. Those in asylum status—13,000 in December 1983—live in closed camps administered cooperatively by the government, UNHCR, and voluntary agencies. New arrivals are not allowed to work, creating a heavier financial burden on the government and UNHCR for food and social services.

Despite lower numbers of refugee arrivals in Hong Kong, stagnating third-country resettlement rates have kept camp populations high, ensuring long waiting periods, and have contributed to poor living conditions for many. At the end of 1982, over 70 percent seeking resettlement had waited more than three years.

To ease tensions created by overcrowding and frustration, the government opened a second camp—Jubilee Center—in 1982. Recent observers have called conditions in this camp deplorable. In early 1983, a new school was opened at Kaitak

Center, serving as many as 1,000 full-time students up to 15 years of age.

Since 1980, Chinese trying to cross the Hong Kong border have been treated as illegal aliens. Hong Kong, no longer believing they will be persecuted, returns them to China. Vietnamese arriving by land are also returned to China, which Hong Kong considers their resettlement country.

Indonesia

Although Indonesia says its large population and heavy unemployment prevent it from accepting refugees for resettlement, it has provided asylum to over 80,000 Southeast Asians since 1975. Most are resettled eventually in the U.S. or Australia.

In mid-1984, 4,000 remained in the two Refugee Processing Centers on Galang Island, where they attend pre-vocational classes and receive language and cultural instruction. Six months is the average stay in the camps, although those needing more training often remain longer.

In mid-1984, some 7,000 Indonesian nationals from Irian Jaya crossed the border into Papua New Guinea, seeking asylum. The governments of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea jointly announced that the recent border crossers would be returned to Irian Jaya. UNHCR, initially unable to gain access to the asylum seekers, expressed concern over their safety and over the possibility of their forcible repatriation to Indonesia.

Japan

With its large, homogeneous population, Japan traditionally has not opened itself to be a country of resettlement for refugees. However, its interest in refugee issues and financial support has made it a leading international contributor to refugee aid. In 1983, it was the UN's largest contributor to Cambodia's relief programs.

Laos

Nearly 337,000 Lao have fled the country since the 1975 Communist take-over of this rugged, ethnically diverse country. Most of those—

283,000—have registered as refugees in Thailand. Of this number, 72,000 remain in Thai holding centers awaiting third country resettlement. Another 50,000 Lao secretly have crossed Thailand's northern border, joining other ethnic Lao communities there.

Refugee flows from Laos have declined to 5,500 annually. Reasons for the decline include some reported easing of government restrictions; Thai humane deterrence policies; and rumors of difficulty for Lao in adjusting to life in resettlement countries. However, recent reports of Vietnamese settlers moving into Laos in significant numbers have raised the possibility of future Lao migration.

In 1980, the Lao government and UNHCR agreed upon a voluntary repatriation plan, and by mid-1984, 2,500 Lao had returned under the plan. Repatriates received government indoctrination, then were returned to the supervision of their local village authorities. It is estimated that 4-5,000 Lao returned to the country outside the program. No reports of harassment of these spontaneous returnees have been received, according to UNHCR, which monitors treatment of returnees and supports improvement of living conditions in villages having large repatriate populations.

UNHCR is also responsible for aiding Cambodian refugees living in Laos. During 1983, 2,200 of the Cambodian population there were voluntarily repatriated. The remaining 1,000, who opted to remain in Laos, continued to receive assistance.

Malaysia

The number of Southeast Asians in Malaysian first asylum camps increased by 3,000 between June 1983 and June 1984—a result of the decreased third country resettlement opportunities and an increase in arrivals of Vietnamese boat refugees. About 11,000 remained in the camps in late 1983 awaiting resettlement, although any number over 10,000 is thought by some observers to constitute an important internal political problem for Malaysian authorities.

Although Malaysia resettles only refugees compatible with its large Muslim population, it has provided



Vietnamese boat people who arrive in Sikhiu, Thailand, are transferred to Phanat Nikhom camp where their eligibility for third country resettlement is determined. UNHCR

first asylum to almost 200,000 since 1975, all conditioned on third country resettlement. To prevent possible friction with its conservative Muslim population, Vietnamese boat refugees are confined to Pulau Bidong island during their stay.

Of those resettled in Malaysia, the 5,000 Khmer Muslims appear to have overcome early resettlement difficulties; and Burmese Muslims have integrated well with fellow Burmese. Between 70,000 and 150,000 Filipino Muslims are settled in Sabah, where employment opportunities are favorable. UNHCR estimates that many of the Filipinos should be considered refugees escaping violence in the Philippines.

Papua New Guinea

In spring 1984, UNHCR described the situation of Indonesian nationals in Papua New Guinea as having worsened considerably over the preceding several months and as giving rise to the gravest concerns. Approximately 7,000 people from the province of Irian Jaya had crossed the border into Papua New Guinea, some associated with the indigenous Melanesian separatist movement. They joined an existing population of refugees, estimated in 1983 to be about 5,000. UNHCR expressed its concern to the Papua New Guinea government that any repatriations to

Indonesia be voluntary and its readiness to provide necessary assistance in the asylum country as well as in reintegrating refugees back into Indonesia. In August, UNHCR assistance was requested for 9,000 refugees, and the agency was granted observer status in both Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.

The new refugees joined existing populations at the camp at Vanimo, which has been receiving UNHCR assistance. Despite social and cultural division among inhabitants, committees have been set up to administer the camp, distribute food, and attend to health, work, sports, and education concerns.

Singapore

Singapore does not resettle refugees or grant permanent asylum to those arriving by boat. However, it does cooperate with UNHCR by allowing refugees rescued at sea a 90-day disembarkment period if they are guaranteed acceptance by third countries.

Forty miles from the Galang Island Refugee Processing Centers in Indonesia, Singapore serves as a transit center for Southeast Asian refugees leaving first asylum countries for training in the camps. Sixteen thousand passed through Singapore in 1982, nearly 2,000 in the first three months of 1983. UNHCR supervises

the Hawkins Road refugee camp, where both first asylum and transiting refugees live while in the country.

Thailand

Thailand continues to bear a heavy burden of caring for Southeast Asian refugees, victims of the continuing political unrest in the region. In June 1984, over 126,000 Lao, Cambodians, and Vietnamese remained in camps in hopes of resettlement in Western nations, which continue to decrease the numbers they are willing to accept.

During the past two years, Thailand has used a "humane deterrence" policy, along with repatriation efforts, to discourage new refugee arrivals. However, with nations resettling fewer refugees each year, numbers are not expected to decrease significantly in the near future.

Since 1975, more than 575,000 Vietnamese have escaped Vietnam by boat. Controversy flared in late 1983-early 1984 over reports that Thai government officials allowed push-offs of Vietnamese refugees attempting to land on their shores. International attention was also drawn to continued pirate attacks on boat refugees in the waters of Thailand and Malaysia. Estimates say that half of those arriving in first asylum countries have been attacked. Critics have called an internationally funded, Thai-administered, anti-piracy program too small and too poorly administered to solve the problem. A UNHCR-funded team of maritime experts studied the program in mid-1983 and called for increased patrols and improved efficiency measures. In a report issued after a fact-finding trip to the area, USCIR called on the U.S., UNHCR, and Thailand to intensify their anti-piracy efforts.

Over 230,000 displaced Cambodians are living at the Thai border, having fled upheavals created by clashes between the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime and Khmer rebels. The World Food Program and the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) administer the relief camps placed at the Thai/Cambodian border. Thailand officially closed its border to Cambodians in 1980.



Vietnam

Vietnam has generated over 983,000 refugees, escaping the Communist takeover in 1975. Several factors in the past two years have contributed to a decline in the annual flow of Vietnamese refugees: a government tightening of security has prevented boats from leaving the country; Western countries are reducing acceptance rates; and pirates continue to attack the boats.

The growth of the Orderly Departure Program may also contribute marginally to the decline. Begun in 1979, the program allows legal departure of persons—to date, mostly ethnic Chinese and Amerasian children fathered by American servicemen—from Vietnam. Over 100,000 applications for processing were available for review in early 1984 in the ODP office in Bangkok, administered by the U.S. government and the International Catholic Migration Commission. Fifty-thousand persons have been resettled under the program since its beginning, and monthly departures have reached 1,500-2,000. ODP has been criticized by some for being utilized to resettle mostly cases of interest to Vietnam, whereas comparatively few cases of interest to the U.S. have been resettled.

Only rarely does the Vietnam government allow repatriation of citizens who left the country after 1979. Most who have returned have been placed in government "reeducation camps." According to the Vietnamese government, over 8,000 persons are held in these camps, the majority of whom have never tried to escape Vietnam, but were associated with U.S. interests or the government of the former Republic of South Vietnam before 1975. USCR has proposed in White House hearings that the U.S. establish 10,000 resettlement spaces for admission of these persons and their families to the U.S. The Hanoi government has, on several occasions, said it would release these inmates if the U.S. would accept them.

Almost 21,000 Cambodian refugees live in Vietnam, most of those in UNHCR-supported centers. Since 1980, third country resettlement has been possible for 5,000. The rest, however, have long waits, and Western governments accept only family reunification cases.

EUROPE

Austria

Austria spent over \$80 million dollars on refugee aid in 1983—a heavy responsibility for a troubled economy. As a neutral country bordering Eastern Europe, Austria cares for both refugees in transit and asylum seekers. It relies heavily on the co-operation of third countries to resettle those in temporary status. In 1983, almost 10,000 asylum seekers, mostly Poles and Czechs, were in Austrian transit centers.

Austria also has accepted Southeast Asian refugees. Most have been resettled through a special project of the Austrian Catholic Church, which provides parish sponsorship of refugee families accepted for resettlement. Seventy percent of those arriving in the past four years have become self-sufficient. Resettled refugees can apply to live in housing jointly run by UNHCR and the government for their use.

France

As in the rest of Europe, refugees in France have been affected by a depressed economy and unemployment. Fewer Southeast Asians have been able to leave government-operated reception centers, a condition causing fewer arrivals from Southeast Asian first asylum camps. France bears the costs of the centers and provides grants to voluntary agencies for integration programs.

In 1983, 163,000 refugees were living in France. Over 119,000 of those have entered the country since 1975. Some were admitted under France's quota system for refugees granted political asylum by obtaining an "establishment visa" from the French consulate in the country where they lived previously. For example, 460 Poles were granted asylum under the quota system in 1983. Other "unexpected refugees" apply after arriving in France. That number continues to grow: approximately 7,000 applied in 1979, 14,000 in 1983.

To relieve the long processing delay for these applicants—from a minimum of six months to over three years is typical—France recently has

created an inter-ministerial refugee delegation to review asylum decisions. Approximately 55 percent of asylum claims are approved.

Germany

Recession, unemployment, controversy over large numbers of foreign workers, and a belief that many asylum applicants are in reality simply seeking economic gain have caused the German government to adopt legislation restricting the rights of asylum seekers. Asylum applicants may not work for the first two years they are in the country and must live in camps run by the state responsible for their care. Partially as a result of these restrictions, the number of applicants for asylum has dropped significantly in recent years: from 100,000 in 1980 to 37,423 in 1982.

Only about 10 percent of those who apply are granted asylum. In 1983, an estimated 45,000 approved for asylum were living in Germany. Those persons who are denied asylum are not required to leave the country if return represents danger to them, and they may remain indefinitely in an undefined status.

Refugees resettled from first asylum countries are limited to only those seeking family reunification; further, the federal government can only accept the number of refugees whom states agree to support, as most refugee aid is handled at the state rather than the federal level.

East Germans entering West Germany are granted automatic citizenship rights. The legal flow of East German refugees in early 1984 was reported to be the largest since the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961—almost 100 persons daily. The increase was straining facilities at the Giessen refugee center, near Frankfurt. Some of those arriving had applied to leave in 1974.

Italy

Although Italy does not resettle large numbers of refugees, it does give temporary asylum to those in transit to third countries, especially Eastern Europeans en route to the U.S. When signing the UN *Convention*, the country limited those it



Two Southeast Asian refugees undergo medical tests and processing in a transit center near Paris. As elsewhere in Europe, unemployment and a depressed economy have made resettlement increasingly difficult. UNHCR

would resettle to Europeans. Recently, however, Italy announced plans to drop the restrictions completely. As the country is a primary staging point for non-European refugee transit, such a policy could create major changes for those refugees now waiting in Italy for third country resettlement. Currently such persons apply for protection from UNHCR, but live in Italy without the right to work and receive no medical or financial assistance from the government, often aided only by modest subsidies offered by UNHCR and various private agencies.

Switzerland

Switzerland reported 17,000 refugees permanently resettled since 1975. Almost 8,000 new requests for asylum were received during the year. As in the rest of Europe, unemployment and a housing shortage in large cities is creating a difficult climate for refugee resettlement in the small country.

Geneva, especially, attracts asylum seekers: 1,300 requested asylum there last year. The canton operates nine reception centers—four run by the government, five by private agencies. Originally, refugees were to stay in the facilities for a few weeks. Now, with no housing available, many spend much longer there.

Recently the government revised Swiss immigration policy to tighten and speed the asylum process. Collective admission of asylum seekers

with cases long pending and stricter eligibility requirements are part of the plan. The law, which took effect in early 1984, limits the number of appeals rejected asylum seekers may make for reconsideration and denies them the right to work until a decision has been made on their applications.

The Swiss are widely respected supporters of international refugee aid.

United Kingdom

A major contributor to refugee aid, both individually and through the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom is home to well over 100,000 resettled refugees and asylum seekers. It reports 6,000 entered and resettled since 1975. Along with U.K. citizens, most face the difficult prospect of finding housing and employment in a country where both situations are in crisis.

The opening of the British Refugee Council's reception center last year is a unique example of aid being given to refugees for housing. The center will provide shelter, language classes, and social workers for as many as 160 persons for up to three-month periods.

Nearly 1,000 Poles have been allowed extensions of stay, pending changes in the Polish political situation. Others granted similar extensions include Afghans, Iranians, Lebanese, Ugandans, and citizens of some Central American countries.

LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina

The October 1983 election that ended Argentina's eight-year old military government and brought dramatic improvements in civil and human rights under the civilian government of President Raul Alfonsín has also begun to bring home some of the estimated 28,000 political exiles who have been living abroad. The government has requested UNHCR participation in a special fund to facilitate the economic and social integration of returnees although international contributions to this effort have been relatively limited. While 200 Argentines were repatriated under UNHCR auspices during all of 1983, 400 returned during the first quarter of 1984.

There are 12,000 settled refugees in Argentina, from Latin America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. In 1982, the 290 Indochinese families were widely dispersed, contributing to their sense of cultural isolation and making local integration projects difficult. Government cooperation, including a September 1982 decree allowing Indochinese refugees the option of acquiring Argentine nationality and the choice of settlement location, has improved conditions for local integration.

In March 1984, government authorities announced plans to renew Argentina's traditional policy of hospitality by enacting a broad amnesty for all aliens residing illegally in Argentina who entered the country before November 15, 1983. There are tens of thousands of aliens, most from Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile, many who entered illegally, living in Argentina.

Belize

While 2,000 to 3,000 people were granted temporary residence in Belize in 1982, there are an estimated 7,000 Salvadoran refugees in the country. Reports in February 1984 of

the roundup of 79 "illegal aliens," mostly Salvadoran, and the deportation of 17 of them raise questions about the future of Belize's traditionally liberal immigration policy. Unknown numbers of such aliens have settled in the interior of Belize along the border with Guatemala.

Bolivia

A general amnesty issued in May 1982 and the installation of a constitutionally elected government in October 1982 have encouraged the return of several hundred refugees and exiles. Of the estimated 5,000 Bolivian refugees, most in western Europe, some 700 returned in 1982 and 250 returned in 1983. ICM and UNHCR provided assistance to needy returning exiles.

Since October 1982, there have been small numbers of Argentine and Chilean families in refuge in Bolivia.

Chile

The Chilean government has declared that most of the Chilean exiles who fled or were exiled in the violent aftermath of the 1973 military coup will eventually be allowed to return. According to the government, 10,000 people, accompanied by 20,000 dependents, were formally exiled during the last decade. Others estimate as many as 40,000 Chileans in exile.

After publishing lists in 1983 of over 3,000 exiled Chileans who would be allowed to return, the government cancelled this policy in late 1983 and returned to a system requiring individual exiles to apply at Chilean missions abroad for permission to return. Under this case-by-case system, 110 of 172 applicants in 1981 and 5 of 60 in 1982 had been accepted. It is not known how many of those authorized to return in 1983 actually did so.

There are approximately 3,000 refugees in Chile, mostly Europeans. Chile has accepted a few refugees in recent years and makes modest contributions to international organizations aiding refugees.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica, in keeping with provisions of its constitution, has main-

tained a liberal asylum policy, but growing numbers of refugees, Costa Rica's recent economic problems, a rise in terrorist activity associated with the presence of refugees, and heightened tension along the border with Nicaragua—where Nicaraguan and "contra" forces are fighting—have contributed to growing anti-refugee sentiment and difficulties in meeting refugees' needs.

Refugees, particularly from Nicaragua, continued to enter Costa Rica last year. There were 4,000 Nicaraguans and 10,000 Salvadorans in Costa Rica at the end of 1983. As many as 200,000 undocumented foreigners, some of whom might be refugees, also reside in Costa Rica. During 1983, approximately 2,350 refugees were resettled in third countries, mostly Cubans joining relatives in the U.S. Small numbers of Salvadorans have been resettled in third countries or voluntarily repatriated to El Salvador.

The Costa Rican government has developed a more consistent refugee policy and more active coordination of refugee matters. The government provides refugees with free schooling through secondary school and with medical care. The emphasis of UNHCR assistance in Costa Rica, \$5 million in 1983, is shifting from care and maintenance to local integration of the refugee population.

Dominican Republic

Of the 500,000 Haitians residing in the Dominican Republic, there are an estimated 5,000 political refugees—opponents of President-for-Life Duvalier and deserters from the Haitian armed forces. Only 400 have received "political refugee" status from the Dominican government.

Although the Dominican Republic routinely deports illegal immigrants, those seeking political refuge are not repatriated if the government determines they have a legitimate fear of persecution. When anti-Duvalier Haitians are expelled for violating Dominican laws prohibiting political activity against other countries, they are sent to countries other than Haiti. However, concern has been expressed about possible detention and forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees.

El Salvador

Twenty percent of the population of El Salvador has been uprooted by civil war, repression, and political violence. Over 245,000 have fled to neighboring countries; thousands more live illegally in the U.S., where there is growing controversy over the government's practice of deporting those not determined to be refugees. Flows out of El Salvador have slowed, possibly because some of the areas of conflict are virtually depopulated.

Within the country are as many as 468,000 displaced persons. Increasing numbers live in camps and shantytowns on the outskirts of cities, with poor sanitation, inadequate nutrition, and a variety of illnesses. The camps, raided frequently by security forces searching for guerrillas, are populated largely by women, children, and old men.

The International Committee of the Red Cross provides food and medical assistance to some 80,000 displaced persons in contested areas. The government provides aid to 264,000 more in zones under its control, largely with funds donated by the U.S. Private voluntary organizations aid 124,000 others. As many as 80,000 others, particularly in areas of conflict, receive no aid at all. Reported violence toward relief workers and medical personnel have hampered the provision of such services.

Guatemala

A continued government "counterinsurgency campaign," including reported massacres of entire Indian villages, has uprooted hundreds of thousands of Guatemalans, most of whom are Indians. Estimates vary from 300,000 to one million displaced. There are 40,000 Guatemalan Indians in border camps in Mexico, an increase of 20,000 since 1982. The Mexican government estimates another 120,000 Guatemalans in Mexico, including many of the traditional migrant laborers who have remained in Mexico illegally. Thousands of others have traveled further north, to the U.S. and Canada.

Many Guatemalans hiding in the mountains suffer from malnutrition and other diseases. Private agencies that provide food and medical relief are subject to government controls



and the army is alleged to use relief food for political purposes.

The Guatemalan government has formally offered the Guatemalans in Mexico safe return and assistance in returning to their former villages and has offered to cooperate with UNHCR in the resettlement. An estimated 500 Guatemalans returned in 1983, but continued violence, including reported army attacks on displaced persons camps and reprisals against returning refugees and refugees in Mexican camps, has made any significant repatriation unlikely.

Although Guatemala has no program for assisting or resettling refugees, 70,000 Salvadorans, many of them former migrant workers who chose not to return to El Salvador, continue to live in Guatemala.

Honduras

Although Honduras is not a party to the *UN Convention or Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees* and despite traditional resentment and fear of Salvadorans, Honduras provides asylum for 18,000 Salvadorans and has continued to receive them at a rate of 200 per month. Over 2500 Nicaraguan Indians and increasing numbers of Nicaraguan Ladinos, some of them families of "contra" guerrillas, also arrived in 1983, bringing the total number of Nicaraguans in Honduras to 19,000. Thirty-six thousand refugees, most of them rural women and children, were being assisted by UNHCR in 1983.

In early 1983, 12,500 Miskito and Sumo Indians were moved from the border to more permanent settlements further inside Honduras. Despite health problems and difficulties of implementing programs in the remote area, efforts toward self-sufficiency have progressed. Each family received an average of 1.5 hectares of land and agricultural activity was begun. Nicaragua, after announcing an amnesty for returning refugees in December, expressed concern about the Indians in Honduras. A Nicaraguan delegation was denied permission to visit the camps to explain the amnesty. There were allegations of murder or threats against those who wanted to return, and forced recruitment of young Miskitos into "contra

forces," a major problem addressed by UNHCR and its implementing partner World Relief.

The Honduran government, with the support of UNHCR, has announced plans to relocate the Salvadoran refugees to northern Honduras. They cite UNHCR policy of moving camps away from a border as a way of making them more secure, the lack of opportunities for work in the border camps, and greater freedom of movement in the new location.

Refugees who oppose the move have said their potential for self-sufficiency is limited not by location, but by the fact that their population is largely women and children. They are worried that the move will effectively close the border to future refugees. UNHCR has stated that it will maintain its presence along the border to protect and aid Salvadoran refugees entering Honduras. USCR believes the issue has been so politicized that first asylum for Salvadorans in Honduras could be in danger.

Mexico

The 170,000 refugees Mexico claims are in that country pose a serious policy issue for the Mexican government. Concern that competition for jobs and the cost of care and maintenance for the refugees are adding to social pressures led, in 1983, to steps—tighter visa controls, increased border patrols, and an emphasis on monitoring refugee activities—to reduce the flow of refugees. But Mexico has reaffirmed its longstanding commitment to guarantee protection of refugees and to grant asylum to any who seek it. Mexico has received UNHCR assistance in providing aid to 37,000 of the 40,000 Guatemalan refugees in over 50 border camps, although the relationship between Mexico and UNHCR has at times been strained.

Serious health problems persist among the Guatemalan refugees, largely due to the poor condition of the new arrivals, now averaging 1,000 per month. UNHCR and Mexican assistance has brought improvements in health and nutrition, but mental health problems remain, especially among children violently up-

rooted. The continued violence in parts of Guatemala leaves the refugees with little hope of returning home, and efforts toward self-sufficiency in Mexico are hindered by the isolation of the camps and the lack of work, land, and seeds. The Guatemalan refugees have expressed gratitude for the help and protection given by local peasants and the Mexican government, but the policy which prevents them from working outside the camps contributes to their low morale.

The Mexican government estimates there are 120,000 Salvadorans in Mexico, but many of them may have moved on to the U.S. Only 3,500 Salvadorans receive UNHCR assistance.

While few Guatemalans have responded to Guatemala's offer of amnesty, 166 Bolivian and Argentine refugees were voluntarily repatriated in 1983, and a greater number are expected to return in 1984.

Nicaragua

In 1982 and 1983, the Nicaraguan government moved 10,000 Indians away from the Caribbean coast and the border with Honduras to settlements in the interior. Another 15,000 Miskito and Sumo Indians have fled into Honduras to avoid forced relocation, government intimidation, and generalized violence. Though recent government policy toward the Indians has been considered "more humane," some 2500 Indians still crossed the border into Honduras in 1983. Nicaragua has publicly acknowledged that its past policies regarding these Indians were inappropriate. The flight of non-Indians from Nicaragua, as many as 14,000 since 1982, has corresponded to periods of heavy fighting and anti-subversive activity by the Nicaraguan military.

Of the estimated 19,000 refugees in Nicaragua, 18,000 of them Salvadorans, about 3,000 receive UNHCR assistance. The government grants refugees resident status, provides the same social services as are available to its own citizens, and has provided land for four rural cooperatives for Salvadorans. As a result, most of the refugees in Nicaragua are self-sufficient and integrated into society.



Panama

Despite its policy not to accept refugees for resettlement because of internal political and economic reasons, Panama has provided refuge to a wide variety of displaced persons and self-imposed exiles. Of 1,000 Salvadoran refugees in Panama, several hundred originally sponsored by the Panamanian government are now supporting themselves in an agricultural resettlement village. UNHCR is providing assistance toward agricultural self-sufficiency to some 450 Salvadorans and is helping an additional 300 in Panama City develop small businesses.

Panamanian officials have expressed growing concern about the "immigration bomb" facing the country. While pledging to relocate Central American refugees to underpopulated parts of Panama, Panamanian military authorities said in November 1983 that steps were being taken to prevent Nicaraguan refugees from entering Panama.

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Iran

Iran is both a nation of major emigration and of asylum. The 1979 revolution against the Shah, the war with Iraq, and Iran's proximity to Afghanistan are all factors in the complex refugee situation it has both created and absorbed.

An undetermined number of Iranians, finding living conditions under the new regime dangerous, fled after the 1979 takeover of the country by the Shiite Moslem majority. Most are living in the Near East, Western Europe, and North America—some as refugees, some as asylees, some as "orbit cases" whom no country has been willing to formally admit.

300,000 Baha'is live in danger of persecution by the Shiite government for their religious beliefs. More than 150 have been executed since the revolution; thousands of others have been driven from homes and jobs. Many have left the country, of-

ten finding at least temporary refuge in Turkey and Pakistan.

Iran continues to provide asylum to large numbers of Afghans—estimates of their numbers range widely—between 500,000 and 1.8 million. In mid-1983 alone, a wave of 400,000 crossed into Iran as Soviet forces battled rebels.

Most Afghans become self-sufficient quickly in Iran. After one to four months in government-run transit shelters receiving health care and counseling, most are moved either to tent camps away from the border or to villages where they have relatives. UNHCR and the government have reached tentative agreement for providing special assistance to a small number with special problems.

Israel

Under the Law of Return, any Jew is entitled to Israeli citizenship. Over a million Jews—half the country's residents—are immigrants, many of whom could be considered refugees upon arrival there.

The number of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate has declined in the past few years: in 1983, just over 1000 received exit visas from the USSR. Only 400 arrived in Israel, the rest choosing resettlement in other countries.

In 1983, 16,000 persons immigrated to Israel, including 2,000 from Eastern Europe; 3,000 from Latin America; 3,000 from the U.S. and Canada; and 4,000 from Western Europe.

Jordan

Sixty percent of Jordan's population is made up of the one million Palestinian refugees living there, the largest refugee population in the Middle East. Of those, over 775,000 were registered with UNRWA in June 1984. The remainder have entered unofficially from the West Bank.

Jordan is the only nation in the Middle East to grant permanent residence and citizenship to Palestinians. As a result, most work and are self-supporting. Still, the tensions created by their presence and the cost—over \$30 million was spent by the government in 1983 to provide

for the 238,000 in camps—have been a burden on the country. UNRWA has been the major source of aid to those in camps.

Lebanon

The presence of 258,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continues to create a dangerous political situation for the entire country. Fighting continued in 1983 and early 1984 in the southern provinces, cutting the refugees off from aid and supplies from the north.

In the aftermath of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which resulted in major casualties to both civilian and refugee populations, the government is trying to control its foreign population more strictly. It is also more reluctant to accept new refugees who might further incite violence and displacement of its own citizens. It is estimated that over 117,000 families, or 600,000 people, have been uprooted since September 1983.

The United National Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) coordinates almost all aid to victims in Lebanon. Over 256,000 were registered with UNRWA officially, and 100,000 Palestinian refugees are probably undocumented.

Because of the fighting in 1983, UNRWA used a special fund of \$53 million for additional emergency needs, beyond its \$26 million operating budget.

Pakistan

Pakistan continues to welcome with widely praised generosity the 2.9 million Afghan refugees estimated to have fled to that country since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

While the number of refugees—the largest in the world—appears to have stabilized, Soviet attacks against civilians keep the number high and prevent any hope for their repatriation in the near future. UNHCR, in its 1984 assistance plans, estimated 2.3 million persons would need aid.

The Pakistani government bears heavy financial and administrative burdens well. Refugees may work and move about without restriction.



As many as half of the adult males have found jobs in Pakistan.

Three-quarters of the refugee population is made up of women and children. Most live in about 340 UNHCR-supported villages spread across the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Many Afghans are ethnic Pathan, sharing language

and Muslim religion with the Pakistani Pathans living near the border. As their ancestors did, these refugees blend into village life and economy among their Pakistani kinsmen.

However, the seemingly intractable nature of the dispute in their homeland has dangerous implications both in terms of fostering de-

pendency among refugees and allowing frictions with Pakistanis to develop.

International aid to the refugees has begun to focus on projects encouraging self-reliance and stability. In 1984, UNHCR and the World Bank began a series of road building and reforestation projects which

Tibet-in-Exile: A 25-Year Search for Freedom

Merlinda Fournier

They have been called among "the waiting people of our time . . . living a shadowy half-existence," these thousands of Tibetan refugees. Since this comment was made 25 years ago by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the West continues to identify Tibet with romanticism, mysticism, and snow-covered mountains. Within Tibet, however, an entire culture and a national identity have been decimated. Tibet-in-Exile, a self-sufficient government and society, has been formed by the 100,000 Tibetan refugees residing in various host countries (India—85,000; Nepal—10,000; Bhutan—3,000; Europe and U.S.—2,000).

Communist China invaded Tibet in September 1949 and in ten years its westward march and concurrent national unrest spread to Lhasa, Tibet's capital. On March 10, 1959, Chinese retaliation for massive demonstrations forced Tibet's ruler, the Dalai Lama, and 100,000 Tibetans to flee their homeland. A number of sources testify to China's total rape of Tibet. In fact, the United Nations has passed three resolutions—in 1959, 1961, and 1965—condemning the negation of human rights in Tibet.

Up to 1976, 44 revolts and 9 underground freedom movements were suppressed by the Chinese. However, after Mao's death, Peking's new leaders relaxed Chinese repression and instituted "delegation diplomacy." Through "fact-finding" delegations sent by the Dalai Lama, they proposed to facilitate the repatriation of the entire exile community. In particular, China is lobbying for the return of the Dalai Lama, who remains for them an international embarrassment and a political key to controlling unrest in the strategic plateau, which is one-fourth of China's landmass.

Upon arriving in India, the refugees faced not only congested housing, with poor sanitation and medical facilities, but also a radical change in climate and diet. Because they had been untouched by foreign influences inside Tibet, they suffered a traumatic shift in their cultural milieu. In these circumstances, TB and tropical diseases killed hundreds. The survivors dispersed to build government-sponsored highways throughout northern India. With international relief aid, agro-industrial settlements were formed and now number about 31. Other refugees, applying their native mercantilism, began peddling knitted goods in India's bazaars. The Tibetan sweater fad that swept India assured many of financial stability.

Shortly after the Tibetans' escape and acceptance into India, the Dalai Lama embarked on a visionary task to

maintain the refugees' cultural, social, and political identity. Dharamsala, an abandoned British hill station, became "Little Lhasa." The Dalai Lama gave education top priority, and the Tibetan Children's Village became the prototype of the 50 all-Tibetan schools now functioning. Tibetan Tantric Buddhism was preserved through the reestablishment of numerous institutions: the School of Buddhist Doctrine; JoKhang (Central Cathedral); replicas of their three great monasteries; and the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, where 40 percent of Tibet's unique literature has been collected.

Most notable has been the reconstitution of the government. A theocratic system has been transformed into a democracy with a new Draft Constitution (1963). Representatives are elected to the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies every three years, and voluntary taxes are paid to Dharamsala. Bureaus in New Delhi, New York, Switzerland, Kathmandu, and Tokyo have taken on embassy-like functions (although not officially recognized) of meeting with government officials and providing information. Because this self-determining Tibetan society exists, most refugees refuse citizenship in their host country.

A previously apolitical people (with hereditary rulership in their theocratic state), the Tibetans have experienced a steep rise in political consciousness and activities over the past five years. Among members of the Tibetan Youth Congress—a body of educated youth on which the refugee community is dependent for its evolving leadership—the battle cry has become "Rangzen," or "Tibetan independence." International awareness and recognition of the exiled government of Tibet is the first step that they seek.

India has viewed this new political voice with growing apprehension. For instance, sometime prior to the Seventh Summit of the Non-Aligned Nations in March 1983, Tibetan activists began to lobby for observer status, at least, at the conference and the inclusion of the "Question of Tibet" on the agenda. On the day before the summit, when it became evident that Tibetans would hold massive demonstrations to gain exposure for their demands, orders were issued by the Indian government prohibiting public gatherings for the duration of the conference. Small delegations of Tibetans throughout India were physically prevented by local authorities from boarding buses or trains bound for Delhi. Despite these precautions, some 2,000 refugees courted arrest in Delhi, and many individuals were jailed for the length of the summit. Another form of political silence imposed by the Indian government, reported in The New York Times in May 1984, has been its requirement that the Dalai Lama avoid political activity on

Merlinda Fournier, a freelance author and photographer, has spent several years studying the circumstances of Tibetan refugees.

would not only provide employment but stabilize the fragile ecology in heavily populated areas. The government planned in 1983 to transfer 100,000 refugees to the Punjab to relieve pressures in the North West Frontier Province created by overcrowding.

An estimated 25,000 Iranian refu-

gees also live in Pakistan; 1,500 or so decline aid. About one-third are Baha'is escaping religious persecution; others include young men escaping conscription in the Iranian military and political dissidents. UNHCR is responsible for their protection and care.

Syria

Almost 288,000 Palestinians have been given temporary asylum since 1948, creating a sensitive problem for the government. Over 232,000 have registered with UNRWA, which provides financial support—\$25 million in 1982. Seventy thousand are



Tibetan refugees live at Dharamsala, a center of culture and education for 85,000 Tibetans exiled in India. UNHCR

his periodic foreign visits.

Another confrontation between refugee nationalism and a host country occurred in Bhutan in the late 1960s. Although Bhutan and Tibet are close culturally, in religious beliefs and institutions, Bhutan has battled historically to maintain its independence from Tibetan suzerainty. Therefore, when Yangki, Tibetan mistress to the king of Bhutan, was convicted of an assassination attempt on the king's life in 1964, Bhutanese suspicions turned into an anti-Tibetan campaign. Then, in 1974, as Bhutan approached the coronation of a new king, charges of Tibetan subversion reemerged. During that period, there were some cases of refugee refoulement, a ban on refugee movements, and dispersions of settlements. Finally, in 1979, the National Assembly of Bhutan announced its decision to return to Chinese-occupied Tibet any refugees unwilling to accept Bhutanese citizenship. Some 1,000 Tibetans reluctantly accepted the change of citizenship, while the remainder posed a tactical problem for India, as it was pressured to intercede with Bhutan and to accept these additional refugees itself. Although Bhutan later postponed its deportation orders indefinitely, such an

open confrontation remains a possibility.

Solutions to such confrontations as those above are complicated by the fact that neither Bhutan nor India has signed the UN Convention or Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Further, these documents do not adequately cover the situation of cohesive refugee communities which refuse integration into their host countries and continue to struggle for national identity. International relief agencies, too, have not fully addressed such problems.

Tibetans have sought channels of communication whereby they can be accorded political voice in the international community. It is clear that they aim to achieve this voice peacefully and despite any imposed silence. They have designated this, their 25th year of exile, as the "International Year of Tibet," and are engaged in a concerted public relations campaign. As the Dalai Lama confided to me, "In case it may be necessary to stay on the outside of Tibet for another 20 or 30 years, we are well established. We can remain on the outside to make a voice for Tibetan freedom."



settled in UNRWA camps. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, over 33,000 Lebanese and Palestinians fled into Syria. A special emergency relief fund was established and, as none of the recent arrivals has been able to return to Lebanon, the program has been extended.

NORTH AMERICA

Canada

Canada continues a leader among nations contributing to international relief organizations and ranks high among numbers of refugees resettled per capita. Over 20,000 refugees were expected to be admitted to Canada during 1984 under its four general admissions categories: a government-sponsored admissions program, which sets an annual ceiling of refugees to be admitted, with the government meeting the cost of their resettlement; and a "designated-class" refugee program, for persons not precisely covered by the UN refugee definition, but who Canada feels are living in "refugee-like" situations (persons from Chile, El Salvador, Poland, and Uruguay are included).

Not counted against the ceilings are refugees for whom private sponsors agree to support resettlement. Special Humanitarian Programs include refugees who are considered victims of civil disturbances—as those in Iran, Lebanon, Poland, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Priority in these cases is given to family reunification, and refugees enter outside the refugee ceiling.

Canada's 1984 Refugee Plan emphasized the deteriorating situation in Central America, especially for Salvadorans. Of the 300 refugees entering from El Salvador last year, about half claimed to be torture victims. Canada operates a unique center in Toronto for the treatment of such persons.

United States

In 1983, the U.S. remained the world's largest contributor to organizations assisting refugees—giving

over \$270 million dollars—although on a per capita basis, five other countries rank higher. It also leads the world in the number of refugees resettled—over 659,000 from Southeast Asia alone since 1975.

The trend toward lower refugee admissions ceilings and smaller numbers of those actually resettled continued. In FY 1984, the proposed refugee resettlement ceiling was 72,000, compared with 90,000 in FY 1983. Actual numbers resettled in FY 1983 were only 60,600, compared with 97,000 arrivals in FY 1982—a 37 percent decline. The fact that fewer Southeast Asian refugees were being processed for settlement was seen as a reason for the decline.

Southeast Asians were the largest category of refugees accepted for resettlement, comprising 65 percent of

all resettled in 1983; 21 percent were from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, though numbers of Soviet Jews declined to half the number of the FY 1982 arrivals, as the Soviet government restricted emigration. Ethiopians made up the largest category of African refugees—2,600; Afghans made up the largest group of Near East refugee arrivals.

In mid-1984, both houses of the U.S. Congress had passed versions of a comprehensive immigration reform measure which would grant amnesty to certain undocumented aliens already in the country, tighten judicial review procedures for pending asylum cases, sanction employers who hire undocumented aliens, and limit the categories of relatives who could enter the U.S. to join family members.

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U.S. General Accounting Office. *Report to the Congress of the United States: Central American Refugees: Regional Conditions and Prospects and Potential Impact on the United States*. July 20, 1984.

Washington Area Group on Immigration Research. Statistical tables on Central American refugees and displaced persons. Photocopies. Washington, DC. March 1984.



Directory of Organizations

International Organizations

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), P.O. Box 100, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. Director: James Carlin. Representatives: New York—Richard Scott, 60 E. 42nd St., Suite 2122, New York, NY 10165. (212) 599-0440; California—William Anderson, Building 500, Rm. 42, Hamilton AFB, CA 94934. (415) 883-0561; Washington—Gretchen S. Brainerd, 1346 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 711, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 785-1909.

Established in 1951, arranges for processing and transportation of refugees to resettlement countries in cooperation with international organizations, governmental and nongovernmental agencies concerned with refugees. Implements programs for transfer of specialized human resources to developing countries.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 37-39 rue de Vermont, Case postale 96, CH-1211 Geneva 20 CIC, Switzerland. Secretary General: Dr. Elizabeth Winkler.

Links Catholic assistance agencies in both first asylum and refugee resettlement countries, providing logistical and sometimes financial support for their emigration processing activities. Since 1951, has administered a series of travel loan funds for refugees and migrants. Acts as Joint Voluntary Agency Representative in six countries. Administers the U.S. component of the Orderly Departure Program. Promotes local settlement activities through project assistance and training of refugee officers.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 17 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland.

Private Swiss organization that protects and helps civilian and military victims of armed conflicts worldwide. Includes medical aid, relief supplies, a tracing agency for missing persons, and a program of civilian internees and visitors to prisoners of war.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 13 Rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. 31 66 02 (Cable: VOLAG (Geneva), Telex: 22891 icva ch). Executive Director: Anthony Kozlowski.

Independent and neutral international association of voluntary agencies established in 1962 as a permanent liaison structure for consultation and cooperation. Presently composed of 60 international and national voluntary agencies.

International Disaster Institute, 85 Marylebone High St., London W1M 3DE, U.K. (Telephone: 01 935 0756, Telex: DISINST 21879.) Administrative Director: Christine Hogg.

Researches all aspects of disaster relief and management, including refugee communities. Runs workshops, briefing and training courses for field staff, and acts as an information center. Also publishes reports; the quarterly newsletter, *IDI News*; and the quarterly journal, *Disasters*. Has set up a Food Emergencies Research Unit in association with the Nutrition Department of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

International Refugee Integration Resource Center (IRIRC), 5-7 av. de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. (Telephone: 022/31 02 61.)

International information and documentation center concerning resettlement and integration of refugees; publisher of *Refugee Abstracts*; establishing a computerized information data bank for external access covering refugee origins, exodus, asylum, resettlement, and integration. A project of UNHCR, the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 17 chemin des Crêts, P.O. Box 276, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. 60 E. 42nd St., Suite 1438, New York, NY 10165. (212) 661-5714. Secretary-General: Hans Hoegh.

Coordinates international Red Cross relief actions on behalf of refugees and displaced persons and in other emergency situations.

Minority Rights Group, 36 Craven St., London WC2N 5NG, U.K. (01) 930-6659. Director: Ben Whitaker. New York Branch: Sue Rolf, 35 Claremont Ave., Suite 4S, New York, NY 10027. (212) 864-7986.

International human rights information and education body. Publishes reports on minority groups worldwide.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palais Je Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. High Commissioner: Poul Hartling. Regional Office: UN Headquarters, Rm. C-301, UN Bldg., New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-7600. Regional Office: UNHCR, 1785 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 387-8546.

Established in 1951 to provide international protection to refugees who fall within the scope of its statute and to seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. Also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons in accordance with various subsequent General Assembly resolutions. Representation in some 80 countries.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 866 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-1234. Executive Director: James Grant.

Since 1946, has cooperated with developing countries in providing child assistance programs involving nutrition, primary health care, water and sanitation, and education. Provides humanitarian assistance to emergency victims of natural and man-made disasters.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Vienna International Centre, Box 700, A1400 Vienna, Austria. Commissioner-General: Olof Rydbeck. New York Liaison Office: John Miles, UN Bldg., Rm. 937, New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-4214.

Since 1950, has provided assistance to registered Palestinian refugees, now numbering almost two million, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Offers basic health

and relief services to eligible refugees, education services to children up to the lower secondary level, and vocational or teacher training centers.

U.S. Government Offices

Department of Education, Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs, Refugee Children Assistance Staff, Reporters Building, 400 Maryland Ave. SW, Suite 421, Washington, DC 20202. (202) 732-1842. Branch Chief: James H. Lockhart.

Administers federal grants to states for educational services to refugee and entrant children in public and private (nonprofit) local schools.

Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 330 C St. SW, Room 1229, Washington, DC 20201. (202) 245-0418. Director: Philip Hawkes.

Provides assistance to refugees after initial placements in U.S. communities with federal funding through existing federal programs which are administered by states.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 425 E St. NW, Washington, DC 20530. (202) 633-2000. Commissioner: Alan C. Nelson.

Administers immigration and naturalization laws relating to the admission, exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens.

Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Room 5214, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 632-5822. Director: James N. Purcell, Jr.

Formulates policy for and directs U.S. refugee and migration programs; assists refugees en route and during reception and placement in the U.S.

House Judiciary Committee, 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. (202) 225-3951. Chairman: Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law Chairman: Romano L. Mazzoli.

Studies and makes recommendations on immigration and naturalization, citizenship, admission of refugees, treaties and international agreements, and other appropriate matters.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, (S/R) Rm. 7526, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 632-3964. Coordinator: Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas.

Formulates policy and plans for U.S. refugee and migration programs; acts as clearinghouse for information on refugee affairs.

Senate Judiciary Committee, 226 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-5225. Chairman: Strom Thurmond, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy Chairman: Alan K. Simpson.

Studies and makes recommendations on the problems of refugees; has jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization legislation.



U.S. Resettlement Agencies

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies that participate in programs to resettle refugees. Readers may contact such agencies for information on sponsorship.

American Council for Nationalities Service, 20 W. 40th St., New York, NY 10018. (212) 398-9142. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein.

Since 1975, actively engaged in the resettlement of refugees and entrants from Indochina, Cuba, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia and other African countries. The U.S. Committee for Refugees is an ACNS public information program (see separate entry). ACNS publications include *Interpreter Releases*, a comprehensive weekly immigration law newsletter, and *Refugee Reports*, a monthly newsletter covering all aspects of refugee resettlement.

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, 1790 Broadway, Room 710, New York, NY 10019. (212) 265-1919. President: Dr. Jan Papanek.

Organized in 1948 to help resettle Czechoslovak and Central and Eastern European refugees. Since 1975, AFCE has participated in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement, City of 10,000 Buddhas, Box 217, Talmage, CA 95481. (707) 468-9155. Executive Director: Bhikshu Heng Ch'i.

Composed of Buddhist organizations and Asian-American civic associations in the U.S. Resettles Indochinese refugees and operates an English language and acculturation training program for newly arrived refugees.

Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2164. Director: Dale S. de Haan.

Relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches. Provides refugee and first asylum services in the U.S. and responds to human need around the world. Works closely with regional ecumenical colleague agencies, including the World Council of Churches.

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Inc. (HIAS), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-6800. Executive Vice President: Karl D. Zukerman.

The refugee and migration agency of the organized American Jewish community. Assists Jewish refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Also assists Indochinese, Ethiopian, Afghan, and other non-Jewish refugees through programs in cooperation with the U.S. government. Global network of offices and affiliated organizations in 47 countries on six continents. Provides for pre-migration planning, visa documentation, reception, transport, etc.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Executive Director: Charles Sternberg.

Nonsectarian, nonpartisan voluntary agency providing relief and resettlement services for refugees and displaced victims of war.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service/Lutheran Council in the U.S.A., 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. (800) 223-7656. Director: Ingrid Walter. Director for Policy and Program: The Rev. Dr. Donald H. Larsen.

Provides a full range of services to refugees and their sponsors from pre-arrival through initial resettlement, with a nationwide network of local offices, congregations, and community groups. Also provides immigration counseling. Since World War II, has resettled refugees from Eastern Europe, Indochina, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa on behalf of Lutheran church bodies in the U.S.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS), United States Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 659-6618. Executive Director: John McCarthy.

Responsible for all immigrant, migrant, and refugee activities conducted by the Catholic Church in the U.S. Coordinates a national network of over 180 diocesan refugee resettlement offices and 40 local immigration offices. Works with public and private sector agencies to resettle and help assimilate individuals and families in American society.

The Presiding Bishop's Fund For World Relief/Episcopal Church, 815 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-9454 or 55. Executive Director: The Reverend Canon Samir J. Habiby, D.D. Assistant Director for Migration Affairs: Marion M. Dawson (Mrs. Robert J.).

Official channel through which the Episcopal Church responds to human need around the world, providing funding for Episcopal, Anglican, and ecumenical projects in relief, rehabilitation, development, and refugee migration. Conducts a program for refugee resettlement in the U.S. through Episcopal dioceses.

Rav Tov, Inc., International Jewish Rescue Organization, 125 Heyward St., Brooklyn, NY 11206. (212) 875-8300. Executive Director: Rabbi David Niederman.

Through its network of overseas offices, has provided pre-migration planning, visa documentation, care and maintenance, and medical assistance to thousands of refugees while in transit. In countries of resettlement, provides a full range of services including reception, transportation, housing, medical care, language training, employment counseling, and maintenance assistance.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., 250 W. 57th St., Suite 1101, New York, NY 10107-0144. (212) 247-2922. Executive Director: Teymuraz Bagration.

Founded in 1939 to assist Russian refugees. Scope has broadened to assist other refugees. Has a cultural center and field and regional offices in the U.S., operational offices in Europe and Latin America, and correspondents in the Middle East.

World Relief/Refugee Services Division: National Association of Evangelicals, P.O. Box WRC, Nyack, NY 10960. (914) 268-4135, (800) 431-2808. Associate Executive Director for Refugee Services Division: Donald Bjork.

Provides comprehensive refugee services through an international network of offices, including both re-

gional and satellite offices in the U.S. Overseas, provides relief and development assistance in countries of first asylum. Domestically, assists sponsoring churches, community groups, families, and individuals from prearrival through initial resettlement of Indochinese, Afghan, African, and Eastern European refugees. Provides ongoing services to Cuban and Haitian entrants, other refugee communities, and ethnic churches. Coordinates other refugee-related services in some localities.

U.S. Aid & Information Organizations

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies and human rights and educational organizations that provide assistance to or information about refugees.

Afghan Community in America, 139-15 95th Ave., Jamaica, NY 11435. (212) 658-3737. Chairman: Habib Mayar.

Provides nonmilitary assistance to those made needy by the present war in Afghanistan. Solicits contributions and gifts of any kind.

Afghanistan Relief Committee, Inc., 345 Park Ave., Suite 4100, New York, NY 10154. (212) 355-2931. Executive Director: Jenik Radon.

Provides charitable, educational, humanitarian, and benevolent assistance to the people of Afghanistan wherever they are located, either directly or through organizations with similar purposes. Solicits funds and in-kind medical donations.

Africare, Inc., 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 800, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 462-3614. Executive Director: C. Payne Lucas.

Carries out more than 30 development assistance projects in Africa, including supporting water supply systems and food production, health care and sanitation, agriculture, construction, and refugee assistance in Somalia.

Aid for Afghan Refugees (AFAR), 1052 Oak St., San Francisco, CA 94117. (415) 863-1450. Executive Director: John Schaecher.

A group of Americans and Afghans organized to raise money for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to raise the awareness of Americans about the Afghan refugee situation.

Alien Rights Law Project, 1400 Eye St., NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 682-5900. Director: Carolyn Waller.

Begun in 1978 by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the project provides legal assistance to aliens, focusing on those cases where aliens suffer discrimination or are deprived of civil rights because of immigration status.

American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210. Executive Director: Leon O. Marion.

Established in 1943 to provide a means for consultation, coordination, and planning to assure the maximum effective use of contributions of the American community for the assistance of people overseas. Its



Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs coordinates plans and activities for refugee assistance at home and abroad. Voluntary agencies in refugee resettlement are members of the committee.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (215) 241-7000. Executive Secretary: Asia Bennett.

Quaker organization that provides food, shelter, and supplies, especially in response to needs created by war, disaster, and gross violations of human rights, where provision of relief may lead to constructive community development.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., 60 E. 42nd St., New York, NY 10165. (212) 687-6200. World Director: Ralph I. Goldman.

Established in 1914, serves as the overseas arm of the organized American Jewish community and provides for the rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of Jewish communities around the world. Current programs in more than 30 countries are largely funded by the campaigns of the United Jewish Appeal. Nonsectarian activities have benefited people in Thailand, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Lebanon, and elsewhere.

American Jewish Philanthropic Fund, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. President: Charles J. Tanenbaum.

Provides relief, resettlement, and retraining services to Jewish refugees in Europe and the U.S. through programs administered by the International Rescue Committee.

American National Red Cross, 17th & D Sts. NW, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 737-8300. President: Richard Schubert. Refugee Affairs and Tracing Service: Thora Frank. (202) 639-3624.

Assists refugees in cooperation with other National Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross Societies. Assists refugees in locating missing family members through its international tracing service. Also provides guidance and assistance in reuniting refugee families.

American Refugee Committee, Headquarters: 2110 Nicollet Ave., Suite 210, Minneapolis, MN 55404. (612) 872-7060. Chicago Office: 317 Howard St., Evanston, IL 60202. (312) 328-1620. Executive Director: Stanley B. Breen. Director: Phyllis Handelman.

Works with Indochinese refugees both in the U.S. and in refugee camps in Southeast Asia. Sends medical teams to refugee camps in Thailand and Cambodia. Participates in resettlement of Indochinese by using returned medical volunteers in creative domestic programs.

CARE, 660 First Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-3110. Executive Director: Dr. Philip Johnston.

An international aid and self-help development organization. Responds to needs of refugees in emergency situations through various repatriation and camp feeding programs and implements longer-term development programs to improve refugee living conditions and facilitate self-sufficiency. Has ongoing programs in Sudan, Chad, Somalia, and Thailand. CARE's long-term programming for Somalia and Sudan includes reforestation, water supply, and cookstove projects.

Catholic Relief Services-USCC (CRS), 1101 First Ave., New York, NY 10022. (212) 838-4700. Executive Director: Mr. Lawrence A. Pezzullo.

Overseas relief and development agency of the American Catholic Community. Active in 75 countries with nutrition, community development, self-sufficiency, emergency relief, refugee aid and rehabilitation projects. Major refugee foci this year are drought-affected Africa, Pakistan, Thailand, and Central America.

Center for Applied Linguistics, 3520 Prospect St. NW, Washington, DC 20007. (202) 298-9292. Director: G. Richard Tucker.

Offers refugee education guides, including a bibliography of teaching materials and dictionaries, through the ERIC system's Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics. Provides language and cultural orientation information and assistance for a fee. Under a cooperative agreement with the Department of State, CAL operates the Refugee Service Center, with offices in Manila and Washington, DC. The Manila office serves the testing, materials, and information needs of the State Department's intensive training programs in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Sudan. The Washington office acts as liaison between the overseas programs and U.S. service providers.

Cultural Survival, Inc., 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-2562. President: David Maybury-Lewis.

Provides research and analysis concerning the survival of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. Examines ethnic persecution as cause of refugee flows. Involved in maintaining the land and health care necessary for the survival of threatened groups.

Direct Relief International, P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (805) 687-3694. Executive Director: Dennis Karzag.

Receives and donates contributions of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment to assist needy health facilities in medically less developed areas of the world, as well as refugees and other victims of natural disaster and civil strife. Recruits, screens, and arranges assignments for volunteer doctors, nurses, and related personnel in these medically underserved locations.

Emergency Relief Fund International, P.O. Box 7703, San Francisco, CA 94120. (415) 864-3734. Executive Director: Woody Carter, Jr.

A Bay Area-based agency that relies on volunteer help and individual contributions to alleviate sickness and sufferings around the world. Nonsectarian, nonpartisan, with emphasis on medical assistance and aid to children. Current projects in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East.

Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., P.O. Box 1180, Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10163. (212) 866-4293. Executive Secretary: Tesfa A. Seyoum.

Founded in 1976, aids Eritreans displaced as a result of war and natural disaster, with major focus on emergency and development project assistance through the Eritrean Relief Association, based in Sudan. Program of assistance includes funds and material aid for food, medicine, clothing, and the provision of education in food production and agriculture.

The Experiment in International Living (EIL), Projects and Grants Division, Kipling Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301. (802) 257-4628. Southeast Asia Programs Director: Claude Pepin.

As a member of a consortium of Save the Children Federation and World Education, EIL offers English as a Second Language (ESL), Cultural Orientation (CO), and Pre-Employment Training (PET) in Panat Nikhom, Thailand, and Galang, Indonesia, to assist adult Indochinese refugees in becoming self-sufficient as soon as possible upon their arrival in the U.S.

Freedom House, 20 W. 40th St., New York, NY 10018. (212) 730-7744. Executive Director: Leonard R. Sussman.

Publishes a survey of freedom; distributes books to students in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords; publishes writing from individuals in countries where there is oppression; and has information and analysis programs on the Caribbean Basin, Afghanistan, Poland, and other countries.

Grassroots International, P.O. Box 312, Cambridge, MA 02139. (617) 497-9180.

A nonprofit agency which channels relief and development supplies to famine victims. In conjunction with the Eritrean Relief Association and the Relief Society of Tigray, it provides relief in the Horn of Africa; also supports self-help projects in Lebanon.

Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance (CIPRA), 307 ICC, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. (202) 625-3545. Director: Fr. Harold Bradley, S.J.

Objective is to influence the choices which will be made in developing a humane, reasonable, and enforceable immigration policy for the U.S. Sponsors lectures, seminars, an annual public meeting on refugee admissions and policy, and educational programs such as internships in refugee assistance, medicine, dental care, and nursing.

Holt International Children's Services, Inc., 1195 City View, Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402. (503) 687-2202. Executive Director: David H. Kim.

Provides assistance in the tracing and documentation for Amerasian children of Vietnam for the purpose of reunification with birth parents or resettlement in the U.S. under sponsorship, foster care, or adoption, as appropriate. In the past, provided care for unaccompanied minors in Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand.

Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 404, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 667-7810. Executive Director: Le Xuan Khoa.

Assists Southeast Asians in the U.S. to make the transition from the status of refugees to a viable and productive Asian-American minority. Major activities include public education and advocacy, leadership and citizenship development, capacity-building for Indochinese self-help organizations, and economic development.

International Christian Aid, A Division of Inter-Aid, 5189 Verdugo Way, Camarillo, CA 93010. (805) 987-8888. President: Joe Bass. Contact: Dale Dobson, Director of Communication.



Aids refugees, displaced persons, and disaster victims with food, clothing, shelter, self-help programs, medical assistance, community development, and emergency disaster aid.

Currently operating programs for refugees and displaced persons in Thailand, Kenya, Zaire, Uganda, Portugal, and Lebanon.

Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 36 W. 44th St., Room 914, New York, NY 10036. (212) 921-2160. Executive Director: Michael Posner.

Legal resource center for human rights activities. The Political Asylum Project provides legal representation for individual asylum applicants through the use of volunteer attorneys.

Lutheran World Relief, 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Norman E. Barth.

Serves as the overseas development and relief agency on behalf of most U.S. Lutherans to assist with long-term and emergency help for people, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Refugee assistance is often channeled through programs of Lutheran World Federation. Aid to Somali refugees is provided through the Inter-Church Response for the Horn of Africa in partnership with Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 S. 12th St., Akron, PA 17501. (717) 859-1151. Executive Secretary: Reg Toews.

Cooperative relief and service agency for Mennonites and Brethren in Christ in North America. Provides material aid and development assistance to refugees from man-made and natural disasters. Current work includes assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Lebanon. Arranges resettlement for refugees in the U.S. and Canada.

National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum, 533 8th St. SE, Washington, DC 20003. (202) 544-0004. President: Rick Swartz.

Stimulates and coordinates policy-focused working relationships and information networks spanning the range of issues and interest groups involved in immigration, refugees, and related foreign policy. Comprised of more than 90 groups, the Forum adopts no position on policy questions.

Operation California, 336 Foothill Rd., Beverly Hills, CA 90210. (213) 858-8184. Telex 295252 OPCAUR. Executive Director: Richard Walden.

A nonprofit organization founded in 1979. Objectives are to collect and transport high-priority emergency relief supplies to areas of need. Has been active in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Lebanon, and Poland.

Oxfam America, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116. (617) 482-1211. Executive Director: Joe Short.

Funds small-scale agricultural and technical assistance projects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America de-

signed to increase self-reliance and promote lasting economic and social development. Also develops educational programs for Americans.

Polish-American Immigration and Relief Committee, 119 East 15th St., New York, NY 10003. (212) 254-2240. Executive Vice President: Janusz Krzyzanowski.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1947 to help displaced persons and political refugees. Field offices in Europe. Activities include resettlement, adjustment of status, family reunification, and social services.

Refugee Materials Center, U.S. Department of Education, 324 E. 11th St., 9th Floor, Kansas City, MO 64106. (816) 374-2276.

Provides bibliographies of free educational and resettlement materials for refugees.

Refugee Policy Group (RPG), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 387-3015. Executive Director: Dennis Gallagher.

Serves as an independent center of policy analysis and research on domestic and international refugee issues. Houses a refugee resource library and provides auspices for policy analysts, researchers, and program developers to meet and conduct their work.

The Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO), 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 833-5646.

Provides relief and assistance within its capabilities to refugees anywhere in the world.

Save the Children Federation, Inc., 54 Wilton Rd., Westport, CT 06880. (203) 226-7272. President: David L. Guyer.

Provides humanitarian aid with an emphasis on making life as normal as possible under the adverse conditions to which refugees from political strife or natural disaster are exposed. Education, health maintenance, potable water supply, sanitation, family gardens, and social services are all components of its program in the refugee camps in Thailand, Indonesia, and Somalia. Organizes language and cultural orientation classes for U.S.-bound refugees.

Spanish Refugee Aid, a division of the International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Director: Margaret Childers.

Founded in 1953 to aid refugees from the Spanish Civil War, 25,000 of whom remained in France. Provides financial and counseling assistance to the aged and sick.

Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH), American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc. 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210.

Serves as a center of information on the socioeconomic development programs abroad of U.S. nonprofit organizations, including voluntary agencies, church missions, and foundations. Issues publications and responds to inquiries.

United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, Inc., 2558 W. 69th St., Chicago, IL 60629. (312) 776-7582. President: Mary P. Rudis.

Nonsectarian voluntary organization founded in 1944 to help political refugees and displaced persons. Provides immigrant relief, resettlement, rehabilitation, and social welfare services, educational aid, and assistance to the needy.

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 20 W. 40th St., New York, NY 10018. (212) 398-9142. 815 15th St. NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 667-0782. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein. Director: Roger P. Winter.

Public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Issues publications and provides information about refugees worldwide. Participates actively as refugee advocate in development of U.S. policy with respect to refugees in U.S. and abroad. Supports specialized UN agencies working to alleviate world refugee problems.

U.S. Committee for Somali Refugee Relief, Inc., 1900 L St. NW, Suite 707, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 833-9542. Director: Martin R. Ganzglass.

Formed in 1979. Major goals are to raise money to provide medicine and related medical supplies to refugees in Somalia, publicize the plight of refugees there, and bring about greater awareness that Somalia has Africa's largest refugee population.

U.S. Committee for UNICEF, 331 E. 38th St., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-5522. President: James R. Sheffield.

Established in 1947, informs Americans about UNICEF's efforts to meet the needs of the developing world's children and raises funds for UNICEF through greeting card sales, group fund-raising events, direct contributions, and special events.

World Vision International, 919 W. Huntington Dr., Monrovia, CA 91016. (213) 357-7979. President: Dr. Ted W. Engstrom.

Founded in 1950. A Christian humanitarian organization active in 85 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the South Pacific, and U.S. Involved chiefly in community development, emergency relief, child care, and Christian outreach programs.

World Concern International, P.O. Box 33000, 19303 Fremont Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98133. (206) 546-7201. President: Arthur L. Beals. Refugee Director: Peter Bylsma.

Provides emergency relief and long-term development assistance to refugees in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Provides financial grants, emergency supplies, medicine shipments, medical teams, public health workers, and economic development assistance. Can respond quickly to developing situations.

YMCA Refugee Resettlement Services, 101 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, IL 60606. (312) 977-0031. Director: Boris Kazimiroff.

Directs national YMCA services for refugees. Acts as liaison for local YMCAs. Cooperates with other national voluntary agencies and appropriate government agencies.



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Further information about the world refugee situation may be obtained from:

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 20 West 40th St., New York, NY 10018 (212) 398-9142; or 815 15th St. NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 667-0782; or from one of the following local agencies affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service:

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Albany, NY 12207
(518) 436-9741

BINGHAMTON

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BUFFALO

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